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SUMMARY OF ARGU M ENT 
The Plaintifrs are not asserting the claims made in the fifth , sixth, and seventh causes 
against the city. These causes of action are specifically reserved against the RDA. 
The Plaintiffs' claims from equitable relief ari se from three sources. The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionali zed Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000 ee, ("RLU IPA") RLUIP A protects 
against governments rrorn implementing a land use regulation that discriminates against any 
\ '111 3 Jet) 
church on the basis of religion or religious denomination. Or unreasonably limits religious 
assemblies in a jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend these provisions of RLU IP A impose liability 
without the need to have a pm1icular piece of propel1y at issue and that administrative remedies 
need not be followed when they have not been "available [to the Mission] without discrimination 
or unfair delay." 
The Missions equitable claim under the Utah Constitution are properly before this court. 
Notwithstanding the Mission did not appeal the 1999 decision of the Plmming and Zoning 
Commission and Board Adjustments, equitable relief remains appropriate on the grounds of (1) 
the Mission was not a party to the Board of Adjustments ruling, (2) thee Mission had already 
challenged on constitutional grounds with a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary 
restraining order unconstitutional aspects of the conditional use process associated with the 
Mission, (3) futility, and (4) the occun-ence of actionable events since 1999. The equal 
opportunity establishment clause analysis from Snvder v. Citv o(Murrav as well as the strict 
scrutiny analysis recently suggested in dicta lw f"11e Utah Supreme C0U11 Customary practi ces of 
the City that are contrary to a facial reading of ord1l1Rnces also merit injunctive relief. 
Plaintiffs also have brought claims under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 rai sing a facial and as applied 
chall enge to va rious City ordinances. Claims under § 1983 do not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. The City's definition of place of worship and "accessory use . .. fo r 
religi ous worship" requires excessive entanglement of the PZD of what constitutcs religious 
worship. The use of defini tions by Salt Lake County and Brigham City so as not to require this 
conflict demonstrates that the City has not used the least restrictive means to achieve its zoning 
IX 
objectives. For similar reasons, the City's ordinances are void because they fa il to give proper 
notice to its meaning and administrators differ as to their application . FUl1hemlore, the zoning 
ad ministrator is given " unbridled discretion" in detenn ining what is a complete application for a 
conditional use permit. 
The Plainti ffs base damage claims under § 1983 on the City's facially unconstitutional 
ordinances, implementation and interpretation of the same by policy makers, and the creation of 
customs upholding unlawful interpretations and applications to the Plaintiff. The City' s of 
ordinances, in and of themselves, constitute policy for which a City maybe held liable when it 
does not conform with the requirements to the federal Constitution. Under City and State Law 
the City Attomey and Mayor are also policy makers for the City. The City Attomey, as the 
"chief legal offi cer" of the City and those who work under his direction establish policy through 
the criminal prosecution of Pastor Wilson, allowing and reviewing with approval decis ions by 
the City Administrator, Board of Adjustments, and other related matters it has served to impede 
and limit the "religious worship" of the Mission and Pastor Wilson. 
The Mayor, on the other hand, is "responsible" fo r supervising Administration and 
cnforcement of all laws in the City .... and administering and exercising control of all departments 
of the City. The City had a policy of di scouraging concentration of services availab le to the 
homeless in one geographical area of the City. This policy, as app li ed, brought abou t a 
concel1ed effort to remove the Mission from its premi ses, favoring the "religious worship" of 
pal1icipating Churches working with Interfaith. Even with a reversal of thi s policy, the present 
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administration has not facilitated the location of the Mission outside a classification as a 
"homeless shelter". 
Certain customs and policies were created and followed by the City Plmming and Zoning 
Department ("PZD"), all in violation of the constitutional rights of the Mission. Issuing letters of 
administration interpretation were issued without following the mandatory requirements of the 
ordinance was used to the detriment of the Mission. PZD staff (1) failed to follow mandatory 
ordinances and provide the Mission with the documents from the Community Council to sign, 
and (2) used discretionary authority, allowed in the application for a conditional use pennit and 
the Board of Adjustments appeal process to thwart rather than facilitate "religious worship" of 
the Mission, and (3) interpreted clear m1d vague ordinances to impede the religious worship of 
the Mission while favOling the "religious worship" of other entities than the Mission. 
The ongoing facially invalid standards and previous unlawful conduct "applied" to the 
Mission have caused the Mission and Pastor Wilson to impose "self censorship" on various 
aspecs of their "religious worship" until these matters are clarified . To the degree the facial 
chall enge to the City Ordinance on establishment clause or vagueness grounds are rejected in 
their facial "context", the same claims are also rai sed "as applied" context. As "applied" the 
City's practices with the Int erfaith Church constitutes improper delegation of civic authorit y to a 
religious entity. Thi s occurs when the City treats the Participating Church's serv ice to the 
homeless as coming within the practice and policy ofln terfaith without fUliher inspect ion, and 
allowing the pm1icipating churches to circumvent the administrative inter]Jretation or conditional 
XI 
use permi t process because they are affiliated with Interfaith. This fails the third prong of the 
United States Supreme Court Lemon tes t. 
In addition there has been objective favoring of other churches and religions when 
compared to how the City has treated the Mission. The Mission was subject to administration 
inspections whi le other participating Churches were not. The PZD did not require Zion's 
Lutheran Church to apply for or complete a substantial expansion of conditional use. None of 
the participating Churches were required to obtain a conditional use permit or at least an 
administrative ruling. The Mission was treated differently in terms of the City's presentation and 
procedures used in front of the Board of Adjustments, than was used at the Church of the 
Madeline or the Jewish Community Center. Finally, an administrative exception for the 
Summum religion was justified in p3li because of "free exercise of religion"; it was not apparent 
at anytime the Mission "free exercise of religion" was given equal consideration. 
These examples of di sparte treatment are considered together or indi vidually of violation 
of establishment clause as been demonstrating, favoring one perspective of "worship" as an 
"accessory use" over other perspect ivcs of other "religious worship" does not sati sfy the 
perspective of the objective observer who is familiar with the hi storical context of the 
governmcnt action and the implementation of government conduct. Witlloul question, any 
objective observer would understand the objections of the City actions, would to make "outsiders 
of non-adherents ." While in practice the restraints imposed on the Mission may reflect a secular 
intent to reign "not in my backyard" syndrome ("NIMBY"). RefelTing or favoring one religion 
xii 
or "the exp ression" of "religious worship" violates the establishment clause of the United States 
Consti tutian. 
The validity of Plaintiffs as "applied" challenge on vagueness grounds to various aspects 
of the City ' s Ordinances can be shown by the City's interpretation of its own ord inances .. For 
example, inconsistent or incomplete applications of what a "homeless shelter" was vis-a-vis a 
"place of worship" occurred on December 24, I 996, December 26, 1996, May 22, 1997, Apri l 
20, 1999, July 2, 1999, September 8, 2003, and either June 21,2004 or July ,2004. There 
was a significant difference in the perspective of different Zoning Administrators as to the 
application of various aspects of mandatory constraints on questions of administrative 
interpretati on, what kind of "change" in "use" from a prior proposal justified reconsideration of a 
determination of a Board of Adjustments rUling. Certain words and phrases remain standardless 
or difficult for even zoning administrators to understand. TIle interplay between "accessory use 
of a place of worship" and a "homeless shelter" were confusing to Randy Taylor. He was 
confused how homeless services could be paJi of a church, the distinction between a Mission and 
a church, and a church and various social service organizations. 
Because the Ci ty's conditional use ordinances have various aspects that provide zoning 
administrators with "unbridled discrction" and the City does not have time constraints for most 
of it s conduct, the past customary actions of the City have established a "prior restraint" on the 
Mission's and Pastor Wilson ' s "free exercise ofreligion". Ordinances and customary practices 
that all owed for overt or dislo,'uised di scrimination against the "religious worship" of the Mission 
had the effect of persecuting and oppressing the Mission and Pastor Wilson and their otherwise 
XIII 
lawful rel igious practices. All of the foregoing subjects the City ord inances, po li cies, practices, 
and customs to strict scrutiny, a standard the City cannot meet. The City's conduct cannot even 
meet a heightened equal protection standard applicable to regulation of more than economic 
interests. 
Damages allowed under § 1983 against a City are either nominal or compensatory. John 
Ravarino's testimony was limited in scope and its duration. Nonetheless, compensatory damages 
for non-economic damages are recoverable fo r both the Mission and Pastor Wilson. Even if the 
Mi ss ion fails in its proof of recoverable damages, it would still be entitled to nominal damages. 
Based on all of the foregoing, the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
I. DISPUTED AND OMITTED FACTS 
Pursuant to UTAH R. CIY. P. 7(c)(3)(B) , the Plaintiffs are choosing to contest various of 
the facts listed by the Ci ty as undi sputed as well as providing a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute that are not raised by the opposing party. 
A. Disputed Facts Claimed By the City 
I. Pl aintiffs are persons affiliated with the Salt Lake City Mission (hereinafter 
"Pl aintiffs" or the "Mi ssion"), a nondenominational religious b~·OUP who provide service 
primarily to the homeless and impoveri shed. (Deposition Exhibit 78; Appendix Exhibit 14; Salt 
Lake City Mi ssion web page, Appendix Exhibit A.) 
Disputed Fact #1: As a biblically based, Chri stian church, the Missi on provides both 
"religious" and related "services" to the homeless and others in the City. (City's Answer to 
XIV 
Second Amended Complaint '\I 9 at 2.) (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 19:1-15, Appendix 
Exhibit 1.) 
The Church's religious mini stries and services [provide hope] to the homeless and 
other persons in the City in need of the blessings and assurances avai lable from 
the teachings of the gospel of Jesus Christ. The focal point of the church's 
ministries are suggested by the Biblical standard the "[e]ven as ye have done it 
unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." The Church's 
mission of saving souls has allowed many who suffer life-control ling problems 
and overwhelming cares of the world to overcome these temporal challenges by 
relying on the spiritual strength avai lable to those becoming a long-term disciple 
of Jesus Christ.I 
The Mission is different from other organizations such as the United Way and the 
American Red Cross that also provide services to the needy but are neither biblically based nor 
founded on Christian principles. (Deposition of 101m Ravarino, 108:21-24, Appendix Exhibi t 2) 
The Mission believes when it follows these principles it is acting for God. (Deposition of Wayne 
Wilson,325: ,Appendix Exhibit I.) 
7. The Mission filed a claim for relocation expenses against the RDA. The 
Miss ion never filed any claim for relocation expenses against the City. (Deposition Exhibits 
19, 26.) 
Di sputed Fact #7: The Mission's claim for relocation expenses under the federal 
Unifoll11 Relocation Assistance Act was justifiably filed with the City on April 9, 200 1. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Missi on is withdrawing its claim for relocation 
expenses under the federa l URA against the City. All claims for the same are reserved as 
1 Verifi ed Complaint. September 9th, 1999 . Paragraph 8 
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against Defendant Salt Lake City Redevel opment Agency. Any damages regarding 
relocation are not waived as they pertain to the remain ing constitutional claims. 
The Mission also concedes that it filed no proof of claim under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63 -30-11 (1999). 
8. On several occasions, the Mission inquired about various possibilities for the 
relocation of its facility and was informed as to the process that would be required for such 
an application. (Deposition Exhibits 2 & 11.) 
Disputed Fact #8: The Mission asserts it either was not properly infonned or was 
informed of a process that, as app lied, discriminated against the Mi ssion. See Legal Analysis, 
Part ll T. B.2; and C, 80-82, inji-a, and attendant deposition" " 
9. The City also provided the Mission with blank application fonns . (Deposition 
Exhibits 63 & 64.) 
Disputed Fact #9 : At no time did the City provide the document that the Community 
Council was to sign for the Mission to return to the PZD after the Community COllllci l 
presentation was made. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 249:24-250: 2, Append ix Exhibit I .) 
The ~mpression given to Pastor Wilson that approval was required rather than merely 
prcscntation was never clarifi ed by the PDZ. The appearance of representatives from the 
Mayor's office and poli ce departmen t at various Community Council meetings support cd 
Pasto r Wi I son's understand ing. (See Omitted Facts ## 119, 122, 129, 134, 135, it?Fa) 
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10. On at least two occasions, pursuant to infoI1l1ation provided by the Mi ssion, 
the City has issued an administrative interpretat ion regarding the Mi ssion's proposed 
acti vities. (Deposition Exhibits 2 & 28.) 
Disputed Fact # 10: The Mission admits two letters dated Apri l 20, 1999, and 
September 14, 1999, labeled as an Administrative Interpretation that were issued to the Mi ssion. 
The Mission denies that the letters were issued according to the requirements of City ordinances. 
(See Omitted Facts ## 81,84, inJi'a.) 
11. The Mission proposed to move into a building located at 580 West 300 South. 
That building was located in zone 03. Based on the description of the uses of the building, the 
City detenllined that the Mission would be a Place of Worship, which was a permitted use in that 
zone, and a Homeless Shelter, which was a conditional use. (Deposition Exhibit 2.) 
Di sputed Fact # 11: The April 20, 1999, letter speaks for itself. The factual and legal 
infillllities of that letter are detailed in (See Omitted Facts ## 90, 93, 94, 99, 100, 102, in/i"a; 
Legal Analysis, Part, VI A. 8, pagel 07, inJi'a.) 
13. A pennitted use is one that is allowed merely by filing for a permit and meeting 
appli cable City codes. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, '13) 
Disputed Fact #13: The Mi ssion was not allowed to secure a pennit for a church in the 
D-3 Zone for the Cohen Building when it was entitled to one. (See Omitted Facts # 101, inJi'a; ~ A 
conditional use is determined by tile Pl anni ng Commission after consideration of an application, 
staff report, and after a public hearing where the applicant can speak and the community can 
speak. 
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A conditional use is a use which has potential adverse impacts upon the 
immediate neighborhood and the city as a whole. It requires a careful review of 
its location, design, configuration and special impact to detennine the desirability 
of allowing it on a particular site. Whether it is appropriate in a particular 
location requires a weighing, in each case, of the public need and benefit against 
the local impact, taking into account the applicant 's proposals for ameliorating 
any adverse impacts through special site planning, development techniques and 
contributions to the provision of public improvements, rights of way and services. 
Any applicant who seeks a conditional use pennit must appear before the affected 
neighborhood's community council. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, -,r 4) 
Di sputed Fact #14: The City's Planning and Zoning Department ("PZD") and the 
City Attorney's office applied this to the Mission as a pre-condition to accepting a 
conditional use appli cation. (See Omitted Facts, # 116, infra.) This was applied differently 
to the Mission than in certain cases to other churches and applicants. (See Omitted Facts, # 
118, infra.) 
14. Pursuant to City ordinances, the Mission was required to present its proposal 
for a conditi onal use pennit to the local Community Council to obtain non-binding input and 
recommendati ons. (19.. and Deposition Exhibit 76.) 
Di sputed Fact #15: The PZD and the City Attorney's offi ce applied this to the 
Mission as a pre-condition to accepting a condit ional lise application. (See Omitted Facts 
## 5, 7, 116, 122, infra.) This was appli ed differently to the Mission than in cert ain cases to 
other churches and applican ts. (See Omitted Facts, # 118 , infra.) 
16. Al l other app li cants for a place of worship have been required to comply with 
thi s process. (City Document 327 , Appendix Exhibi t H.) 
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Di sputed Fact #16 : Zion's Lutheran Church, the Salva ti on Anny, and Parti cipating 
Churches with the Salt Lake In terfaith Hospitality Network ("Interfaith") were not required 
to m eet these req uirements for conditional use penn its. (See Omitted Facts ## 88, 11 8, 132, 
infra.) 
19. Places of worship are allowed in Sal t Lake City as a matter of right in the 
foll owing zones: Commercial CB, CC, CS, CSHBD, CO; Downtown D-l , D-2, D-3, D-4; 
Gateway OMU; and Special Purpose RP, BP, I, UI, MU. These zones comprise approximately 
10.8% of the area of Salt Lake City (without including the City Creek area). (Affidavit of Cheri 
Coffey, ~ 6.) 
Disputed Fact #19: The City needs to clarify what was applicable in 1999 and at 
present, 2006, and the percentage of areas of the City covered at each time. 
20. Places of Worship are also all owed as a conditional use in all residential zones, in 
the Neighborhood Commercial zone (CN) and in the Light Industri al Zone (M-l). (Affidavit of 
Cheri Coffey, ~ 7.) 
Di spu ted Fact #20: The City needs to clarify what was applicable in 1999 and at 
present, 2006 and approximately the percentage of the area of Salt Lake City that this area 
compri ses at each time. 
21. Under Salt Lake Ci ty ordinances, a homeless shelter is classifi ed as a building or 
portion thereof in which sleeping accommodations are provided on an emergency basis for the 
temporarily homeless. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 8: 12-23; 34:23-24 .3. Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
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Disputed Fact #2 1: This is the definition of "homeless shelter" in the City Code that 
existed in 1999 and presently ex ists. As applied, however, alternate definitions have been used 
by reason of treating conduct that could be classified as a homeless shelter as an "accessory use 
. for religious worsh ip. " (See Omitted Facts # I , inji-a.) 
22. Homeless Shelters are allowed as a conditional use in the D-3 and the CG zoning 
di stri cts . Salt Lake City has not prohibited the location of homeless shelters in the City. The 
City has several operating homeless shelters. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, '1l 8. ) 
Di sputed Fact #22: The City needs to clarify that the City's classification of homel ess 
shelters as a conditional use was in effect in 1999 and remains the same in 2006. (See Omitted 
Facts ## 1,2, 12, in/i"a.) The City claimed in its answer to Interrogatory # 8 (of the set answered 
October 7,2005) that it did not "keep track of homeless shelters" (Appendix Exhibit 4.) (The 
intent of the request was to include, in pali, the li sting of all current locations classified as a 
"homeless shelter. ") The City's designated witnesses not only had no knowledge of the 
identificati on of a homeless shelter by admini strative rule from 1995-2005 (Deposition of Cheri 
Coffey 38: 12-16, Appendix Exhibit 4), but only one, the Road Home, was identified. (Deposition 
of Brent Wilde 51 :23-52:9, Appendix Exhibit 3.) Notwithstanding the foregoing, Paragraph 10 
of the Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey refers to City regu la tion of "all homeless shelters." The 
Mission's Final Set of Di scovery to the City defined three "homeless shelters" as being the three 
ent ities id entifi ed in the RDA Depot Distri ct Dcvelopment Plan, e.g. Travelers Aid Socicty 
(now, The Road Home), St. Vincent de Paul Center, and Salvation Army Thrift Shop and 
Kitchen. (Appendix Exhib it 17.) The City'S response indicated there had been thirty thousand 
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(30,000) call s to the police or appearances made by the police at these three "homeless shelters" 
in the City. (Appendix Exhib it 8, at 4.) If the City regulates these three and/or others, the City 
should be required to identify the same. 
23. At one time, City policy di scouraged the concentration of homeless shelters, 
substance abuse treatment centers and similar uses in the Downtown and Gateway area (the so 
called "moratorium"). However, the policy did not forbid such uses, provided that an applicant 
or the Mi ssion applied for a conditional use permit. (Deposition Exhibits 2, 49, 88, and 
Deposition of Randy Taylor, page 37.) 
Disputed Fact #23: As to homeless shelters, the City had such a policy in place at least 
as earl y as 1997 (see Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, March 16, 2006, ~_, Appendix Exhibit II.) 
and independent of the 1999 moratorium. On January 12, 1999, and again on February 10, 1999, 
the City adopted moratoria that prohibited the expansion of vatious types of treatment facilities 
as a principal or accessory use in any commercial downtown or Gateway di strict. (Deposition 
Exhibit 88 ; Appendix Exhibit 18; Appendix Exhibit 19.) Even though the moratori a did not 
address homel ess shelters as a separate classificati on, it was understood that the purpose of the 
moratoria was to stop the growth of homeless s11elters. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, _ :_ , 
Append ix Exhibit 5; Deposi tion of Brent Wilde _ :_ , Appendix Exhibit 3. ) On April 29, 1999, 
the Mi ssion had fil ed liti gat ion chall enging the reasons for the moratOli a and asserted the 
violation of its own constitutional ri ghts and those of others .' Because of pending liti gation, the 
real purpose of the moratoria was not disclosed by the staff of the PZD to those citizens they 
2 See Sal! Lake City's rvlemora nduJ11 to Di smi ss Second Amended Compla int, dated ___ , Appendix Exhibit 20. 
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worked with. (Deposition Exhibit # ; Appendix Exhibit 20; Deposition of Randy Taylor : 
_ ; Appendix Exhibit 5.) On June _, 1999, the City Council adop ted Reso lution _ _ _ 
whi ch made the provisions of the moratoria part of the City Code. (Deposition Exhibit 88, 
Appendix Exhibit 18.) 
Before and after the adoption of the moratOJia as City Code, the Cohen property that the 
Mi ssion desi red to locate on was in the D-3 zone and included in the area to which the moratoria 
appl ied . (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 47:24 - 50:21, Appendix Exhibit 3.) Had the Mission been 
understood to be only a church (or "place of worship") by the PZD, the Mission would have 
qualified for a building pennit as a pennitted use. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, _ -_ , Appendix 
Exhibit 3; Deposition of Randy Taylor, _ -_, Appendix Exhibit 5; Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, 
Appendix Exhibit 10.) 
Nonetheless, on April 20, 1999, Randy Taylor issued an unrequested "administrative 
interpretation" letter that found the Mission's use at the Cohen location constituted penni tted 
uses of a "place of worship," a "charity dining hall" and "social servi ce organization," and 
conditi onal uses of a "homeless shelter" and two of several types of "treatment facilit[iesJ ," 
which required licensure by the state. (Deposition Exhibit 2; -_, Appendix Exhibit IS. See 
definit ions beyond Exhibit 90, #1 Omitted facts) 
On Apri l 19, 1999, the State Depmiment of Human Services, Di vision of Licensing, 
notified the Mission that it was not subject to licensure. (Deposit ion Exhibi t Appendix 
Exhibit 16.) On April 2 1, 1999, the Mission sen t by facsimile a copy of the letter from the 
Division of Licensing to the PDZ and Mayor Corradini. (Affidavit of Philip Arena, ~ 9, 
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Appendix Exhibit 9.) Notwi thstanding the foregoing, on Aplil 21, 1999, Brent Wilde, Deputy 
Pl anning Director of the PZD, debated with Philip Arena of the Mission and claimed that all of 
the uses identifi ed in the Apri l 20, 1999, letter wou ld be appl icable to the Mission at the Cohen 
Property. (Deposition of Philip Arena _ :_, Appendix Exhibit 6; Affidavit of Philip Arena ~ 20; 
Appendix Exhibit 9.) 
In the April 20, 1999, administrative interpretation letter, c ity poli cy favoring the 
decentralization of services for the homeless was used as a basis to notify the Mission that PDZ 
staff would not be able to make a positive recommendation were the Mission to submit an 
application for a conditional use pennit regarding the Cohen property. (Deposition Exhibit 2; 
Appendix Exhibit 15 .) Because the Plalming Commission "usually" follows the 
recommendation of the staff, (Deposition of Cheri Coffey __ , Appendix Exhib it 4), or does so 
eighty-fi ve to ninety percent (85% - 90%) of the time, (Deposition of Randy Tayl or 44:3- 10, 
Appendix Exhibit 5) the "unwritten" but implemented City poli cy, aJUlounced in advance, of 
decentralization of services to the homeless would guarantee a negative recommendation by the 
staff regarding the proposed condi ti onal use and would al so result in a rejection of the proposal 
by the Planning Commission. See Omitted Facts ## 104, 147, inji-a . The Mission's li mited 
budget and other time constra ints would not allow investmcnt in an effort to secure a building 
PC1l11 it for a build ing for which the City had vo lunteered such an openly hostile assessment. 
(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '1'1 26, 28, 34, Appendix Exhibit 12.) Indeed, the unsolicited and 
unexplained offer to provide assistance to the Mission to relocate in the County (instead of 
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remain in the City), Deposition of Randy Taylor , Deposition Exhibit 5) made the Mi ssion 's 
eff'0I1 to stay seem futile from the outset. (Appendix Exhibit 15) 
24. Salt Lake City has regulated all homeless shelters, regardless of their ownership 
or affiliation. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, ~ 10.) 
Di sputed Fact #24: Salt Lake City has not regulated the Participating Churches whose 
conduct also meets the stated definition of homeless shellers as it has been applied to the 
Mission. See Omitted Facts ## 26-29, 34-42, 47, inji-o. Furthermore, the City has failed to 
disclose the location of the homeless shelters. See Disputed Fact # , supra. 
25. The regulation of homeless shelters is motivated by wholly secular concerns, not 
religious concems. (Deposition Exhibits 49,88.) 
Disputed Fact #25: The fact that the City has used "accessory use of ... religious 
worship" to allow Pmiicipating Churches to circumvent both the community council prc-
application involvement, the conditional use application process, and administrative regulati on 
issues associated with providing shelter or other care for the homeless, involves more than 
"wholly secular concerns." See Disputed Faets # ____ infi'a; Omitted Facts ##26- 28, 34, 35, 
4 1-43, infi ·a. 
28 . In gencral Places of Worship in.herently involve large numbers of people 
congregat in g together with the attendant noise and traffic. Such a use has the potential to have 
more negative impacts on residential neighborhoods and fewer impacts in the zones whcre 
Places of Worship are permitted as a matter of right. Thus, in many areas Places of Worship are 
..----
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a conditional use to allow the specifi c fact based determination of whether they are appropriate 
for that area, particularly residential areas. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, '1 9) 
Disputed Fact #28: This City ordinance was not in place pri or to April 12, 1995, when 
the Participating Churches with Interfaith were originally built. See Omitted Facts #2, infra. 
Interfaith was not fonnally operating until 1997. See Omitted Facts #36, infra. Building pern1its 
have been issued to ___ of seven parti cipating Interfaith churches for remodeling since 1995. 
(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~ , Appendix Exhibit 11.) Issuance ofa pennit means the property 
and uses were in confonnance with the City Code. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, _:_, Appendix 
3.) Without an administrative ruling or securing a conditional use pennit, the untracked and 
unacknowledged Participating Churches with Interfaith have received sLib siiento the benefit of a 
new (and surely not customary as to that church 's pre-1 995 conduct and worship, as required by 
the City Code's definition of "accessory use") "accessory use ... for reli gious worship" that 
expands a "grandfathered" conditional use without requiring the detailed req uirements and 
procedures to which the Mission has been subject. 
29. Pl aintiffs appl ied for and were heard regarding a cond itional use of the Rosewood 
Terrace propeliy where they wished to locate thcir Pl ace of Worship. (Deposition Exhibits 48, 
84, and Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, ~ 14 and the attachments thereto .) 
Disputed Fact #29: The Mission was heard but in a manner that depri ved it of due 
process of law and other concems outlined in its Motion for a temporary restraining order, 
including (1) use of the vote taken by the State Fair Park Community Counci l, (2) comparison of 
police calls to other churches with that of the Mission, (3) use of present internet speech site to 
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define future conduct, contrary to the application (see Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order, October 6, 1999, page 2) and (4) requiring the appearance before the Commiss ion when a 
secular boarding house would not have been required to appear. (Deposition Exhibit # 47; 
Appendix # 20; Deposition of Randy Taylor ,Appendix 5; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~ _, 
Appendix Exhibit 11.) 
The discretionary failure to notify the Mission that the cancellation of the Fairpark 
Community Council meeting did not prevent the filing of and beginning the application process 
(Deposition Exhibit 51; Appendix Exhibit 21; Deposition of Cheri Coffey _ :_, Appendix 
Exhibit 4) also damaged the Mission to the degree that the earlier initiation of the application 
process would have allowed both the PZD to take additional time to evaluate evidence it had 
received and allow time for the Mission to respond to and resolve with the City the pending legal 
and factua l disputes regarding both the nature of the content of the staff repOJi to the 
Commission as well as even the need to appear before the Commission. (Affidavit of Wayne 
Wilson , ,35, Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
30. On October 7, 1999, the City Planning Commission denied the Mi ss ion's 
applicat ion for a conditional use permit to relocate its facility to the Ro sewood Terrace 
Building. Pl aintiffs were not granted a conditional use at Rosewood Terrace because of the 
impact on the neighborhood and the inability to mitigate that impact. The Planning Commission 
determined that the neighborhood was too fragile to supp0I1 the activities proposed by the 
Missi on. The Commission determined that there were likely to be heavy impacts on the 
nei ghborhood from this proposed use. The Mission plan was to have 25 -3 0 residents on a semi-
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permanent basis in a boarding house at the site as well as to bus in up to 200 of the "homeless-
poor" at various times during the day for a variety of counseling, rehabilitation services, religious 
devotionals and chapel services. While it was felt that the Mission could control what went on in 
its building, it was detennined that it likely would not be able to control what went on outside. 
This was b ased on objective evidence. In its prior location the Mission had a history of at least 
58 police calls per year and as high as 122 calls per year. It was stated by plaintiffs that the 
Mission would be perfonning similar activities in the Rosewood Terrace location so it was 
rationally detennined that the Mission would bring with it this higher need for police 
intervention. This was of particular concern to the neighborhood surrounding Rosewood Terrace 
because they were trying to recover from activities which had required police in the past. The 
neighborhood included the Guadalupe neighborhood and the Fairpark community. Both 
communities were working on reviving from previous times of drug houses and high crime. The 
goal was to establ ish safe, stable and cohesive neighborhoods for which progress was being 
made. 1t was determined that the impact of the Mission would reverse that progress. Thus, the 
Planning Commission concluded that the need for the conditional use did not outweigh the 
potential impact on the community and it would not be possible to mitigate the detrimental 
impact that the Mission would impose upon that fragile neighborhood. (Salt Lake City Pl anning 
Commi ssi on Staff Report attached to the Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, and Deposition Exhibits 79 
& 84.) 
Disputed Fact #3 0: The Mi ssion does not di spute that the Planning Commission 
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denied the request. The minutes do not reflect the comments by counsel for the Mission 
objecting to being required to be there in the first place. (Affida vit of Matthew Hilton ~ _; 
Appendi x Exhibit II.) The Mission does dispute that the Planning Commiss ion made find ings of 
fact as required by City ordinance (Appendix Exhibit 23) or adopted the findings of the staff 
report (Deposi ti on Exhibit 84, Appendix Exhibit 22). Based on the foregoing, while the City 
may point to what could have been "substantial evidence" in the record, the Commission failed 
to ind icate it relied on the same. 
31. In September 1999, the Community Council filed an appea l chall enging the 
City's admini strative class ification of the Mission 's proposed activi ties. (Depositi on Exhibit 
55.) 
Di sputed Fact #3 1: On October 4, 1999, the PZD assisted the Chainnan of the 
Fairpark Community Council to file an appeal challenging the administrative class ification 
of the Mission as a "place of worship." (See Deposition Exhibit 55; Appendix Exhib it 25 ; 
Omitted Facts ## , inFa.) 
32. In connection with that appeal, the Mission received notice of, had the 
opportunity and, in fact, did present ev idence at the Board o f Adjustmcnt hearing. 
(Depos ition Exhibits 8 1 & 42 .) 
Di sput ed Fact #3 2: As any other ci ti zen, the Pl ainti ffs had the right to appear and 
present evidence fo r the Board 's considerati on. The Boa rd of Adjustmcnts also received 
irrelevant, negative infomlalion regarding the Mission at its Central C1u·istian Church location, 
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evidence that was promoted by City employees. See Omitted Fact ##134-135, irifi-a. Providing 
information is not outcome detemlinative. 
The notice sent to the Mission regarding the Board of Adjustments hearing included 
notice of the hearing, but not the staff report prepared by the City's staff for the Board of 
Adjustments. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 80:5-22, Appendix Exhibit 3.) The staff report by 
Merrill Nelson framed the issues for the defense of the appeal. (Deposition Exhibit _; 
Appendix Exhibit 26) The framing of the issues raised with the Board of Adjustments after an 
appeal has been made that places the Zoning Administrator in the position of defending that 
position mayor may not include consultation with the original entity or person who received the 
administrative deci sion. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 23:4-23, Appendix Exhibit 3.) The Mission 
was not consulted by the PZD regarding the framing of the issues on the appeal. (Affidavit of 
Wayne Wilson '1'143-45, Appendix Exhibit 12). 
How the City framed the issues for resolu tion by the Board of Adjustments could wel l 
have become outcome determin ative of tIle result of the appeal. For example, the Board of 
Adjustments did not address Randy Taylor's classification of the Mission's proposed 
"missionary training program" use as a "board ing house." However, the Board did find that 
the previous non-conforming use of the property continued as a non-conforming use. 
Furthermore, if the Mi ssion was really not a church as the Fairpark Community 
Council claimed, then the portion of the appli cation relevant to the non-conforming use 
would have been considered to be secular. If secular, a continuation of a non-conforming use 
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could be applied and a building pemlit issued to the Mission without a conditional use pemlit 
hearing. 
In add ition, the Board of Adjustments found the Mission to be a church or "place of 
worship." Had the City's practices regarding "accessory use" and the Participating Churches 
with Interfaith been disc losed to the Board by the City sta ff and/or counsel, an obvious 
excepti on in practice to what by ordinance was defined as "a homel ess shelter" would have 
been evident. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 44, Appendix Exhibit 12). Considering the 
naITow limitations Randy Taylor had placed on the Church's protecting the "homeless" only 
overnight when in "life threatening" situations, and limiting the Mission's advertising of the 
new loca ti on, the Board of Adjustments could well have detennined the proposed "use" 
similarly constituted an "accessory use" of a church rather than a "homeless shelter." See 
Omitted Facts ## , inji-a. 
In addition, the City did not notifY the Mission of (1) the appellant's October 27,1999, 
request to postpone the November 15, 1999, hearing (City 434; Appendix Exhibit 27), nor (2) 
the opt ion to appeal the Board of Adjustments rul ing within thirty (30) da ys after the 
decision was made (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, '1 43, Appendix Exhibit 12; Affidavit of 
Matthew Hilton ~ ,Appendix Exhibit I I ; Deposition Exhibit # ~ In addition, counsel 
for the Mission received a copy of the minutes of the November 15, 1999, meeting after the 
time for appeal had run. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~ ,Appendix Exhibit II.) 
As to why the Mission was not a pm1y to the appeal, see Legal Analysis, Pal1 III A2, 
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33. In November 1999, the Board of Adjustment held that the Mission's proposed 
activities constituted a place of worship and a homeless shelter. (Deposition Exhibit 42.) 
Disputed Fact #33: The Mission disputes that it was a party to the appeal or bound by 
the ruling. See Legal Analysis Part III A 2, infra. Because the City failed to follow its own 
mandatory ordinances regarding the issuance of an administrative interpretation, the letter issued 
September 14, 1999, was void as a denial of due process, leaving the Board without jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal. 
34. Plain tiffs did not timely appeal the Planning Commission's denial of the 
conditional use for the Rosewood Terrace location although they could have by appealing to the 
Land Use Appeals Board. After that the matter could have been appealed to the courts. 
(Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, ~ II.) 
Disputed Fact #34 : The Mission admits it did not appeal to the Land Use Appeals 
Board. To have clone so would have been futile for reasons cited in Legal Ana lysis, part III A 2 
b, infra. Exhaustion of remedies is not required by 42 U.S.c. § 1983. The Mission does not 
concede that it did not timely raise issues regarding the staff report of the Commission in 
sta te district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before the Commission hearing on October 7, 
1999 
35. The Mission did not file a timely appeal of the decision of tlle Planning 
Commission or the Board of Adjustment. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, '111) 
Disputed Fact #35: The Mission admi ts it did not appeal the decision of the 
Planning Commission to the Land Use Appeals Board. This is not relevant under 42 U.S.c. 
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§ 1983 . The Mission does not concede that it did not timely rai se issues regarding the same 
in sta te di strict court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
36. Pl ainti ffs had notice of and could have used the conditional use process for other 
locations. Although the Mi ss ion made several inqui ries to the City, it only filed one 
application with the City, seeking to relocate its facilities to the Rosewood Terrace Building 
loca ted at 158 North 600 West. (Deposition Exhib its 63, 64, Affidavit of Clleri Coffey, ~ 
IS.) 
Di sputed Fact #36: Plaintiffs contest the adequacy of th e notice they recei ved 
regarding the conditional use process , see Omitted Facts # __ , inji-a; Legal Analysis, Part 
_, pages _ - ._' infi'a , as well as its app lication to the Mission in an unlawfu l manner, see 
Omitted Facts # __ , inji-a; Legal Analysis, Part _, pages _ - _, il'zji'a. 
38. Plaintiffs ha ve not been fl agged in Salt Lake City computers as being targeted fo r 
ex tra scrutiny, it is not possible to flag persons or associations, only propeJiies can be fl agged. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 18:1 8-19:2; Depos ition of Roger Evans, 7:13-8:1, Appendix 
Exhibits D and E.) 
Disputcd Fact #38 : City staff gave instructions to flag the computer. (See Deposition 
Exhibit 12; Appendix Exhibit ) While witnesses may not recall the breadth of the "fl ag" written 
relative to the Mission's inquiry about the Andrews Avenue property, arising aft er October 26, 
1998, staff at the permit counter kllew on June 25, 1999, that the Mission cou ld not obtai n a 
pennit on the Cohen propeJ1y without clearance from Rand y Taylor, Zon ing Administrator. (See 
Deposition Exhib it __ ; Deposition of Randy Taylor 18: 15-20:4, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
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39. Plaintiffs ' proposal for the Rosewood Terrace building was, in part, a Place of 
Worship for people who did not live in that neighborhood, plaintiffs stated that they would be 
busing in most of the users of the building. (Deposition Exhibit 78.) 
Di sputed Fact #39 : The City ordinances do not restrict members of a congregation 
from only being within a certain radius of the church. Plaintiffs do not know what is meant by a 
"user" of the building but do not di spute homel ess persons would be bused in for meals and/or 
religious counseling. 
40. Ultimately, Plaintiffs relocated their Place of Worship, and carried out their 
proposed activities in conformity with their religious beliefs, in the Central Christian Church 
located at 370 East 300 South in Salt Lake City. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, page 267, 
Appendix Exhibit 1.) 
Di sputed Fact #40: The Mi ssion was unable to carryon its own worship services at the 
new location. (Deposition of Wayne Wil son, 170:20-25; 175:5,6, Appendix Exhibit 1). 
Notably, however, the Mission, staff, and volunteers were able to provide emergency overnigh t 
temporary housing for the homeless at the Central Ciu'istian Church at thi s site. (See Omitted 
Fact # __ ; A ffid avit of Wayne Wilson '148, Appendix Exhibit 12 ; Affidavit of Phil Arena '1 
, Appendix Exhibi t 9.) 
41. The zoning ordinances and tll eir regulation of temporary housing for the homeless 
have a secular PUlvose, to limit the impact on neighborhoods to a reasonable level. (Affid avit of 
Cheri Coffey, ' 112.) 
xxxiii 
Disputed Fact #41: The Pl aintiffs challenge thi s statement in that ( I) the City has 
fai led to keep track of (much less regulate) the Participating Churches with Interfaith (Deposition 
Exhib it, Appendix Exhibit __ and (2) whether or not allowing as applied use through the 
City ' s definiti on of "accessory use .. . of rel igious worship" qualifies as a secular purpose. See 
Legal Analysis, part _____ , inji-a. 
42. Several Salt Lake area churches participate in the Interfa ith Hospitality 
Network. (Deposition Exhibit 32.) 
Disputed Fact #42: For a li sting of those that host fami li es, see Omitted Fact # 
infra. Other churches in Salt Lake City also participate. (See __ ; Appendix Exhibit 28.) 
43. Those In terfaith Hospitality churches operate within certain guidelines. 
Pursuant to those guidelines, each church may house a maximum of 4-6 homeless fam il ies (a 
maximum of 16-20 persons) for one week, four or fi ve tim es a year on a rotating schedule. 
(l d.) 
Disputed Fact #43: The Mission acknowledges that th is is the standard recited by 
Interfaith as exi sting in 2003. It is not obvious that the same standard has always existed, 
e.g. six (6) churches rotating th irty-six (36) families during 1997 would have required more 
than fou r or five times a yea r. (Deposition Exhibit 32; Appendix Exhib it 29.) The Mission 
also observes that there are no inspection enforcement records from the Ci ty/Coun ty Health 
Department or the City that shows any in spection or confirmation of the stated levels of 
temporary serv ice were not exceeded or that the safety of the churches for overn igh t guests is 
maintained. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ,, _ , Appendix Exhib it 11.) 
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44 . The City is wi lling to allow the Mi ss ion or any other church to operate 
according to these same Interfaith Hospitality guidelines. (City Response to Request for 
Admission No.9, Appendix Exhibit 6.) 
Disputed Fact #44: The City 's bel ated proffer of pseudo-equality IS objectionable 
for several reasons. 
First, The Mission b elieves that being required to restri ct and redefine its religious 
mission to fit within secular categories of "use" that do not reflect its biblically based Mission is 
an affront to God. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 325: Appendix Exhibi t 1) 
Second, the City is willing to offer a standard to the Mission if the Mission will apply for 
it with the City when no Participating Church wi th Interfaith either (1) has been required to 
individually apply for the same, or (2) be subject to City regulation regarding the same. 
(Appendix Exhibit 8, Answers to InteITogatories , at .) 
Third, whi le perhaps based on "logical" assumptions, (Deposi tion of Brent Wilde __ , 
Appendix Exhibit 3.) the City's ad hoc determinations of what constitutes acceptab le amounts of 
the "religious worship" of a church by offering to allow the Mission to conform to the In terfaith 
"standard" ignores key aspects ofthe perspective as to thei r missions as a fun cti on of "religious 
worship" that add ress issues beyond numbers of people assisted and duration of stay. 
Interfaith and its Participating Churches serving the homeless "share our fa ith by actio n, 
not by words, bringing hope to those without." (Depos ition Exh ibit 32, Appendix Exhibi t 1) 
The Mission's religious convictions also illustrate that "faith without works is dead," (James 
2: 17), and offers a different perspective on what it means to "feed Jesus [and] clothe Jesus," 
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(Depos iti on of Wayne Wilson, 292: 1 2-1 5; 294:3-1 1; 303:23-225; 304:8-13, Appendix Exhibit 
I), believing "[eJven as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto 
me." (See Matthew 25: 40.)' 
The Interfaith guidelines operate not onl y in terms of numbers of homeless sheltered, 
and the duration of the stay, but also as to who is served. Interfaith only serves single or 
two-paren t fam ili es with children. The Mission serves families and individuals. Interfaith 
wi ll not serve those wi th addi ctions; the Mission will. In terfaith implicitly is understood to 
work only with residents of the City and Salt Lake Vall ey. (Depos itio n Exhibit 32; Appendix 
Exhibit ). The Mission serves local residents and those who are transient; taking the 
b ibl ical injunction "least of these, my brethren" quite literally. The Miss ion wi ll not turn 
away a homeless person in a life-threatening position (twenty degrees (20°) or below 
outside) when there are no other available opti ons in the City; Interfaith has no provision fo r 
such assistance. 
In addition, the Mission also has strongly resisted efforts to use government funding 
[or soc ial service providers. (Affidavit of Wayne WilSOll '1 54, Appendix Exhibi t 12.) Pastor 
Wi lson is of the understanding that Int erfaith accepts government ['unding to ass ist it in 
fuliilling its commendable efforts with the homeless . To imply or require affi liat ion with an 
enti ty that serves God and the homeless with Caesar rather tha n separating the two is not pa rt 
of the Chr istian mission of the Mission. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 54, Appendix Exhibit 
12.) 
'Verified Complaint, September 8, 1999, ~ 8. 
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The Miss ion does not facially object to operating within limits declared applicable to 
certain uses and properties by fire, health, and related authorities as well as objective, 
definitive criteria articulated in City zoning regulations that are equally applied. (Deposition 
of Wayne Wilson, 482:21-24; Appendix Exhibit 1.) 
45. The Mission has acknowledged that it does not intend to operate its activities 
within those Interfaith Hospitality guidelines. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, pp. 390-95; 
Appendix Exhibit .) 
Di sputed Fact #45: The Interfaith guidelines regulate far more than objective 
criteria as to the number of overnight homeless sheltered, the duration of the assistance, and 
who are "acceptable" homeless. See and incorporate response as Di sputed Fact # 43, supra. 
47. Virtually all of the events described in the Mission's Second Amended 
Complaint occurred before September 2000. (Second Amended Complaint, ~~ 9-88. ) 
Di sputed Fact #47: Many of the challenges confronting the Mission have been 
ongoIl1g. See Mi ssion's Answers to Interrogatories, Deposition Exhibit ___ " Appendix 
Exhibit . The challenges faced by the Miss ion during Mayor Corradini 's administration 
have resurfaced and remain unrcsolved during Mayor Rocky Anderson's administration after 
the Mission left the Central Christian Church in June 30, 2002, through the present. 
Contrary to the City's claims in Interrogatory responses, meetings and interchanges 
with City staff including Mayor Anderson occurred on May 3, 2001, June 23, 2003, June 21, 
2004, and July 19, 2004. Meetings with counsel and/or ranking staff of the PZD attended as 
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noted in 2003 and 2004 as well as occurred on September 8, 2003. (Affi da vi t of Wayne 
Wilson ~~ 56, 69, Appendix Exhibit 12 .) 
48. Plaintiffs have designated accountant John Ra varino as their spokesman on 
damages. (Deposition of John Ra vari no, 209: 16-21 0:8 , Appendix Exhibit 2.) 
Disputed Fact #48: John Ravarino was designated as an expert witness for the Plaintiffs.' 
[n the Miss ion 's response to discovery from the RDA, dated April 8,2005, the testimony of John 
Ravarino was explained as "will testify regarding hi s knowledge of the Miss ion, its relocation, 
and impact of the relocation on the Mission." (Appendix Exhibit at 2.) In response to the City's 
di scovery request, his testimony was listed as "the same subject matter as Wayne Wilson and as 
outlined in the RDA di scovery." (I'q)pendix Exhibit at 4.) Wayne Wilson was designated as 
testi fying regarding "his knowledge of the Mission and interacti on with the City, community 
council s, efforts to relocate after 1999, its impact on the Mission , and factual claims not admitted 
by the City or RDA in the pleadings ." ( A-ppendix Exhibit at 3.) Nowhere does it state that John 
Ravarino is the sole witness for damages for the Mission. 
Furthermore, the terminology "special damages" was defined by counsel for the Ci ty as 
"hard economic damages." (Deposition of John Ravarino 210:24-25, Appendix Exhibi t 2.) 
Damages for constitutional violations can be nominal or compensatory, the latter being hard to 
measure. (See Lega l Analysis, patt _ , infra.) When asked whether he was designated as the 
damage expert or the person wi th the relevant infonnation on hard econom ic damages, 
accountant John Ra varino repl ied that he had not been des ignated as such, (Deposition of John 
4 See Plaintiffs' Designatioll of Expert \\fitness, 
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Ravarino, 209 : 19-21, Appendix Exhibit 2.) and indicated he was not aware of damages since the 
end of 2002. (ld at 211 : 1-5.) Specific reference was made to non-economic damages claimed in 
intelTogatories as pari of the record as well and counsel for the City indicated he understood. (Jd 
at 212:11-21.) 
49. Plaintiffs have submitted special damage claims for the time period of October 
1999 when they moved out of their long time location through 2001 when they were relocated at 
the Central Christian Church, 370 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Deposition Exhibit 
19.) 
Disputed Fact #49: These damages were submitted for relocation compensation under 
the federa l Unifonn Relocation Assistance Act and are not claimed under that Act as against the 
City. 
Plaintiffs have also submitted through response to IntelTogatories and depositions claims 
for the following damages : 
Preparation of preparing plans and loss of deposits 
Loss of congregation 
Loss of sanctuary 
Wayne Wilson personally 
(Deposition Exhibit # _ ; Appendix Exhibit .) 
$ 20,000.00 
$ 50,000.00 
$ 50,000.00 
$ 10,000.00 
50. Pl ainti ffs' elaim for special damages consists of expenses involved IJ1 mov lI1g, 
abandonment of improvements to their prior location, loss of properiy in the move, lost 
contributions and improvements to its new building. (ld.) 
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Di sputed Fact #50: See Response to Disputed Fact # 48. 
56. Ravarino did testify, somewhat inexactly, that the expense figures for the time 
period for which damages were being claimed did not include some items appearing to total 
$45,456. (Ravarino Deposition, page 198 line 24-page 203 line 12, and Exhi bit 19.) 
Disputed Fact #56. After explaining whether an entry is listed as an expense or on the 
balance sheet, Mr. Ravarino went on to explain line-by-line which items were not included in the 
1999-2000 expense total. (Deposition of John Ravarino, 199:2-23, Appendix Exhibit 2.) The 
following items are capitalized, and not expensed (Deposition of John Ravarino , 200 : 19-23; 201 : 
12; 202 : 14-15; 204 : J 8-20; Appendix Exhibit 2.) : 
RDA 00794 - Direct Costs for Disconnecting, Dismantling, Removals, 
Reassembling, Reinstalling Relocated Personal Propeliy 
RDA 00798 - Fair Market Value (Depreciated Value) of Leasehold 
Improvements left behind 
RDA 00802 - Actual Direct Loss of Tangible Propeliy 
RDA 00804 - Purchase of Substihlte Property 
TOTAL 
B. Omitted Facts 
xl 
$ 5,017 
$ 4,31 8 
$ 1,200 
$17,908 
$ 3,418 
$3 1,861 
Documents referred to and relied upon are either already in the court files or are attached as 
Exhibits to the Appendix filed with this Memorandum in Opposition. By this reference, they are 
included in thi s Memorandum where referenced. 
Ordinances 
1. From April 12, 1995, through the present, the City has had ordinances providing 
mandatory definitions to be used in the City ordinances. Three definitions that will be focused on 
in thi s memorandum inc1 ude the following: 
"Place of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place of 
religious worship, including any accessory use or structure used for religious 
worship . 
"Accessory use" means a use that: 
(A) Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal 
use; 
(B) Is customarily found as an incident to such princi p al use; 
(C) Contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessi ty of those 
occupying, working at or being serviced by such principal use; 
(D) Is, exccpt as otllerwise exprcssly authorized by the provisions of 
thi s title, located OIl the same zoning lot as such principal use; and 
(E) Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use. 
"Homeless shelter" means a building or portion thereof in which sleeping 
accommodations are providcd on an emergency basis for the temporarily 
homeless. 
(S LC City Code §§ 21 A.62.040) (Deposition Exhibit # 90; Appendix Exhibi t # _ .) 
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2. On April 12, 1995, a comprehensive set of zoning revisions were adopted by Sal t 
Lake City. Churches were required to obtain conditional use pel111its in a residential zone. 
Homeless shelters were continued to be defined and limited to the 0-3 and CG zones . (See 
Deposition of Brent Wilde. Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
3. From at least Apri l 12, 1995 through the present, the City mandatory requirements 
necessary to invoke an administrative interpretation by the Zoning Administrator. (See 
Deposition Exhibit 94; Appendix Exhibit # .) 
4 From at least Apri l 12, 1995, the city has had mandatory ordinances providing 
requirements that are applicable to public procedures. (See Deposition Exhibit 54; Appendix 
Exhibit # .) 
5. In 1999, the City had mandatory ordinances regarding conditional use 
applications and the processing of the same. (See Appendix Exhibit # ). 
6. The City ordinances applicable during 2003 -2006 regarding requirements for 
conditi onal use appl ications and the processing of the sam e have changed fTom those in 1999. 
(See Deposition Exhibit 93; Appendix Exhibit 5). 
7. The City ordinances defining the Community Counci l notice and reporting 
process have been in place from April 12, 1995, through the present. (Appcndix Exhibit 6). 
8. In 1999 the City had mandatory ordinanccs goveming the City'S Board of 
Adjustments. (Appendix Exhibit 7). 
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9. In 1999, the City had mandatory ordinances governing the Land Use Appeals 
Board. (Appendix Exhibit 8). 
10. The applicable statutes and ordinances from 2003-2006 governing the City's 
Board of Adjustments and di strict court review of the same on appeal are attached hereto. 
(Appendix Exhibit 9). 
11. From at least April 12, 1995, the City has had in City ordinances, a mandatory 
requirement that homeless shelters constituted conditional uses in the CO and D-3 zones. TIle 
Mission was notified of the same by City Deputy Attorney Lynn Pace on August __ , 1997. 
(Appendix Exhibit 8). 
12. The applicable mandatory definitions from the Salt Lake County Code define as 
follows the words "Church" and "accessory use": 
19.04.120 Church. 
"Church" means a building, together with its accessory buildings and uses, wh ere 
persons regularl y assemble for religious worship, and which building, together 
with its accessory buildings and uses, is maintained and controlled by a religious 
body organized to sustain public worship. ((Part) of Ord. passed 817180: prior 
code § 22-1 -6 (paI1)) 
19.04. 550 Use, accessory. 
"Accessory use" means a subordinate LIse customalily incidental to and located 
upon the same lot occupi ed by a main use. (Pri or code § 22-1-6(68)) 
There is no definition for a homeless shelter. (Appendix Exhibit -----.J 
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13. The applicable mandatory definitions from the Brigham City Code define as 
follows the words "Accessory Use or Building," "Church," "Homeless Shelter," and 
"Transitional Housing Authority": 
Accessory Use or Building. A use or building on the same lot with, and of a 
nature customarily incidental and subordinate to, the principle use or building. 
"Church" A building, together with its accessory buildings and uses, maintained 
and control led by a dully-recognized religious organization where persons 
regularly assemble for worship . 
"Homeless Shelter" Charitable lodging or sleeping rooms provided 011 a daily or 
other temporary basis to persons lacking other safe, sanitary or affordable shelter. 
May also include a kitchen and cafeteria. 
"Transitional Housing Facility" A facility owned, operated or contracted by a 
govemmental entity or a charitable, nonprofit organization which provides fi·ee 
temporary housing to homeless persons for at least thiliy (30) days while they 
obtain work, job skills, or otherwise take steps to stabilize their circumstances. A 
transitional housing facility does not include: 
A. A homeless shelter; 
B. A dwelling unit provided to a fami ly for its exclusive use as part ofa 
transitional hous ing program for more than thiliy (30) days; or 
C. A residential faci lity for persons with a disability. 
(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton '1 __ Appendix Exhibit 11 .) 
Mission 
11. On Apri l 16, 1986, the Spectacular Ministries of the Lord's Servants, filed 
Articles ofIneorporatiol1 with the State of Utah, as a non-profit religious organization. 
15 . On July 26, 1988, the Utah State Tax Commission granted exemption fi·om 
franchise tax to the Mission. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '13, Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
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16. Upon inquiry, the lntemal Revenue Service notifi ed the Mission that it is their 
practice to not require churches to apply for tax-exempt status because it is automatically 
gTanted. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson __ ; Appendix Exhibit I; Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '1] 
Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
17. On May 23, 1997, the Spectacular Mini stries of the Lord ' s Servants filed a dba 
wi th the State of Utah, using ' Salt Lake City Mission' as its name. (Deposition of Wayne 
Wilson, 8:20-9:4, Appendix Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '1]17, Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
18. On July 18, 1997, the Utah State Tax Commission granted the Mission a sales tax 
exemption number because it qualifi ed as a religious or charitable institution. (558 MIS) 
(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson '1]1 8, Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
19. On August 12, 1997, the United States Post Office granted the Mission postal 
privileges as a non-profit organi zation. (561 MIS) (Affida vi t of Wayne Wilson '1]19, Appendix 
Exhibit 12.) 
20. The reli gious min istries of the Mission have been able to provide the fo ll owing: 
Ca(c~ory 1999 2000 200 1 2002 
Converts to Christ 24 5 300 300 500 
Long-Tcnn 10 IS 12 20 
Recovery 
Pantry food 2UO 250 300 700 
distributed to 
needy families 
Goods provided 1500 people, 1500 people, 1700 people, 5,000 people, 
for needy famil ies 20,000 pieces 20,000 pieces 25,000 pieces 40,000 pieces 
Holiday and other 250 volunteers; 300 volunteers; 300 volunteers; 500 volunteers; 
meals provided. Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving 
dinners combined dirmcrs combined dinners combined dilUlcrs combined 
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3,000 3,000; 3,100; 6,000; Christmas 
Christmas dinners Christmas di rmcrs Christmas dinners dinners combined 
combined 3,000 combined 3,000; combined 3,000; 5,000; Wrapped 
Wrapped presents Wrapped presenls Wrapped presents presents for various 
for va rious families for various famil ies for various families fami lies 1,500; 
900 900; 1000; 
Bible studies and 500 600 600 650 
other group 
sessions 
Daily meals 600 meals a day. 600 meals a day. 600 meals a day. 1500 meals a day 
served 
She lter Prov ided Yes Yes Yes YesfNo 
Category 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Projected) 
Converts to Christ 200 250 300 500 
Long-TcnTI 12 IS 20 20 
Recovery 
Pantry food 100 50 50 500 
distributed to 
needy families 
Goods proyided 500 people; 200 people; 200 people; 500 people; 
for needy people 8,000 pieces 4,000 pieces 4,000 pieces 5,000 pieces 
Holiday and other 400 vo lunteers; 500 yolunteers; 500 yolunteers; 500 yolunteers; 
meals provided. Thanksgiving Thanksgiying Thanksgiving Thanksgiving 
meals combined dinners combined dinners combined dinners combined 
2,500; 4,000; Christmas 4,700; Christmas 4,700; Christmas 
CIu-istmas dinners dinners combined dilUlcrs combined dinners combi ned 
combined 2,000; 3,000; 3,000; 4,800; 
Wrapped presents Wrapped presents Wrapped presents Wrapped presents 
for various for various for various for various 
families 1,000; families 1,200; families families 1,700; 
1,500; 
Bible studies and 400 400 400 1,000 
other group 
sess ions 
Daily meals served 100 100 100 100 
Shelter Provided No No No No 
(Affidavi t of Philip Arena ~ 2 J, Appendix Exhibit 9.) 
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Salt Lake City 
21. Defendant Salt Lake City is a municipality organized under the laws of the State 
of Utah. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice __ , March 20, 2006.) 
22. Deedee Conadini was mayor of Salt Lake City from January 1992 to January 
2000. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice __ , March 20, 2006.) 
23. Cunent Mayor Rocky Anderson has been mayor of Salt Lake City from January 
2000, through the present. (See Plaintiffs' Third Request for Judicial Notice __ , March 20, 
2006.) 
Interfaith Participating Churches 
24. "In 1994 a team of 12 concerned advocates for homeless families began meeting 
monthly to see if a national organization's program was possible for this valley, National lHN 
[Interfaith Hospitality Network] Founder, Karen Olsen came to Utah to meet with us. Providing 
a safe, temporary home to those without, was very impOIiant to us. We received National IHN 
infollllation in regards to working with city and county officials to temporarily house homeless 
families." (Deposition Exhibit 32) (Appendix Exhibit # .) 
25. On or about March 23, 1995, Salt Lake County responded to Our Savior's 
Lutheran Church regarding providing IHN temporary assistance to homeless families as an 
"accessory use" under the county ordinances. The Salt Lake County Zoning Department 
responded as follows: 
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The proposal is considered to be within the range of "accessory uses." If the 
acti vity extends beyond the ch urch boundary to the extent as to cause complaints 
or interferes with neighborhood lifestyles, the church activity would be reviewed 
on a case by case basis to resol ve problems. Care should be taken to assure that 
each building is approved for life-safety issues with the Fire Department and the 
building code officials. 
(Deposition Exhibi t _: Appendix Exhibit # . 214 MIS) 
26. On Apri l 27, 1995, Keith McDonald (a County inspector) established rules for 
Our Savior 's Lutheran Church to provide II-IN services for the homeless. (223 MIS) (Appendix 
Exhibit # .) 
27. On May 8, 1995, Ted Black (of the County Fire Department) inspected Our 
Savior's Lutheran Church for providing IHN servi ces for the homeless. (224-225 MIS) 
(Appendix Exhibit # .) 
28 . On September 19, 1995, Salt Lake Interfaith Hospitality Network ("Interfaith") 
was established as a non-profit corporation by the State of Utah. The Interfaith Mission 
statement is as follows: "Salt Lake Interfaith Hospitality Network is a non-profit organization 
dedicated to supporting families during transitional times in order to ease the individual family 
and community concerns and challenges of homelessness ." (Deposition Exhibi t 32 ; Appendix 
Exhibit .) "[Interfaith] serves families wi th children. This can be single or two parent 
families." (Id.) 
29. During 1995, Jnterfaith obtained IRS recognition of its Sal (c) (3 ) tax exempt 
status. (id.) 
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30. During Mayor Corradini's administration, Roger Evans, head of the Enforcement 
Division of the Planning and Zoning Department ("tile PZD"), investigated the practices of 
Interfaith in Salt Lake County and IHN in Clark County, Nevada. (Deposition of Roger Evans, 
13:6-14:14; Appendix Exhibi t 7.) 
31 . On or about December 26, 1996, Mayor Deedee Corradini "pledged supp0!1 of 
the interfaith network church es." (Answer of Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, ~ 24 at 4.) 
32. Interfaith came to the PZD to obtain approval for a Participating Church on the 
east side of Salt Lake City. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 11:22-13: 1; Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
33. Arrangements were made through the City Attorney, the Planning Director, and 
Head of the Enforcement Division to allow churches in Salt Lake City to pa!1icipate in the 
Interfaith network of churches and provide overnight services to the homeless as an "accessory 
use" of the pal1icipating churches . "There was a deternlination about where would the 
'accessory use' - what would be a logical 'accessory use' threshold for that type of an 'accessory 
or incidental use' of a church." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 20:21 -25; Appendix Exhibi t 3.) 
The participating churches were not classified as "homeless shelters" restricted to conditional 
uses in the D-3 and CG zones. (Deposition of Rogcr Evans, 15: 14-18: 18, Appendix Exhibit 7; 
Depositi on of Brent Wilde, 10:20-13:1 , and 13:12- 14: 23, Appendix Exhibit 3; Deposition of 
Cheri Coffey, 37:20-38:7, Appendix Exhibit 4; Deposition of Wayne Mills, 15:16-23, Appendix 
Exhibit 8.) 
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There were discussions in staff meetings of the PZD that focused on the 
classification of those Participating Churches as "accessory uses" the overni ght services 
provided by pmii cipating churches with Interfaith rather than homeless shelters. The practice 
and policy apparently were not written down. (See Deposition of Brent Wilde, 20: 19-21 :6, 
Appendix Exhibit 3; Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 34:24-35:6, Appendix Exhibit 4.) It was 
unknown how or to what extent thi s definition of "accessory use" was conveyed to others in the 
City. 
35. On January I, 1997, Interfaith began providing overnight services to the homeless 
with six hosting churches. That year, thirty-six (36) famili es were ass isted. See Deposition 
Exhibit #3 1 : (Appendix Exhibit # .). 
36. September 29, 1998, Mayor COITadini wrote Interfai th regarding service providers 
for the homeless located in the same area as the Mission. She wished Vickie Newmann and the 
Interfaith Hospitality Network "continued success," observing the "service you provide is 
invaluable in assisting homeless families regain stabili ty and return as productive members of 
our comm.unity." (See Deposition Exhibit #_: Appendix Exhibit # .) 
37. At least as early as 1998, the City was aware of the practices of the Part icipating 
Churches as outlincd in City documents 252 and 253 (See Deposition Exhibit # : Appendix 
Exhibit # .) (SLC Response to Plaintiffs' Final Set of Written Di scovery, Request for 
Admission #7, page 3, Appendix Exhibi t ---.J 
38. At least eight churches within City limits were identified as pmiicipating with 
Interfaith: St. Paul's Episcopal Church, First United Methodist Church, First Christian Refolllled 
Church, First Baptist, Saint Catherine's of Siena Newman Center, Wasatch Hills Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church, Wasatch Presbyterian, and Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, ("Participating 
Churches") Id. 
39. The Participating Churches were in existence at their present locations prior to 
1995. Jd. 
40. None of the Participating Churches are located in the D-3 or CO zones where 
homeless shelters are allowed as a conditional use. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 9: 17-1 0: 13, 
Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
4 1. The Palticipating Churches were not individually evaluated by the City regarding 
their housing of homeless people, nor was an administrative opinion issued regarding the 
practices of Participating Churches with Interfaith to house homeless people. (Deposition of 
Randy Taylor, 36:24-37:2, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
42. No City documentation was provided regarding an administrative interpretation 
regarding any Participating Cburch's worship as reflected in their involvement with Interfaith as 
an accessory use. (Affidavit of Matthew Bilton, '1, Appendix Exhibit 11.) 
43 . On either March 12, 1999, or March 15, 1999, Vickie Neumann, Executive 
Director of Interfaith, and Phil Arena of the Mission met with Randy Taylor, Zoning 
Administrator of the PZD. (See Deposition Exhibit 92, Appendix Exhibit _ .) 
44. No City documentation was provided that demonstrated any submission to the 
City of information regarding the organization or governance of the Participating Churches. 
(Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, '1_, Appendix Exhibit 11.) 
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45. Notice of an administrative interpretation regarding a Participating Church's 
involvement with Interfaith as an accessory use would have been sent to the respective 
community council where the Church was located. (Appendix Exhibi t _.) 
46. The City "does not track or maintain separate fi les for accessory uses for places of 
worship." (City's Response to Request for Documents, #5, October 7, 2005, at page 10.) 
(Appendix Exhibit ~ "The City does not know how many may exist or where they may be 
located." (City' s Response to First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory #6, page 4, Appendix 
Exhibit .) 
47. When the staff repOli was prepared regarding the Mission's conditional use 
application on the Rosewood Tenace property, staff was aware of the Interfaith Participating 
Churches. (Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 34: 1 0-17, Appendix Exhibit 4.) 
48. The City is not Sllre that the pol icy regarding Patiicipating Churches would allow 
an accessory use in the Downtown and Gateway area of secular bu ildings assisting no more than 
twenty individuals at one time on a life-threatening basis. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 59:4-9, 
Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
Homeless Shellers 
49. Undated and unacknowledged building requirements regarding homeless shelters 
were in the files of the PZD and included the following: 
a. Conditional use in a D-3 or a CG Zoning District. The applicant must 
apply for and receive approval from the PlaIll1ing Commission. As part of 
the approval process, the application is required to go through a 
notification process which includes the applicant meeting with the 
community counci l in the district. 
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b. A fire sprinkler system is required when sleeping 20 or more persons. 
c. Two (2) exits are required when sleeping ten (l0) or more persons. 
d. Toil ets and sinks are required on a ratio of 1 per 8 occupants. 
e. Exit signs are requi red when two (2) or more exits are req ui red. 
f. Hard wired smoke detectors with a battery backup and interconnected are 
required with a maximum spacing of 30 feet in all rooms used for sleeping 
purposes. 
g. Natural or mechanical ventilation is required for all sleeping areas . If the 
venti lation is natural it must be equal to 1120 of the floor area. If the 
ventilation is mechanical it must provide two (2) air changes per hour. 
(Deposition Exhibit 51; Deposition of Roger Evans, 18: 16-18, 19:7-12, Appendix Exhibit 7; 
Deposition of Randy Taylor 35: 18-36: 13 , Appendix Exhibit 5; Deposition of Brent Wilde, 41: 1-
8, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
50. The City imposed a moratorium because it was concerned about the concentration 
and impact of certain types of activities and facilities. " ... there was concern about concentration 
[of homeless shelters, transitional treatment centers, drug --- substance abuse and so on) and 
impact and so on and the city counci l wanted to take some time to review thaI." (Deposition of 
Randy Taylor, 37: 16-23, Appendix Exhibi t 5.) 
51. The April 20, 1999, classification of the Mission as a homeless shelter, rather than 
as a pennitted use only, required that a hearing be held before the community counci l. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36:9- 13, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
52. . Randy Taylor was unclear, as it related to a conditional Lise request, of how an 
adverse impact on a neighborhood versus the city as a whole could be distinguished under the 
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current criteria. "I just --- J guess that the neighborhood, being part of the city as a who le, is ... 
how J would respo nd to that." (Deposition o f Randy Taylor, 43: 11-19, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
53. According to Randy Taylor, the recommendation of pl anning staff would change 
if the City changed its policy and decided to concentrate services to the homeless, substance 
abuse treatment centers, transitional homes, and the like. (Depos ition of Randy T aylor, 38: 19-24, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) Likewise, if the City changed its policy to encourage the concentration of 
homel ess shelters, substance abuse centers, et cetera, et cetera, in the downtown and Gateway 
are, the planning staff wou ld find that it was compatible and did not have a material net 
cumul ative adverse impact under this ordinance. "Well, likely it would cause the staff to find 
that it was compatible, perhaps, and did not have a material net cumulative arlverse impact. " A 
change in city policy could drive the finding of fact that it was comp atible and not adverse. 
(Deposi tion of Randy Taylor, 41 :13 -42:2, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Board of Adjustment Process and Actions 
54. From January 14 - September 21, 1998, the Cathedral of the Madeli ne was 
allowed to continue non-conforming use and request review by the Board of Adjustments unti l 
an amcnded variance was granted by the Board of Adjustments conforming with the Church's 
use beyond that which had been estab li shed as an approved use. The process was "fairly normal 
.. in complica ted cases." (Depositi on Exhib it 107; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 51 :8-52:10, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
55. After an administrative ruling regarding an accessory use of the Jewi sh 
Community Center was appealed by an objecting pa11y, the City P lanning and Zoning 
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Department worked with both the Center and objecting pal1y during the pendency of the appeal. 
(City 45-51; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 25:8-27:17, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
56. On December 20, 1999, Randy Taylor, Zoning Administrator, suggested to the 
Board of Adjustment that if the detennination of accessory use at the Jewish Community Center 
needed revision, the Board of Adjustment was free to do so. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75:7-
13, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
57. No church, except for the Mission, was classified as a homel ess shelter, from 
1995 through the present. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 15:5-16:6, Appendix Exhibit 3; 
Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36: 15-19, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
58. There was no di scussion by the PZD before the November 15, 1999, Board of 
Adjustments meeting about the possibility of the Board setting limits on church-related homeless 
accommodations. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75 :2-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
59. The City has not given a reason why the practice of 'accessory use' for the 
homeless shelter limit was not di sclosed to the Board of Adjustments. (Deposition of Brent 
Wi lde, 23:24 - 24:5, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
GO. The City has taken the position in vari ous situati ons that the Mission is bound by 
the November 15, 1999, classification of the Board of Adjustments, that it was a homeless 
shelter and a church. (Deposition of Brcl1t Wilde. 29:1 J-30:13, Appendix Exhibit 3; Deposition 
Exhibi t 59) 
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Enforcement Action Vis-a-vis the Mission as a Church at 466-468 W 200 S 
61. On May 3,1994, an amended three day-notice to quit was served on the Church. 
The stated bias for the eviction was that the church was: 
causing or suffering premises to be used as residence in violation of zoning laws; 
causing or suffering excess numbers of persons to occupy the premises; causing 
or suffering tenant's customerslinvitees to : loiter about premises and sidewalk 
outside premises, engage in illegal drug use and/or transactions on or about the 
premises, invade other tenants' leaseholds and intimidate other tenants and their 
customerslinvitees, litter sidewalk outside premises and in front of other tenants' 
leaseholds and other tenants ' leaseho lds with trash and urine, and intimidate 
govemmental inspectors always from doing inspections of premises; and serve 
food or about the premises without proper licenses.' 
62. A trial was held on the amended notice to quit on May 16, 1994, before the 
Honorable Michael L Hutchings. 
During the tlial witness from the City, including police officers and staff of the 
Zoning Depariment, sought to demonstrate to the court that it was illegal for the 
[Church] to remain in their [building] and to care for the homeless at their present 
location under the rules of the Salt Lake City zoning and rel ated matters ... 
[G]enerally the couli found and the pariies' stipulated that the [Church] could 
continue what it was doing as a church, and continue caring for the homeless 
provided celiain matters were improved as outlined in the written order of the 
cotll1. Further, the couli found that the contract (lease) allowing them to remain at 
the premises and conduct thei r business as a church was a legal contract.' 
63. On July 19, 1994, Judge Michael Hutchings issued an ordcr in an unlawfu l 
detaincr action brought against the Mission indicating that the Mission could rcmain in its 
premIses on the MBI and continue to provide servi ces to the homclcss. (Dcposition Exhibit 
_.) 
5 Verified Complaint. September 8, 1999. Paragraph 17. 
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64. On December 24, 1996, Sherie Reich, an enforcement officer of the PZD, 
received a complaint from poli ce regarding the Mission operating an illegal homeless shelter. 
After speaking with a supervisor, she went to the Mission and gave Pastor Wilson a notice to 
cease and desist that stated the following: "This stlUcture is only to be used as a church- no 
sleeping at any spot on premises day or night. This is a violation of the SLC zoning ordinance, 
please cease and desi st or a citation will be issued." (Deposition Exhibit 20, App endix Exhibit 
.) In addition to the issues inherent in addressing the nature and uses of the church, this cease 
and desist order was different than the norm because there was no time frame provided to cure 
the deficiency. "[T]ypically, when there's a violation known, that the city in a lot of cases will 
issue a notice and order nuticing what remedies need to take place and urder that work be 
accomplished and done in a celiain time frame ... we would contact them if it was failure to 
comply, and at that point we would typically issue some kind of a criminal misdemeanor citation 
ticket or we would - along with voiding out the pennit, is typically what we would do." 
(Deposition of Roger Evans 31 : 13 - 32:4, Appendix Exhib it 7.) 
65 . On December 26, 1996, a criminal citati on was issued to Pastor Wilson for 
vio lating zoning laws. (A Hidavit of Wayne Wilson ' 113, Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
66 . On December 27, 1996, zoning enforcement staff consisting of Sherie Reich , 
Harvey Boyd, Scott Mikelson, and police visited the Mission premises and again told tIle 
Mission to shut down its "homeless sheller. " (City 336, 342; Affidavit of Mallhew Hi lton 'I~. ) 
IJ Verified Complaint. September 8,1999. Paragraph 19. 
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67. On January 13, 1997, B.L. Smith of the City Poli ce Depmi ment made a complaint 
regardi ng the Mission to the City/County Health Depaltment. (512-513 MIS; Affidavit of 
Matthew Hilton" .) 
68. On January 13 , 1997, Diane Keay of the City/County Di visi on of Environmental 
Health and Dan W11ite of the City/County Health Depaliment visited the Mission. (370-371 MIS: 
514 MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~_.) 
69. On January 14, 1997, Diane Keay and Dan W11ite gave wri tten repolis of areas fo r 
improvement to the Mission. (370-371 MIS; 514 MIS) Diane Keay' s repori stated: 
There is a sign posted on the south wall that says the facility is open 24 hours a 
day. Pastor Wilson said that they are open 24 hours a day for the winter. I do not 
believe that 'winter' is an emergency and the shelter is not operating only as an 
'emergency' shelter. To my knowl edge, a clear definition of 'emergency' does 
not exist at this time in enviromnental health regulations. According to Salt lake 
City-County Health Department Regulation #3 Housing, em ergency housing is 
defined as 'structures utilized for occupancy in an emergency that are des ignated 
by governmenta l authority as emergency housing.' 
(370-37 1 MIS, Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~_.) 
70. On November 4, 1997, Roger Evans, Director of Building Services and 
Licensing, notified the Mission that it wanted to make an administrative inspection on November 
4, 1997. (349 MIS) (Deposition Exhibit 11 5) (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~_.) 
71. On January 13, 1998, the City Attorncy's Office requested that inspecti on be 
allowed "to insure that celiain life/safety measures are obsel-ved so that those ind ividuals who 
stay at the church will not be in danger." (344 MIS) (Depos itio n Exhi bit 116) (Affidavi t of 
Matthew Hilton ~_. ) 
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72. On April 3, 1998, Sherie Reich inspected the Mission premises. (City 330; 
Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~_.) 
Non-Enforcement Action Against a Tongan Church in 1997 
73 . On August 6, 1997, a Tongan Church that was illegally situated before April 12, 
1995, was encouraged to work out options with the neighborhood, acquire more land so as to not 
be a non-confonning use. It was not evident a referral was made referring the case to 
enforcement. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 22:12-23 , Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Administrative Inspection at the Mission as a Church at 370 East 400 S 
74. On October 14, 1999, Mission counsel confinned with City Counsel that without 
"missionary" ovemight status, churches are allowed in commercial zone without conditional use 
pe1111its. At the same time, a request was made that the Mission could relocate to specific zones 
within City boundaries without any further "conditional use pel111its, neighborhood hearings, or 
other such delays." (Ex. #83)(422-23 MIS) Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~ .) 
75 . On October 30, 1999, Cheri Coffey a1er1ed Craig Spangberg regarding 
enla rcement issue> at tne Mission located at Central Christi an Church. (Deposition Exhibit #56; 
Cherie Coffey Deposition _ ;_, Appendix # .) 
76. On January 6, 2000, the Salt Lake City-County Health Department grants the 
Mission ninety (90) days to rectify its listed items ofcorrectiol1. (644 MIS; Affidav it of Matthew 
Hilton'l .) 
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77. On January 21,2000, R. Stanley of the City Fire Depa11ment. provides thirty (30) 
days' noti ce to Central Christian Church to correct violations or hazardous conditions. (337-338 
MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~ .) 
78. On Apri l 7, 2000, Sal t Lake City-County Health Department issued a permit to 
Mission at Central Christian Church (339 MIS; Affidavit of Matthew Hilton ~_.) 
Administrative Interpretation 
79. Randy Taylor served as Zoning Administrator from 1994-2000. (Deposition of 
Randy Taylor 6:18-25, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
80. City ordinances required that certain procedures be fo llowed when issuing an 
administrative opinion, induding that t.he opinion be requested by an applicant, based on certain 
written, submitted facts as appli ed to specific propeliy, and a fee paid. (Deposition Exhibi t # 94; 
Randy Taylor Deposition , Appendix Exhibit # 5.) 
81. Randy Taylor did not recall whether the City PZD had a form to complete for 
requesting an administrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 23 :23-24:5, Appendix 
Exhibit 5.) 
82. At no time was the Mission asked by the City PZD to fo ll ow the requirements in 
the City ord inances to obtain an administrative int.erpretation. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, "58, 
Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
83. The Mission did not file a request for an administrative interpretati on regarding 
the Cohen property in 1999, or the Rosewood Terrace property in 1999, 2003, or 2004. 
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(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, ~ 59, Appendix Exhibit 12; Deposition of Wayne Mills 31:2-13, 
Appendix Exhibit 8.) 
84. The Zoning Admini strator typically takes one to tlu-ee weeks to clarify what an 
applicant's uses are; "two to three weeks probably is fairly routine." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 
46:3- 15, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
85. Typically, before issuing the classification, if there is a question regarding state 
licensure, the City would write a letter requesting a determination, generally obtaining one 
within two to three weeks. The PZD would typically "want to see what the State had to say 
first," before they issued a classification as to use. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 47: 12-23, 
Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
86. A letter dated May 27, 1998, to Rabbi Zippel of the CHABAD LUBAVlTCH OF 
UTAH was considered to be an administrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor 13:3-
12, Appendix Exhibit 5.) No notification was given to the community nor was notification given 
of any aggrieved party's right to appeal. (Deposition Exhibit 96.) Then Zoning Admini strator 
Randy Taylor did not recall whether or not Rabbi Zippel completed an application form for an 
administrative interpretation. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 23:23- 24:6, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Brent Wilde was consulted regarding this letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 21 :17-22:8, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
87. A letter dated July 6, 1998, to Zion's Lutheran Church was labeled as an 
administrative intcrpretation and was considered to be such. (Deposition Exhibit # 97; 
Deposition of Randy Taylor, 13: 13-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) No notification was given tbat any 
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aggrieved party could appeal. (Deposition Exhibit # 97.) The City did not identify "a parti cular 
rcason" why this was not language was not included. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 13 :20 - 14: I, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) Then Zoning Administrator Randy Taylor did not recall whether Dr not the 
Cllurch cDmpleted an application fonn for an ad mini strative interpretation. (DepDsition of Randy 
Taylor, 15:9-17, Appendix Exhibi t 5.) No community counci l meeting was held. (Derosition 
Exhibit 97.) Brent Wilde was consulted regarding this letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 
21 :17-22:8, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
88. Pastor Wilson or some of his staff talked with Randy Taylor about the Mission 
being a church, with pali of its mission being to feed and clothe the needy because to do so is 
feeding and clothing Jesus, and, thereby, is an integral part of religious worship. (Deposition of 
Randy Taylor, 29:25-30:5, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
89 . Brent Wilde and Bill Wright, of the PZD, and Lynn Pace, of the City Attomey's 
office, reviewed the admini strative interpretation letter of Aplil 20, 1999, before it was sent to 
the Mission. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 45 :8-11, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
90 . Randy Taylor perceived the Mission's case as being complicated because of 
"Well, the level --- I don't --- you know, the level of services and so on to homeless and to -- -
and the substance ab use and all being considered conditional uses in most locations. So that's 
what made it complicated to me." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 60: I 0-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
In addition, " ... to the ex tcnt that --- that as a church activities like substance abuse and homeless 
services of various kinds would be considered allowed uses under the umbrella, if you will, of 
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the church, that part of it was complicated to me." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 61:2-6, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
91. There was a question III Randy Taylor's mind about the Mission's "religious 
worship" because he di stinguished between practices of a church and social service aspects of 
the Mission. To Taylor, some aspects of the Mission clearly appeared to be church and/or 
worship activities; whereas, counseling, referrals, providing meals, and other social aspects could 
be classified as activities in which a "mission" would engage - related, but distinctly separate 
fTom worship . 
Well, yes, there was some question in my mind. There was quite a bit of 
discussion about mission versus church. And I didn't pretend to understand fully 
what a mission is, but I had an idea. But they certainly sounded like a church in 
many, many, many ways and did church-related things ... what I thought a mission 
was was a --- you, know, the kinds of things that they do . They provide services 
of various kinds to folks who need them, a lunch, a --- some counseling, some ---
some referral to help of various kinds . . .1 viewed it probably more as a --- you 
know, you've got your church and the worship services, and then you've got the 
social aspects on the side or along with that. And I viewed them as different 
things, related but different. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75:21-76:20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
YZ. On April 20, 1999, the City issued to the Mission a letter labeled Admini strative 
Interpretati on that addressed the classification of the uses as the City understood thcm for the 
Cohen propcrty. Four days before the letter was issued, April 16, 1999, drafts of the same 
appear to have been writt en bv S il! Wlight, Pl anning Director. (Depos ition Exhibits 101 and 
100; Depositi on of Randy Taylor, 20:6 - 21 :22, Appendix Exhibit 5.) As Zoning Administrator, 
Rand y Taylor was responsible fo r producing, signing, and sending letters; however, fairly often 
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Mr. Taylor involved Mr. Wright in review, cOITection, and clari ficatio n. (Deposition Exhi bits 
101 and 100; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 21 :9- 22, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
93. A draft of the April 20, 1999, admin istrative interpretat ion letter irom Randy 
Taylo r (# 2) was ed ited by Bi ll Wrigh t, Pl anning Director (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 20:6-14, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) The draft was dated April 16, 1999, and was prepared under the name of 
Bill Wright. (Deposition Exhibit 101) 
94. A subsequent typewri tten copy of the cOITections made by pen contained the same 
Apri l 16, 1999, date but Bill Wright's identification as the signer was stricken. (Deposition 
Exhibit 100; Deposition of Randy Taylor, 20 :21-23: 8, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
95. The use of specific facts protects an applicant both from the City using extrinsic 
evidence to evaluate their proposal as wel l as being assured of the factual basis upon which an 
appeal to the Board of Adjustments may need to be made. 
96. Randy Taylor did consider whether or not the sheltering of tbe homeless 
overn ight In an emergency situation could be "an accessory use" of the Mission's pl ace of 
worsh ip. His decision was based on the "magnitude of activi ty that seemed to be going on" 
without distingu ishing betwcen day and night activities. " Imcan I don' t know that much abou t 
what they wcre doing other than it was characteri zed as quite a bit of activ ity." (Deposit ion of 
Randy Taylor 34:5- 19, Appendix Exhibit 5.) He relied on "the descriptions given me in wri ting 
and the discussions that he held, that he had." (Deposition of Randy Taylor 36:20-23. Appcndix 
Exhibi t 5.) While he met with Philip Arena and his superiors Brent Wilde or Bill Wright, 
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(Deposition of Phil ip Arena, 15:16-16:4, Appendix Exhibit 6.), he did not recall ever discussing 
with them how one would detennine whether or not "providing shelter to the homeless on an 
emergency basis could be an accessory use of the church." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 35:13-
17, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
97 . The request in the letter to have the Mission determine if it required licensure by 
the State would not have made any difference in the "classification of the use" but it would have 
made it easier to "detenl1ine those uses" of the Mission. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 49:2-50:5, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
y~. The April 20, 1999, letter contained a classification of proposed uses of the 
Mission as a treatment shelter, which classification required state licensing. (See Omitted Fact # 
1.) . 
99 . The April 20, 1999, letter contained a classification of the Mi ssion as a homeless 
shelter, based on "the descriptions given to me in writing and the discussions that I held --- that I 
had." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36:20-23, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
100. l-1ad the April 20, 1999, admini strative interpretation not classified the Mission as 
a homel ess shelter or substance abuse treatment home the Mi ss ion would have been able to 
obtain a building pe1111it for the Cohen building. (Deposition of Randy Taylor 33:12-34:5, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
101. The Mission was advised to refer to the City Attomey's to resolve unstated legal 
questions. (Appendix Exhibit .) 
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102. The City also indicated it "would be willing to assist you in the location of a more 
su itable site that is consistent with the city's preference for smaller facilities in decentralized 
locations throughout the county." (Deposition Exhibit ). Other than to "broaden the base, the 
geography," Randy Taylor did not know why the offer was made "throughout the county" rather 
than "throughout the city." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 44: 11 -45: II, Appendix Exhibi t 5.) 
J 03. The April 20, 1999, classification of the Mission as a h omeless shelter, 
rather than as a permitted use only, required that a hearing be held before the community 
counci l as to its proposed use. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 36 :9-13, Appendix Exhibit 
5.) 
104. The September 14, 1999, adminish-ative interpretation letter was issued in 
conjunction with the Mission's conditional use pennit application. That was "not common .. 
but in complicated matters certainly it would be and could be done and was done." (Deposition 
of Randy Taylor, 59 :20-60:8, Appendix Exhibi t 5.) 
105. On September 10, 1999, tlu'ee drafts of a letter rega rding the potential use of the 
Mission at the Rosewood Ten'ace Building (167 North 600 West) were prepared for Randy 
Taylor' s signature. One provided the Mission was a church, one provided the Mission was a 
church and boardinghouse, and one provided the Mission was a church, boardinghouse, and 
homeless shelter. (Deposition Exhibi t 106) These lettcrs were the results of discussions with 
Brent Wilde, Bill Wright, and Lynn Pace. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 6 1: 15-62:5, Appendix 
Exhibit 5.) "To the best of [Randy Taylor's] knowledge, [the draft lettcrs] seem to represent 
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how the Mission could have been classified at that time. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 62:6-14, 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
106. "[MJost" of the "information from [Mission's counsel's] various correspondence" 
sent to Randy Taylor was the "factual criteria" relied upon by the decision makers to produce the 
September 14, 1999, letter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 62: 15-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
107. The September 14, 1999, letter indicated that beyond the thiliy people li ving on 
the premises, there would be no other individuals living or sleeping at the Mission except in 
emergency or life-threatening instances. (Deposition Exhib it 2) Randy Taylor did not know why 
this potential occurrence of providing help had not been sufficient to classify the Mission as a 
homeless shelter. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 65 :6-1 0, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
I don't know. It was going --- it was heading into a conditional lise process and--
- and --- and obviously that service is an important one, and so I don ' t know why 
it didn't trigger. It was stated there because it was stated in the infonnation given 
to me, and so it didn't cause me to just automatically call it a homeless shelter. 
On a real dire emergency sihlation when someone was going to stay out and 
freeze and they were going to ... help them out, then, you know, that's why it got 
stated in there. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 65: 1 0-2 l, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
108. The September 14, 1999, admi nistrati ve interpretation also indi cated that having a 
homeless shelter, or any other residential activity requirin g licensure from the State of Utah, was 
forb idden . No "adverti sing regarding any of these prollibitecl uses is allowed. Then if any of the 
above are engaged in or advel1ised for, the City will initiate revocation of the conditional use 
pennit or any other permi ts issued and take enforcement action ." (Deposition Exhibit 28) 
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) 09. This advertising prohibition was "not really common ... but that kind of th ing can 
be added ... to reviews." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 68:25-69: ) 3, Append ix Exhibit 5.) Randy 
Taylo r did not intend to "restrict advertising of the church but to restrict adveIiising that would 
have impacted [on] having people stay ovemight on an emergency basis ." (Deposition of Randy 
Taylo r, 69:21 -71 :3, Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
I was simply trying to indi cate, I believe, that --- that any reasonable person 
would recognize that if someone shows up at 10:30 at night on the doorstep of a 
church and is going to freeze to death if they're not given some kind of help that-
-- that they ought to be helped and --- but that would be --- but that would be an 
emergency kind of a thing and a --- you know, not an every night, by the hoards 
kind of a thing. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 70-12-20, Appendix Exhibit 5.) Randy Taylor "was simply saying 
that that circumstance ought to be discussed [by the planning commission and the review body of 
this application] with respect to their kind of services." ~ 70:6-11 
110. Randy Taylor understood that had the Mission been a 501(c)(3) charitable 
institution, rather than a church, and was going to maintain a boardinghouse or equivalent 
nonCOnfOI1l1ing use of the Rosewood Terrace Building, that there would have beron no 
requiremcnt that a conditional use peI1l1i t be obtained. The reason a conditional lise permit was 
required was because the Mission was a church and tbe nonconforming use was in a residential 
zone. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 66:9-67:20, Appcndix Exhibit 5.) (Deposition of Brent 
Wilde 68: 1-12. Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
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Pennit Depaliment 
111. A church must be in compliance with all City ordinances if a building pennit is to 
be issued to remodel or make other changes to a church. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 63:12-16, 
Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
112. On October 26, 1998, Pastor Wilson appeared at the Pennits & Licensing 
counter and submitted a letter for 399 West Andrews Avenue as he understood Randy Taylor to 
have requested the letter. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 234:22-237:3, Appendix Exhibit 1.) 
Staff brought in Randy Taylor who told Pastor Wilson that he had to meet with the People's 
Freeway Community Council (City 013, Deposition Exhibit 22), and "submit another letter 
spelling out how the use would be operated and managed. [Taylor] then told [Wilson] we would 
then make a detemlination as to what category his use would fit into and refer him to the 
appropriate process." (Deposition Exhibit # 22, City 11.) [Taylor] asked [Wilson] to revi se the 
letter he had and be more descriptive as to his activities and use." (City 0391.) 
113. On June 25, 1999, Phil Arena and other individuals fi·ol11 the Mi ssion went to the 
pellllit counter and asked if a church was a pel111itted use in a D-3 Zone. Paul Doer told them it 
was and a set of plans were produced. The Mission was told it was a homeless shelter and not a 
church; the Mission stated that it was a church. Doer told the Mission representatives that "i n 
order to recei ve a building permit [they] would have to provide documentation authOIizing use 
approval from the Zoning Administrator's office" and instructed them where the office was. 
(Deposition Exhibit 108.) Randy Taylor recalls receiving the written memorandum reciting the 
foregoing. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 53:4-14, Appendix Exhibit 5.) He does not recall 
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giving that kind of directive to Paul Doer. (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 52:14-25, Appendix 
Exhi bi t 5.) No follow up was done with the Mission or anyone c1se to clarify the practice. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 53: 18-21 , Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Involvement Wi th Community Councils 
114. Appli cable city ordinances stated the following regarding "Consul tation with 
Neighborhood Organizations." 
In order fo r an application for a Condi tional Use Pennit to be determined 
complete, the app licant must include, when required by the Recognized or 
Registered Organization Notification Procedures, Title 2, Chapter 2.62 of the Salt 
Lake City Code, a signed statement from the appropri ate neighborhood 
organizati on that the applicant has met with that organization and explained the 
development proposa l for which approval is being sought. The s igned statement 
shall be on a fonn provided by the zoning administrator. (Per 2 IA. I 0.01 O(B)) 
115. At no time did the zoning administrator provide the Mission with the form to be 
signed verifyi ng that the presentation had been made. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson 
Appcndix Exhibit 1.) The PZD did not have such a [01111 from 1999 - 2004. (Deposition of 
Cheri Coffey 6:8-12; 17:8-1 7, Appendix Exhibit 4.) 
11 6. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Zoning Administrator was given the 
discretionary authority to not require the submission of: "A complete application" .. .. (8) A 
signed statement that the appli cant has met with and explained the proposed use to the 
appropri ate neighborhood organization entitled to receive notice pursuant to Title 2, Chapter 2.62 
of the Salt Lake City Code." (Appendix Exhi bit ). 
117 . Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to the Sutherland Building located at 
405 South Redwood Road. Pasto r Wilson made a presentati on at the Poplar Grove Community 
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Council. A uniformed poli ce officer appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mi ssion. 
After the presentation, chair indicated that the Mission would receive a letter of detennination in 
about a week; thereafter, however, he refused to send the Mission a letter. In the absence of the 
same, staff at PZD refused to allow Mission to fi le an appli cation for a conditional use penni!. 
(Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 23; Appendix Exhibit 12.) 
11 8. Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to 1515 South 400 West (f0I111eriy, 
Travelers Aid Society; now, The Road Home). Pastor Wi lson made a presentation at the 
People' s Freeway Community Council. The Community Council offered to assist the Mission to 
locate outside of their Community Council area, but would not approve the requested location. 
One of the police officers who had come to tbe Mission offices and told the Mission that the 
Mayor's Office wanted it shut down, appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mi ssion. The 
Community Council never sent verifi cation of the presentation or its decision to the M ission. 
Despite having made the presentation; thereafter, staff at PZD twice refused to allow the Miss ion 
to file an appli cation. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 24, Appendix Exhibit 12.)(AffidaYit of 
Monica Wilson ,,6-8, Appendix Exhibit 13.) 
119. Before 1999, the Miss ion wanted to relocate at 850 West 1600 NOlih (at the 
Superfund site). PZD staff rdused to notify Capital Hill Community Counci l that the Mission 
needed to be 011 their agenda to make a presentation, thereby justifying the Mission's belief that 
the preparing of an applicati on would also be fut ile. (See Deposition Exhibit at _ _ .) 
120. In the early paJi of 1999, the Mission detel1l1ined it would like to acquire the 
Cohen Building located at 580 West 300 South. At the time of the inquiry, a Church was a 
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permitted use in the 0-3 zone where the property was located. A building pennit was requ ested . 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Randy Taylor, Zoning Admini strator, encouraged the Mission to 
make a presentation to the Rio Grande Community Council. (See Depos iti on Exhibit at -.-J 
Phil Arena of the Mi ssion made the presentation. The presentation was disrupted by Marge 
Harvey of the Mayor's Office who spoke out against the Mission. Unifonned poli ce officers in 
attendance spoke out against the Mission as well. The Mission was asked to make another 
presentation at the next meeting on Apri l 21, 1999. 
121. On April 20, 1999, the Mission again presented at the Rio Grande Community 
Counci l. Brent Wilde of the PZD was in attendance and di sputed if not debated the Mission's 
claim it was on ly a church rather than all of the use classifi cations contained in the Apri l 20, 
1999, letter that were contrary to the use classifications explained by the Mission. (Deposition of 
Philip Arena, 16:25- 17:5, Appendix Exhibit 6. ) 
122 . Occasionally, an applicant may be directed to appear before a community council 
a second time. 
On occasion a conditional use request will go to a community counci l, but there 
may be additional questions or information that was not ava ilable that the 
community council may have requested additional in formation before they make a 
decision. So it 's on occasion we wi ll have an appl icant go back a second time. 
(Deposi ti on of Brent Wilde, 42: 12- 18, Appendix Exhibit 3.) (cmphasis addcd) 
123. Mr. Wilde was unable to provide the number of times in the last ten years that an 
applicant has returned to the communi ty council a second time. "I can ' t give you a number. We 
have a few pla1ll1ed developments that have gone back more than once. I cou ld find that 
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information but I just can ' t tell you." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 42:19-25, Appendix Exhibit 
3.) 
124. On April 22, 1999, the Mission obtained a li sting of all Community Council and 
their respective chairpersons from the Mayor's Office. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 30 
Appendix Exhibi t 12 .) 
. 125. During the middle of the summer, the Mission detennined it would try to relocate 
in the Rosewood TelTace Building located at 168 North 600 West. The Mission was unable to 
reach the Chainnan of the Fairpark Community Council during earl y August 1999 because he 
had gone of vacation. Unbeknown to the Mission, the Fairpark Community Cow1cil meeting for 
August 1999 had been cancel led because of vacation schedul es. The Mission notified the PZD 
and City Attomey's Office of their inability to meet with the Fairpark Community Council and 
the urgent need to begin processing their application for a conditional u se regarding Rosewood 
Ten'ace properties. (Deposition Exhibit ) 
I. Requirement to Present Before Appli cation Accepted 
126. According to the ordinance, a conditional use appli cant was required to go to the 
Community Council pri or to submitting an application to the PZD. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 
41 :3-6 Appendix Exhibit 3.) Notwithstanding this requirement, the Zoning Administrator has 
di scretionary flexibility regarding the application proccss. 
There has been some flexibility in terms of when an applicant might go, or if a 
community council chooses not to schedule a particular request they don't go. 
But if the community councils are contacted prior to a conditional use going to the 
planning commission, and if the communit, council desires to h"ve them on an 
agenda for discussion, we require th nt they go ... The ordinance requlI e' pre 
applicati on. There has been some flexibility in that, given the circumstances. 
lxxiii 
Sometimes there have been cases where we received an application and do not 
send them. 
(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 41 :9- 24, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
127. On August 3 I, 1999, the City Attorney's Offi ce notified the Mi ssion that 
appearing before the community counci l was required before an application would be accepted. 
(Appendix Exhibit ). 
128. There have been times when an application has been prepared and the community 
council could not meet within a ' reasonable schedule' because of summer vacations or holidays. 
When this occurs, the PZD wi ll accept an application with the understanding that the applicant 
wi ll follow up with the community council at its next scheduled meeting. 
There have been an occasion where, if --- if an applicant has --- has thei r 
application ready, a community counci l cannot meet within what wou ld be 
considered a --- a reasonable schedule; we have received an application and 
scheduled with the community council after. Occasionally during the summer or 
during the holidays the community council may not meet, so we have no 
meeti ngs , so we get it in with the understanding they'll follow up and get to it in 
the next meeting. 
(Deposition of Brent Wi lde, 43 :9-2 I , Appendix Exhib it 3.) 
A 'reasonable time' is generally considered to be wi thin a month. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 
43:22-44:5, Appendix Exhibi t 3.) There is no set rule regarding community councils, but 
appl icants must notify the community counci l that they should be put on the meeting agenda, 
which is gencrally prepared one or two weeks prior to the scheduled mceting. 
Generally they meet once a month, and they'll prepare their agenda. They all 
. vary a bit but they'll prepare their agenda one or two weeks in advance ... No set 
rule with community councils. 
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(Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44:3-7, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
129. "Sometimes [PZD] would accept an application [for a conditional use pennit] if 
we knew the applicant had been scheduled or was working to be scheduled on a community 
council agenda." (Deposition of Cheri Coffey, 25: 17-23 , Appendix Exhibit 4.) 
130. · On June 6, 1998, and April 2, 2003, the PZD used administrative discretion to 
eliminate the need for a church to appear before a community counci l or participate in th e 
conditional use process. (See Omitted Facts # # , supra.) W11en these specific cases were 
excluded, in addition to those Participating Churches with Interfaith that were "excused" under 
the "accessory use" doctrine, the City could then claim that every case sent to the Commission 
for a conditional use review, had been heard by the community councilor it was returned by the 
Plmming Commission to do the same. (Affidavit of Cheri Coffey 56:20-25, Appendix Exhibit 
10.) 
2. Nature of Presentation 
131. The obligation of the applicant is " simply to appear at the Community Council 
and make a presentation." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44: 11 , Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
13 2. The Mission's presentations at various community council s before 1999 (see 
Omitted Facts ## 11 9, 120, ssupra,) were opposed by members of the Mayor's offi ce and 
uniformed members of the poli ce department. (Affid av it of W ayne Wilson ~ 22, Appendix 
Exhi bit 12 .) 
13 3. The Mission ' s presentati on at the Rio Grande Community Counci l on March 17, 
1999, regarding the Cohen Prope11y was opposed by members of the police depa1 ment and a 
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representative from the Mayor's Office, Marge Harvey. (Deposition of Philip Arena, 19: 19-
20: 12, Appendix Exhibi t 6.) 
134. The Mission's presentation at the Rio Grande Community Council on April 21, 
1999, regarding the Cohen Property turned into a debate with Brent Wilde of the PZD over the 
nature of the Mission. (Deposition of Philip Arena, 16:25-17:5, Appendix Exhibit 6.) 
Verification of Presentation 
135. PZD staff report a variety of means used to veIify an applicant's presentation at 
the community counci l meeting. "In most cases, but not always, a staff plaIUler will attend that 
meeting. (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44: 14-15, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
On the occasion, where [staff doesn't attend], community councils will give some 
written response with a community council recommendation that provides 
documentation .... [T]here's nothing set or fo rmal. On occasion, a staff member 
may have to call the community council to get documentation the applicant was 
there." (Deposition of Brent Wilde, 44: 12-22, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
136. "Occasionally, if it's fairly routine [a community council] will not have an 
applicant come in. That, however, is the exception. The maj ority of the time, the commun ity 
council will want to see the applicant, thcy would attend, and we look for documentation they' ve 
becn there." (Deposition ofBrcnt Wilde, 44:25 - 45:6, Appendix Exhibit 3.) 
Use of Vote of Community Counci l 
137. On September 14, 1999, the Mission was notified by the Fairpark Community 
Council th at a vote would be taken of those attending the Community Council meeting scheduled 
for September 23, 1999, to detelllline whether or not the Community Counci l would be in favor 
of the Mi ssion's presen tation. No form from the Zoning Administrator or PZD, acl<JlowJedging 
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that the Mission had made a presentation regarding the proposal, was disclosed to or provided to 
the Mission for the City Chair to complete. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, ~ 37, Appendix Exhibit 
12 .) 
138. On September 23, 1999, the Mission made its presentation regarding the 
Rosewood Terrace Property. A vote was taken of persons in attendance and of those who were 
residents of the Fairpark Community, one hundred sixty-eight (168) opposed the Mission's 
proposed Rosewood Terrace property relocation; four (4) were in favo r. (Deposition Exhibits 
). 
139. City staff from Planning and Zoning attended the meeting and took notes that 
included the vote totals. (Deposition Exhibit ---.l The Chair of the Community Council 
subsequently notified the City Planning and Zoning Department of the vote. (City _.) 
140. The totals were included in the PZO staff report to the Planning Commission. 
(Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey, Appendix Exhibit 10.) 
141 . Nonetheless City ordinances mandate that if a Community Council issues a repOli 
to the PZD the vote must be provided. Nonetheless, the City's Answer stated that "[c}ity 
ordinances do not requi re a community counci l vote on the proposal." (See City's Answer '1 39 at 
7 .) 
142 . Staff reports have not been consi stcnt in reporting to the Planning Commi ssion 
the vote of the Conununity Counci l whcn recording various church's conditional use pemlit 
applications. (Affidavit of Matthew Hilton '1 Appendix Exhibit II.) 
lxxvii 
143 The City opposed the Mission's noticed, and counsel attended TRO request to 
delete the reference in the staff report to the Planning Commission to the (I) use of the vote of 
those attending the Community Council meeting September 23, 1999, taken by the Fairpark 
Community Council, (2) comparison of pol ice calls to other churches with that of the Missi on, 
(3) use of present intemet speech site to define future conduct and, and (4) fa ilure to produce the 
backup infonnation for the listing by the police of the numerous telephone call s from the 
Mission. (Appendix Exhibit ). 
Discouragement Given To Mission and 
Encouragement Given to Other Churches to Remain in City 
144. On January 30, 1997, Pastor Wi lson received a written response from the staff of 
the City Counsel regarding his request for assistance in find ing a place for relocation. He was 
refeITed to the PZD. Alice Steiner, Executive Director of the RDA, and Marge Harvey of the 
Mayor's Office, were copied on the January 30, 1997, letter. (Wayne Wilson Deposition ) 
145. The April 20, 1998, Administration Jntelllretation letter stated, "We would also be 
willing to assist you in the location of a more sui table site that is consisten t with the city's 
preference fo r smaller fa cilities in decentrali zed locations throughout the county.'" Years latcr, 
Randy Taylor confirmed the offer to assist the Mi ssion in its rclocation in decentralized locations 
throughout the 'county,' (rather than the 'city') was an attempt to broaden the potentia l 
geographic base that would be more suitab le for those providing serviccs to the homeless. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 44: 15-45 :7, Appendix Exhibit 5.) The Miss ion understood the 
, Salt Lake City Depos ition Exhibit #2. 
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, 146. unsolicited response to mean that so long as the City's policy favori ng 
decentralization of servi ces for the homeless was in place, no m atter what the Miss ion proposed 
as paJi of a conditional use permi t application, staff of PDZ would detemline it had a "negative 
impact" on the City because it was in the geographic area of the other ser vice providers. 
147. On June 30, 2005, City issued an administrative determination allowing the 
Summum religion accessory use request, justifying the same, in pa11, by allowing the religion 
"free exercise of religion." (City 33) 
148. In December 8, 2005, the Commission approved a conditional use permit fo r a 
church known to be affili ated with Interfaith to allow ovemight stay (in the priest's residence 
area) and move the location of the foodbank. There was neither mention of, nor analysis, in the 
staff report or the minutes of the C::ommission of either accessory use of the Church. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
II. Clal'ifying F in al Claims Again st the City 
The Plai nti ffs are not pursuing relocation and participation claims against the City as 
identified in the Fifth and Sixth Cause of Action. Plaintiffs are not pursuing agai nst the City any 
claim of entitlcment to relocation assistance under the federa l statutes and regulations outlined in 
the Seventh Cause of Action. 
Ill. Pl aintiffs' Con stitutional Claims and RLU JPA Claim 
Arc Properl y Befor e the Court 
The City has claimed that all of Pl aintiffs' claims should be dismissed on ripeness 
grounds because Plaintiffs (I) have failed to obtain a final, definiti ve, decision from Salt Lake 
City officials, and (2) have not exhausted the administrative procedures. Und er the facts of this 
case at th is juncture, these arguments are invalid. 
A. Claims for Equitable Relief 
The Plain ti ffs' claims for equ itable relief arise from three sources: RLU IPA , the Utah 
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. "As applied" claims under RLUIP A and the 
United States Constitution are also asserted. Claims for violation of federa l constitutional rights 
are asserted for declaratory relief and damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983. 
I . The M ission' s Claims under RLU IPA are Properly Before the Couli 
RLUIP A provides an independent basis for jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc. The 
Act was not available to the Mission during its 1999 efforts to relocate plior t.o moving to the 
Central Christian Church. Nonetheless, the Mission raises the eq uality portion of the statute to 
the prescnt challenges faced by the Mission as it relates to present treatment of Participating 
Churches with Interfaith vis-a-vi s the Mission. 
The poli c ies, practices, and customs of the City have interfered with the ability of 
transient homeless to reccive intervention in emergency, life-threatening situations in Salt Lakc 
City. The present inability of the Mission to relocate under lawful regulation has impacted its 
ability to engage in religious worship, "feed and clothe Jes us" by serving meals and caring 
spirituall y for the homeless and poor, which in tum has resulted in a decrease of purchase or 
acquis ition of food stuffs and clothing by the Mission in Salt Lake City (see Omitted Facts #2 1, 
supra). In the meantime, these resu lts , and the pressure to conform and become as a 
Participating Church with Interfaith, thc loss of a mecting place and congregation, and major 
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disruption of its ability to feed, clothe and shelter the poor and needy have constituted a 
substantial burden on the religious mission of the Mission and the religious practices of Pastor 
Wilson. All of the foregoing has 11ad a direct impact on interstate commerce' Based on the 
foregoing, the jUlisdictional authority for Congress to act has been satisfied. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither the Mission nor Pastor Wilson can satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirements to invoke the protections of 42 U.S.c. § 2000 cc (a). Under these 
provisions, the City 
shall [not] impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the 
burden on that person, assembly or institution - (A) in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of 
fulihering that compelling interest." 
However, a "land use regulation" is defined so that a challenge to government action must be 
based on its impact of a "zoning or landmarking law" that limits how a claim ant uses or develops 
property in which the claimant has an interest. 9 Because the Mission's present facilities are not 
the subject of challenge (because they are inadequate in te1111S of a sanctuary for worship services 
and shelter accommodations), the Mission is not able to challenge the City's ongoing conduct 
under 42 U.S.c. § 2000cc(a). 
Nonetheless, the COUli of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has lef1 open the opportunity 
of not so restricting a claimants juri sdictional ability to claim discriminatory interference. " 
• 42 U.S .C. § 2000 cc (a) and (g) . 
9 See 42 USC. 2000cc-5(5); Praler v. eilY of Burnside, Kenllld.J' , 289 F. 3d 417, 433-43 4 (6 '" Cif. 2002). 
IU Midrash SherCll'di, Inc. v. Town afSul/side. 366 F.3d 12 14, 1229-30 (2004) em, denied 543 U. S. 1146, 125 S.Ct. 
1295,161 LEd.2d 106 (200 5). 
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Furthermore, subsequent precedent allowed evidence of the risk of discriminatory enforcement 
as being sufficient to deny granting a City summary j udgment di smissing a RLUIPA claim vis-a-
vis an ordinance that had already been applied to a plaintiff." 
RLUIP A provides that "[n]o goverrU11ent shall impose or implement a land use regulation 
that discliminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or reli gious 
denominati on. " (42 U.S .C. § 2000cc (b)(2).) For reasons cited above, th e City has discriminated 
agai nst the Mission in its implementation of its land use regulations vis-a-vis the Participating 
Churches with Interfaith .. 
Furthenn ore, "[n)o government shall impose or impl ement a land use regulation that . . 
unreasonably Iiln its religious asscmblies, institutions, or structures within a jllliscliction." (42 
U.S.c. § 2000cc (b)(3)(B). Requiring the Mission, as a church, to incur the expenses of finding, 
locating, and tentatively securing a location as a pre-requisite to appl ying for an admin istrative 
interpretation to clarify vague ordinances and customary unlawful City practices to dete1111ine 
what (I) are the limits of pe1l11issible "accessory uscs ... for reli gious worship" and (2) whether 
or not that use is a "custom[ary)" aspect of "religious worshi p" is both an "umeasonable" and 
substantial burden on thc Mi ssion. 
Based on the forego ing, Plai ntiffs' case docs state a claim under RL UI PA bccause 
"restri ctions or distinctions are [)related to the religious characterization."" Indeed, the 
legislati ve history of RLUIPA suggests that the Mission may properly cease applying until the 
past discriminatory acts and unfai r delay regarding the Mission is reso lved. "This Act does not 
11 KOllikov v. O)'(lilge Coullty Florida, 410 F.3d 1317, 1330-1331 (II 'h Cir. 2005). 
provide religious institutions wi tb immunity from land use regulations, nor does it relieve 
religious institutions from applying for variances, special pennits or exceptions, hardship 
approval, or other relief provisions in land use regulations, where available without 
discrimination or unfair delay." As applied, the Mission has demonstrated "discrimination or 
unfair delay."" 
Having shown standing to not apply prior to challenging City ordinances facially under 
RLUIPA based on di scrimination, the facial claims raised as a matter of the establishment clause 
as well as vagueness, inji-a, are incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. The Mission's Equitable Claims under the State Constitution 
are Properly Before the Court 
Plaintiffs agree that they do not have a claim against the City for damages under tbe Utab 
Constitution. (See City Memorandum at 27-28.) While interpretations of the Utah Consti tution 
are usually dependent on an exhaustion of administrative rem edies, 14 the Mission is entitl ed to 
equitable relief under the same even though appeals were not taken ii'om the Planning 
Commi ssion 's decision of October 7, 1999, or the Board of Adjustments decision of November 
15, 1999, on the grounds of (1) irrcparable harm, (2) futility, and (3) the occurrence of action:Jble 
events since that date. 
12 Midrash Sherardi, inc. v. TOllln 0/ Swfside, supra, 366 F.3d at J 235 11 . 17. 
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a. Ineparabl e Harm 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that as against government actions, "loss of 
First Amendment rights, even for limited peri ods of time, constitute ineparabl e harm." " As 
aga inst individuals, the Utah Supreme Court has found the harm required for injunctive reli ef is 
appropriate for the" 'purpose of protecting [others'] right to religious worshi p ",16 and "freedom 
of religion in being penni tted to worship in peace and good order. ,,1 7 
A chall enge to completed Ci ty conduct under both the fi'ee exercise and establi shment 
clauses of Utah' s constitution was all owed by the 2003 Utah Supreme Court opinion in Snyder v. 
Murray City Corporation." In 1994, the City of MUlTaY did not have formal pol icies governing 
guidelines or restrictions on prayers in City Council meeting. On request, the City Attorney 
outlined them by letter. In response, Tom Snyder submitted a written prayer and asked to give it 
at the next sched ul ed City Council meeting. The City Attorney responded by letter and rejected 
the prayer because it failed to meet the previously provided f,'1liclel ines . 
Not long after the request was denied, Snyder fi led a civil rigllts compl ai nt III federal 
cOUJ1 against the City. On September 13, 1995, the federal distri ct coul1 granted the City 
summ ary judf,~llent on the federa l and state claims. On October 27, 1998, the en bane Court of 
Appeals fo r the Tenth Circuit affirmed judgment on the federal claims and di smissed slate 
IJ 146 CONGo REG. S7774-0 1, 'S7776 (2000) Goinl statement orScns. I-latch and KefUlecly on the Rcligious Land 
Use and lnstituti onal izcd Persons Act of2000) . 
"See PallerSOn1'. American Fork Cfly, supra, 2003 UT at 11111 8-20; 69 P.3d at 472-73. 
Il Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.C!. 2673, 49 L.Ed .2d 547 (J976) 
Hi See COIparation afthe President oflhe Church of Jesus Christ a/Lauer-day Saints v. IVaI/lice, 573 P.2d 1285, 
1287 (Utah 1978) (citation omi tied.) 
]1 CO/pollion of the President oflhe Church 0/ Jesus Christ of Lalter-day Saints v. Wallace , 590 P. 2d 343, 345 
(J 979). 
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constitutional law claims without prejudice. On March 29, 1999, the United Slates Supreme 
Court denied appellate review. On August 3, 1999, Snyder filed for relief in state district court 
under the Utah Constitution. Notwithstanding the delay, the Utah Supreme COUJi detem1ined in 
2003 that the following equitable reli ef was appropriate: 
If Murray City chooses to continue to open its city council meetings with prayer, 
it must strictly adhere to the neutrality requirements set forth herein and in Society 
of Separationists. Under those neutrality requirements, Snyder should be allowed 
to offer his prayer. J9 
Like Snyder, the Mission and Pastor Wilson are entitled to pursue their claims for equitable relief 
under the Utah Constitution. (The Plaintiffs, however, do not waive an as applied claim for 
declaratory and equitable relief under the Utah Constitution as well.) Allowing such claims to 
proceed fOlward when a majority of the Utah Supreme COUli recently has indicated a willingness 
to enteliain free exercise claims under the Utah Consti tution in a manner that compOlis with the 
pre-1990 Smith federal rejection of the compelling govemmental interest and strict scrutiny 
analysis." 
b . Futili ty 
If the Mi ssion was unable to secure the needed approvals from Salt Lake City, the 
Mission's lease with the Rosewood Tcnace Building expired October 15, 1999 . (See Affidavit 
of Wayne Wilson, ~ ,Appendix Exhibit 12, Omitted Facts If 11 2, 127, supra.) As such, any 
appeal of the October 21, 1999, written ruling of the City's Plmming and Zoning Commission, or 
the November 15, 1999, Board of Adjustments deci sion, in tell11S of seeking reversal of the same 
18 2003 UT 13,73 P3d 325. 
19 Snyder v. A1urray Cily COlpom/ion, supra, 2003 UT '13 1,73 P.3d at 332. 
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(as distinct from a damage claim) would have been moot, and futile, either on administrative 
appeal or in district court. The fact that the exception of "capable of repetition but evad ing 
review" doctrine could have been invoked as a discretionary matter by the district court does not 
establ ish that the administrative bodies (Land Use Appeals Board or Board of Adjustments) 
could or would have done so. 
In addition, the Mission was already in court having chall enged certain aspects of the 
staff report being submitted to the Planning Commission; having continued the chall enge, inFa, 
there is no basis to require administrative exhaustion of remedies. 
c. Future Events Are the Basis for Equitable Relief 
Various completed events demonstrate the need fo r equitable relief under the Utah 
Constitution to prohibit their continued practice use. These unlawfu l practices include the 
following: (I) using the administrative interpretation process withou t complyin g with the 
mandatory requirements by ord inance that protect an applicant authorizing to invoke the samc 
(see Omitted Facts #3, 4, 81, 83, 106, supra); (2) failing to follow the mandatory ordinance to 
provide the Mission with the required form the community counci l was to sign (see Omitted 
Facts ## 82, 11 7, 139, supra); (3) failing to use discrctionary authority in the City ordinances to 
facilitate the Mission's application fo r a conditional use pennit or building permit when the 
autho ri ty was used to facilitate the appli cation of other churches and non-churches (scc Omitted 
Facts ## 118, 128, supra); (4) using lawful authority to single out the Mission for enforcement 
20 See SWle v Green. 2004 UT 76 PP 63 (Justices Durham and Nehring) 65-73 (Just ice Durrant and Witkins) 98 P.3d 
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when other churches and non-churches were not trea ted the same (see Omitted Facts #62-74, 
supra); (5) using the Board of Adjustment appeals process to thwart rather than fac ilitate the 
"religious worship" of the Mission as was done for other churches or entities (see Omitted Facts 
#9, 10, 56, 87, 88, 96, supra); and (6) interpreting facially clear or vague provisions of City 
ordinances to thwari the "religious worship" of the Mission, whi ch interpretation were contrary 
to the interpretations provided to other religions or entities. 
3. Mission's Claims under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 are Properly Before the Court 
Salt Lake City is a "person" against whom a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may 
be brought. A claim under § 1983 can include injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. A 
"final, definitive decision from Salt Lake City offici als" has occurred because the Mission is able 
to establish a "prima facie" case showing violations of the United States Constitution based on 
City's previous, definite, completed actions to whi ch the Mission had no right of appeal or was 
not a pariy. Injunctive relief and damages can be awarded based on the Mission's presentation 
of "prima facie" constituti onal violations by compl eted City administrative conduct as to the 
Mission, other reli gions or religious entities, and relevant secular entities or persons. 
The Miss ion is unwilling to apply to have the City determine what its "use" is for a 
paJiicular area because of the ongoing facially invalid standards and previous past unlawful "as 
applied" challenges imposed on the Mission. Having been previously criminally prosecuted, 
Pastor Wilson similarly has imposed "self-censorship" on vari ous aspects of hi s "religious 
820, 834-837. 
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worship" unti l these matters are clarified. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wi lson '1 49, Appendix 
Exhibit 12.) 
fV. Jurisdictional Basis for Damage Claim Against the City ' s Unlawful 
Ordinances, Policies, and Customs 
Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, the City is liable fo r facially unconstitutional ordinances, 
implementation and interpretation of the same by policymakers, and the creation of customs 
upholding unlawful interpretations and applications to Plaintiffs. 
A. Adopting Ordinances Creates Policies 
The United Stales Supreme Court has stated that 
it is plain that municipal liab ility may be imposed for a single decision by 
municipal policymakers under appropliate circumstances. No one has ever 
doubted, for instance, that a muni cipality may be li ab le under § 1983 fo r a single 
decision by its properly constituted legislative body-whether or not that body 
had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future-because 
even a single deci sion by such a body unquesti onably constitutes an act of official 
1· 21 govemment po ICy. 
The City's adoption of definitions of "rel igious worship" and "accessory use" that allow the 
government to define what is an "accessory use ... fo r religious worship" and allow what is 
"customary" religious worship (City Code §§ 21 A.62.040) facially vio lates the Establislunent 
Clause and are unconstitutionally vague. Even though an "applied" prior restraint on fi'ee 
exercise of religion is required when chall enging city ordinances that regulate matters normally 
not associated with express ion, as the success of the challenge presupposes the ord inances as 
adopted provided excessive discretion to decisiolUllakers and failed to impose time constraints on 
10 
decision makers, it is proper to subject the City to liability for the effects caused by excessively 
discretionary ordinances. 
B. Binding Nature of Decisions of I'olicymakers 
Actions taken by the Mayor and the City Attomey (and their respective offices) as 
policymakers of the City as well as custom and practice of City dep7artments bind the City as 
the responsible party for the Mission's "as applied" claims under the establishment clause, fi·ee 
exercise clause, equal protection, and due process clause. The COUli of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has stated: 
Where a city official 'responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 
subject matter in question' makes a deliberate choice to follow a course of action 
. . . fi·om among various alternatives,' municipal liability attaches to the decision. 
Pembaur v. City a/Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483,106 S.C!. 1292,89 L.Ed.2d 
452 (1986). Municipal liability arises even if the official's decision is specific to a 
paliicular situation. 22 
A ci ty official may be a policymaker for the City "in a particular area, or on a particular issue."" 
\Vhether a city official has "final policymaking authority" is a question of state law." There are 
three elements to detennine whether an official is a "final POliC)~llaker": 
(I) whether the official is meaningfully constrained 'by policies not of that 
official's own making;' (2) whether the official's decisions are final- i. e. are they 
subject to any meaningful review; and (3) whethcr the policy decision 
purportcdly made by the official is withi n the grant of authority." 
Under this standard , the Mayor and City Attorney all have becn polic )~l1akers for the City as to 
celiain aspects of this case. Unlike the City Council whose policy decisions expressed as 
21 Pembclllr v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480,106 S.C!. 1292, 1298,89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). 
22 Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 , 1 121 (lO'h Cir. 1998) 
23 McMiltian v. Monroe COUllty, Ala., 520 U.S. 781,785,117 S.C\. 1734,1 737, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). 
24 City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik , 485 U.S. 112, 124, 108 S.C\. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). 
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ordinances may be faci ally challenged, the acti ons of the City Attorney, Mayor, and those to 
whom authority has been delegated, are normall y challenged for reason of their application o f 
the ordi nances in question. 
I. City Attorney and Office as Policymakers for the City 
Under state law, a City Attorney "may prosecute violation of city ordinances" and "shall 
represent the interests of the ... municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted in any tri al 
co ul1 by the City Attorney. "" A city attorney "has the same powers in respect to violations as 
are exercised by a county or di strict attorney" except as to certain matters of transactional 
immunity." The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has already recognized that both the 
City Attomey and the County Attorney are binding policy-making deci sion-makers as it rel ates 
to criminal prosecutions for their respective governments .28 Thus, the decision to prosecute 
Pastor Wil son in 1996 was made by a policymaker for the City. 
The same discretionary policy making authority of a deputy County Attol11ey in 
Washington County rel ative to FOLlli h Amendment options choscn to follow in a civil proceeding 
was also rccognized as being clearly sufficient to establi sh hi s actions as a policymakcr for the 
County." .iust as a deputy County Attorney can be a policymaker in a County Attorney ' s Office 
through delegation, likewise, a deputy City Attorney can be a poli cymaker through delegati on. 
" Ra"dle v. City of ALirora, 69 F.3d 44 1,448 ( 10" Ci r. 1995). 
" U.CA S 10-3-928(1) and (4). 
21 U.CA S 10-3 -928(3); see also U.CA S 17- 18-1. 
" See DLS. v. Ulah, 374 F.3d 97 1,974-975 (I O'h Cir, 2004) ("II fo llows that a plaintiff can not show a rea l illIeat of 
prosecution in the face of assurances [by affi davits of city prosecutor and county attorney] of non-prosecution fro m 
the government merely by pointing to a single past prosecllti on of a different person for different conduct. ") 
29 See 1.8. v. iVashington COLinty, 127 F.3d 919, 924 (I O'h Cir. 1997) 
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The deternlination that the City Attorney is an autonomous policymaker as it relates to 
choosing between lawful and unlawful positions is in accord with the City ordinance that 
provides that the City Attorney "shall be the chief legal officer of the City," being "responsible 
to the mayor and city counci l for the proper administration of the legal affairs of the executi ve 
and legislative branches of city govenunent," with the "responsibility . . . to administer the office 
of the City AttoI11ey in a manner that will enable the mayor and the city council to fulfill their 
respective duties in a timely fashion." (City Ordinances § 2.08.040 A I and A 2.) The fact that 
neither the Mayor nor City Council are prohibited from using City funds to retain "separate 
counsel" enhances the understanding that while they mayor may not agree with the advice and 
actions taken, they do not have the authority to ovenide the deci sions of the City Attomey (or 
delegated by him to those of his office) as policymakers for the City .. 
In addition to the criminal prosecution of Pastor Wilson, the City AttoI11ey and hi s office 
developed, was aware of, and/or approved of the foll owing: (J) the creation and application of 
the Interfaith church policies (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (2) the insistence on administrative 
enforccment investi gations to be brought aga inst the Mission (see Omitted Facts # , supra); 
(3) the creation and issuance of the Apri l 20, 1999, letter labeled as an admini strati ve 
intcrpretation lettcr (see Omitted Facts # , s1Ipra); (4) the crcation and issuance of thc July 2, 
1999, letter regarding what the Mission potentially was to be classified as (sce Omitted Facts # 
, supra); (5) the creati on and the issuance of the August 31, 1999, Ictter continuing to mandate 
pre-application presentation to a community council meeting before being all owed to submit a 
conditional use ap plication (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (6) the creation and issuance of the 
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September 14, 1999 letter labeled as an administrative interpretation letter (see Omitted Facts # 
, supra); (7) opposing the Mission's efforts to remove from the statf repOli the (a) the communi ty 
counci l vote; (b) comparison of the Mission to other churches; and (c) relying on past truthful 
statements and lawfu l conduct of the Mi ssion to denigrate futu re statements and religious 
practices to engage in "religious worship" within agreed upon conditions which restricted both 
speech and advertising (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (8) defining the issues for review before 
the November 15, 1999, Board of Adjustments (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (9) interpreting 
the factual "change" necessary to justify reconsideration of the Mission's 1999 appl ication for 
the Rosewood Terrace Building (see Omitted Facts # ,supra); (l0) interpreting the Mission's 
status at the Central Christian Church (see Omitted Facts # ,supra); (1 I) lIsing the 1999 Board 
of Adjustment ruling to continue classifying the Mission as a homeless shelter for purposes of 
re-subm ission of a request to use the Rosewood Terrace Building (see Omitted Facts # 
supra); and (12) refusing to identi fy the reasons that justified the City's di fferent treatment of the 
Interfaith churches (see Omitted Facts # , supra). 
2. The Mayor as a Poli cvmaker for the City 
For the same reasons, the Mayor of Salt Lake City is a policymaker for the City as wel l. 
The mayor shall be responsible for the proper administrat ion of all affairs of the 
city with which the office is charged. The mayor's powers and dutics include, but 
are not limited to ... [s]upervising the administration and enforcemcnt of al l laws 
and ordinances of the city ... and [a]dministering and exercising control of al l 
departments of the ci ty." 
(City Ordinances 2.04 .010 A & B, Appendix Exhibit ) 
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The adoption of a City policy to discourage concentration of transient homeless in the 
downtown area was in place and was function ing vis-a-vis the Mi ssion as early as 1994 and 
carri ed through all of the Corradini administration. Although the Anderson administration stated 
the City policy regarding the concentration of the homeless services in the City has changed (see 
Omitted Facts # , supra) , the result of the actions of that administration had the same effect as 
it related to the Mission fulfilling its religious mission as had the action taken by the Corradini 
admini stration. 
The City Mayor and her or his offices developed, were aware of, and/or approved of the 
following: (1) a concerted effori to displace the Mission from its premises in 1994 (see Omitted 
Facts II , iiL/pra); (2) adoption of a process allowing Participating Churches and Interfaith to 
circumvent the administrative interpretation and conditional use pem1it process and an omission 
of administrative inspections of these "accessory use" homeless shel ters (see Omitted Facts # 
supra); (3) the favoring of the "religious worship" of Interfaith and the Part icipating Churches 
working with families li ving in Salt Lake City that were temporaril y homeless over the "religi ous 
worsh ip" of the Mission that also included single persons, those with add ictions , or in need of 
shelter to prot.ect themsclves against life-threatening weather conditi ons (see Omitted Facts # 
supra); (4) the promotion of moratoria dcsigned to thwart the Mission's relocat ion in the first 
half of 1999 in the Downtown or Gateway district (see Omitted Facts # , supra); and (5) the 
continued no tifi cation to the Mi ssion that its location based on use was restricted to the 0- 3 and 
CG zones whcn no such restriction had not becn placed on the Mission during its stay at the 
Central Christian Church. 
J 5 
C. The C ustomary Practices of the P lanning and Zoning Department 
Are Policies of the City 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
Secti on 1983 also refers to deprivations under color of a state 'custom or usage' 
and the Court in Monell noted accord ingly that ' local govemments, like every 
other § 1983 'person.' ... may be sued fo r constitutional deprivation visited 
pursuant to govemmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received 
f0l111a l approval through the body' s offt ci al decision making channels.' 436 U.S. 
at 690-691, 98 S. C!. at 2036. A § 1983 plaintiff may be able to recover from a 
municipali ty without adducing evidence of an afft nnative decision by 
policymakers if able to prove that the challenged action was pursuant to a state 
'custom or usage.'JO 
Of course, 
[i]n the same way that a law whose source is a town ordinance can offend the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though it has less than state applica ti on, so too can a 
custom with the force of law in a politica l subdivision of a State offend the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though it lacks state-wide application .'1 
Otl, er cOU1is have arti cu lated when a de facto custom of a City is sufficient to establi sh 
municipa l li ab ili ty. 
Unlike a 'policy' , whi ch comes into ex istence because of the top-down 
affirmati ve decision of a policymaker, a custom develops [rom the bottom-up. 
Thus, the liability of the munici pality for customary constitutional violations 
deri ves not from the creation of the custom, but ii·om its toleration or 
acquiescence in it." 
" It is not necessary that [the govenunental entity have] endorsed these policies or customs 
through legislative action for it to earry its imprimatur."l3 A "custom or usage" is attributab le to 
the govenu11ental body when the "duration and frequency of practice warrants a finding of either 
30 Pembaur v. eilY o/Cil1eil1l1",i, 475 U.S. 469, 46 1 n. 10,106 S.C!. 1292, 129911.10,89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). 
31 Adiekes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173, 90 S.C!. 1598, 1616-16 17, 26 L.Ed .2d 142 (1970). 
"8rillol1 v. Malol1ey, 901 F. Supp. 444,450 (D. Mass. 1995). 
33 Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 8 15 (6'" Ci r. 2003). 
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actual or constructive knowledge by ... the governing body [or poli cymaker with responsibility 
for oversight and supervision] that the practices have become customary among its employees."" 
When the departments or officials in question repeatedly act beyond their authorized scope of 
authority, resu lting in a constitutional violation, the governmental entity has shown "deliberate 
indifference ... even if unaware of the unlawfulness of the action."" 
The following customs or policies were followed by the City' s Plmming and Zoning 
Department ("PZD"), all in violation of the constitutional rights of the Mission: (I) use of the 
administrative interpretation process without complying with the mandatory requirements by 
ordinance to invoke the same (see Omitted Facts # , supra) ; (2) fai lure to follow the 
mandatory ordinance to provide the Mission with the required fOlm the communi ty counci l was 
to sign (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (3) failure to use discretionary authority to faci li tate the 
Mission's application for a conditional use permi t or building permit w hen the authority was 
used to faci litate the appli cation of other churches and non-churches (see Omitted Facts # 
supra); (4) use of lawfu l authority to single out the Mission for enforcement when other 
churches and non-churches were not treated the same (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (5) use of 
the Board of Adjustment appea ls process to thwart rather than facilit ate the "reli gious wo rship" 
of the Mission as was done for other churches or entiti cs (see Omitted Facts # , supra) ; and (6) 
interprcting facially clear or vague provisions of City ordinances to thwart the "reli gious 
worship" of the Mission, which interpretation was contrary to the interpretations provided to 
other religions or entities . 
3' Spell v. McDa niel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4'" Cir. 1987). 
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V. Facial Challenges 10 C ity Ordinances 
The Plaintiffs chall enge the City's ordinances on facial grounds under the Establi shment 
Clause as well as the Due Process Clause on vagueness grounds . 
A. Facial Violation of the Esta blishment Cla use 
The City's ordinances must satisfy three requirements under the Establishment Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its prin cipal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .. . ; finally, the 
statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion36 
On the face, the text of the ordinance violates the third prong of the Lemon test by excessively 
entangling the City in detcnnining what constitutes "religious worship," an "accessory use ... of 
religious worship," and whether that accessory use is "customary" for that religious worship. 
On their face, the City ordinances defining a church and accessory use require the 
unconstitutional entanglement of the City' S secular perspective as to what constitutes "religious 
worship." 
"P lace of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place of 
religious worship, including any accessory use or structure used for religious 
worship. 
"Accessory use" means a use that: 
CA) Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to , and serves a 
principal use; 
CB) Is customarily found as an incident to such principal use; 
l5 FOllst v. M cNeil, 310 F. 3d 849, 862 (5'" Cir. 2002). 
J6 Lemon v. Kllrt:mClIl, 403 U.S. 602, 612-6 13 , 91 S.C!. 2105,29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (quotat ions and citat ions 
om itted .) 
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(C) Contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessity of 
those occupying, working at or being servi ced by such 
principal use; 
(D) Is, except as otherwise expressly authorized by the 
provisions of thi s title, located on the same zoning lot as 
such principal use; and 
(E) Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use. 
(City Code §§ 21A.62 .040) As written, the "place of worship" can be interpreted as including 
"any accessory use," "any accessory use ... for religious worship," or "any accessory use .. 
used for rel igious worship." All three interpretations violate the third prong of the Lemon test. 
As written, the ordinances, require excessive entanglement insofar as the PDZ is required 
to determine these uses, especially when the ordinance fails to define when, and by whom, a 
"customary" use is allowed to change. Thus any church introducing any new aspect of "religious 
worship" (apal1 from doctrine) that included conduct, even if it were all confined to the existing 
premi ses, would be at ri sk. Letting govellUllent define the allowed parameters of "religi ous 
worship" with ill-dcfined cri teria requires excessive entanglement of the Ci ty in the affairs of the 
church, in violation of both the state and federal establi shment clauses. Consequently, Salt Lake 
City's use of these definiti ons is facially both "umeasonable and ilTational" and subject to a strict 
scrut iny under "substantive due process" analysis." 
" Smith lnveslmelll Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252-253 (U tah Ct. App. 1998). 
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The use of altern ate definitions - such as those used by Salt Lake County or Bri gham 
City - dernonstrate the City cannot show it has used the least restrictive means to achieve its 
express or implied plalUling and zon ing objectives (see Omitted Facts # , supra). 
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed an ordinance that exempted 
reli g io us sol icitations so lely for "evangelical, missionary or religious but not secular purposes." 
Secular solicitations were defined as "not spiritual or ecclesiastical, but rather rel ating to affa irs 
of the present world , such as providing food, clothing and counseling. " The Seventh-clay 
Adventist Church chall enged the regulation after being told it had to register to so licit because 
some of the monies being solicited would be "used for the purchase of food, clothing and shelter 
for those in need." Without regi steling, the Church raised an "as applied" challenge to the 
City's notifi cati on to the Church that the regi stration requirement applied to its solicitati on 
effOlis. 
The setting up of a city agency to make distincti ons as to that which is religious 
and that which is secular so as to sUb.ieCt the laner regulation js necessarily a 
suspect effOli. It may be that applied to an organization wnich can be shown to 
commit atrocities in the name of religion or with a religious cloak would present a 
different problem. We do not, however, ha ve this cond ition here. The conception 
of religion entertained by the City in this very case was that it had to be purely 
spiri tual or evangclical. Thus, the charitable activity of the church having to do 
with the fccding of the hunb~'y or the offer of clothing and shelter to the poor was 
deemed to be subject to regulation. This broad definition of secular is part of the 
problem. Wllether a less vigorous constru ction would result in a different 
conclusion is not, of course, before us and is not a proper subj ect fo r us to 
consider. Inasllluch, however, that the challenge is to the ord inance as applied we 
must conclude that the present effol1 is an invalid interference ..... RegJJlal ion 
which burdens the free exercise of religion and p_oses a threat of entanglemen t 
between tile affaIrs ot Church and State must be j uslifl_ed _~Y a eonlpdling state 
Interest, Sil erberl v. Verner. j14 U. s. 39/i, 8j S. ct. / 1'}0, iO L. 6d. l a 965 
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(1963), and there must neit exist less restrictive and entangling altematives, Walz 
v, Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 90 SCt, 1409, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1970)." 
Even though thi s deci sion was pre-Smith , the City's ordinance would be subject to a strict 
scrutiny anal ysis because the chall enged ordinances are detennined and applied on a "case-by-
case" basis, (see Affidavit of Cheri Coffey, Appendix Exhibit I 0,) or as applied to Interfaith's 
Participating Churches, there is an exclusive "group" detennination of appropriateness as to prior 
and future "accessory use" related to the "place of worship ," 
1. Facial Violation of Prohibition on Vagueness 
Plaintiffs challenge the ordinances of the City ordinances on grounds of vagueness, , 
Vague laws offend several impOItant values, First, because we assume that man 
is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, Vague laws trap the iIU10cent by not 
providing fair waming, Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to 
be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them, A 
vague law impem1issibly delegates basic poli cy matters to policemen, judges, and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc basis and subjective basis, with the attendant 
danger of arbitTary and discriminatory application,39 
"A regulation is void on its face if it is vague that persons 'of common intelligence must 
necessaril y guess as to its meaning and differ as to its appl ication.' Connally v, Gen, ConsU', Co" 
269 US 385, 391, 46 S Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed 322 (1926)."" For the reasons notcd above under 
the establi shment clause claim, the City' S ordinances are also unconstitutionally vague. 
38 Espi nosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 , 48 1-82 (10"' Cir, 1980) . 
39 Flipside, supra, 455 U,S. a l 498; 102 S. CL a l 1193, 
40 KOllikav v. Orange Caull I)' Florida, 410 F.3d 1317, 1329 (5 '" Ci r. 2005). 
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Notwithstanding the stated req ui rement to present to a communi ty counci l before a 
conditional use pennit may be accepted, Salt Lake City has allowed the zoning administrator to 
have unbridl ed di scretion in determining whether to wai ve that requirement. 
A complete appli cati on shall contain at least the following infonnation submitted 
by the applican t, unless certain infonnation is determined by the zoning 
administrator to be inapplicable or unnecessary to appropriately evaluate the 
appli cation: ... (11) such further infomlation or documentation as the zoni ng 
administrator may deem to be necessary fo r a fu ll and proper consideration and 
disposition of the particular application" 
As used in the licensing context, similar language has been found to vi olate "unblidled 
discretion" prior restrain t requirements. 42 In addition, because of its inherent contradictory 
nature with the opening authority of waiver, it fa ils to give notice of what waiver can be sought 
for by an applicant. 
VI. "As Applied" Challenges to the City Ordinances Brought by the Plain tiffs 
Based on the foregoing conduct authorized by or known to policymakers of the 
City, or established customs, the Plaintiffs bring "as applied" challenges on gTOunds of violations 
of the establishment clause, vagueness based on the due process clause, "prior restraint" of free 
exercise of religi on, fi'ee exercise of religion , denial of due process regarding the Board of 
Adjustment ruling on November 15, 1999, and equal protection. 
The Missi on is unwilling to apply to have the City determine what its "use" is for a 
41 SLC Cil y Code § 21 A 54.060 8, 11. 
42 See AlIl ericall Target Advertisillg, 1I1C., 199 F.3d 124 1, 125 1-1254 (J 0'" Cir. ) cen . dellied 53 1 U. S. 8 11 , 12 1 S.C! . 
34,148 L.Ed.2d 14 (2000). 
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particular area b ecause of the ongoing facially invalid standards and previous past unlawful "as 
appli ed" challenges imposed on the Mission. Having b een previously criminally prosecuted , 
Pastor Wi lson similarly has imposed "self-censorship" on various aspects of hi s " religious 
worship" until these matters are clarified. (See Affidavit of Wayne Wil son ~ 49, Appendix 
Exhibit 12.) 
A. Establishment Clause Violations 
To the degree the facial challenge raised as a violation of the Establi shment Clause is 
faciall y rejected, the sam e claims are also raised in as applied context. 
The City's ord inances, practices and customs must satisfy three requirements under the 
Establi slunent Clause of the United States Constitntion . 
First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or pnmary 
effect mllst be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the 
statnte must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion'3 
As administered, the City delegated governmental functions to a religious association In 
violation of the second and third prong of the Lemon test. As administercd, the City has favored 
certain religions o r religi ous entities over the Mi ssion, thus violating the Establ ishment Clause. 
1. Improper Delegati on of Civic Authority to a Religious Entity 
In 1989, the United States Supreme COUli observed that 
[i]n the course of adjudicating specific cases, this COUl1 has come to understand 
the Establislullent Clause to mean that government ... may not di scriminate 
among persons on th e basis of their religious beliefs and practices [and] may not 
del egate a governmen tal power to' a religious institution[.t4 
43 Lemon v. Kurloman, 403 U.S . 602, 612·613, 91 S.Ct. 21 05, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1 97 1) (quotations and citati ons 
omirted. ) 
" CoullIY oj Allegheny v, American Civil Liberlies Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590·91, 109 S.C!. 30S6, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 
(1989) (footnoles containing citations omitted.) 
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The City's practice of (I) treating the services to the homeless provided by the Participating 
Churches as coming within the practices and poli cies of the Interfaith without further inspection 
and (2) al lowi ng the Participating Churches to ci rcumvent the administrati ve interpretation or 
process of acquiring a conditi onal use penni t based on representations of Interfaith vio lates these 
constitutional requirements. 
We can assume that [Interfaith] would act in good faith in their exercise of the 
[delegated] power, yet [the City'S practice] does not by its tenns require that the 
[Interfaith 's] power be used in a reli giously neutral way. The potential for conflict 
inheres in the situation, and [the City has] not suggested any effecti ve means of 
guaranteeing that the delegated power will be used exclusively for secular, 
neutral, and nonidelogical purposes. In addition, the mere appearance of a joint 
exercise of legi slati ve authority by Church and State provides a significant 
symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power 
conferred. It does not strain our prior holdings to say that the [practice] can be 
seen as having a "plimary" and "principal" effect of advancing rel igion 45 
Furthermore, relying on Interfaith' s representations as being sufficient to all ow uninvestigated 
conduct of member churches that on the face could merit enforcement of zoning requirements 
mandating relocation of Participating Churches to other zones of the City, violates the third 
prong of the Lemon test. 
[The City's practice] emmeshes churches in the exerCIse of substantial 
governmental powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause; ' the objective is to prevent, as fa r as possible, the intrusion 
of either [Church or State] into the precincts of the other. ' Lemon v. KurlzmC/n, ... 
We went on in that case to state: 
Under our system the choice has been made has been made that govellU11 ent 
is to be entirely excluded fi'om the area ofrel igious instruction and churches 
excluded from the affai rs of governmen t. The Constitution decrees that 
45 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116,125-126,103 S.Cl. 50 5,74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982) (c itations and quotations 
omitted.) 
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religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the 
institutions of private choice, and that while some invol vement and 
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. 
Our contemporary views do no more than reflect views approved by the Court 
more than a century ago: 
The structure of goverrunent has, for the preservation of civi l liberty, 
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other 
hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority. 
As these and other cases make clear, the core rationale underlying the 
Establislunent Clause is preventing 'a fu sion of governmental and religious 
functions.' The Framers did not set up a system of govenunent in which 
important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared 
with religious institutions. 
[The City's de facto delegation of authority to Interfaith) substitutes the 
unilateral and absolute power of a church[ -related entity) for the reasoned 
decisionmaking of a public legislative [and administrative) body acting on 
evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant economic and 
political implications. The challenged [practice) thus enmeshes [affiliated) 
churches in the processes of government and creates danger of '[p)olitical 
fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines,' Lemon v. Kurtzman, ... 
Ordinary human experi ence and a long line of cases teach that few entanglements 
could be more offensive to the spirit of the Constitution.46 
Thus, the City's reliance on Interfaith's representations both as to what services are provided to 
the homeless of Pmii cipating Churches and over time the safety of the environment in which 
they are provided fails the tllird prong of the Lemon tcst. 
2. Objective Favoring of Other Churclles and Religi ons Over the Mission 
In addition to the conduct of the City with Interfaith recited above, the fa ctual basis for 
several of the Mission's claims includes the following conduct of the City vis-a-vis otber 
churches as compared to actions taken by the City regarding the Mission. 
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a, Disparate Enforcement of Code 
While functioning as a church and fu lfilling its ministry to the homeless, the Mission was 
subj ect to admini strative inspections while other Participating Churches were not (see Omitted 
Facts # ,supra) , 
b, Disparate Enforcement of Conditional Use Process 
Without admini strative authOlity to do so, the City's PZD did not require the Zion's 
Lutheran Church to apply for and complete the conditional use process for a substantial 
expansion of a conditional use, FUIihennore, none of the Participating Churches were required to 
obtain a conditional use pemlit ei ther for an expansion of a pre-existing conditional use (through 
a new "accessory use", fo r religious worship") or at least an administrative ruling (with notice 
to tbe community counci l) that tbe involvement with a facially applicable "homeless shelter" 
definition was to be subsumed as an "accessory use," The Mission was never allowed any of 
these options, 
c, Disparate Use of Board of Adjustment Process 
The PZD treated the Mi ssion differently in terms of presentation and procedure to the 
Board of Adjustmcnts than that Llsed with the Church of tile Madeline and the Jewish 
Community Ccnter. The appeals focused on the religi ous related entit ies' "secular" activities, 
e,g, a school at Church of the Madeline and a day care center at th e Jewish Community 
Center. For these two ent it ies , the PZD and Board of Adjustments encouraged and allowed 
(I) delays to obtain a clarifying legal opinion or modify an earli er ruling of the Board, as 
.16 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, s1Ipra, 459 U.S. at 126-127 (quotations, citations, and fOOlnote omitted.) 
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well as (2) a request made, after disclosure, for a Board of Adjustment decision regarding 
what was considered to be an "accessory" use of the Jewish Community Center if it 
disagreed with the assessment of Randy Taylor. In the Mission's case, the City would not 
delay the hearing even though the appellant requested that the Board do so . In add ition, the 
Board of Adjustments was not notified by the City of the practice of considering the 
providing overnight accommodations on a temporary basis for families by Participating 
Churches with Interfaith to be an "accessory use" to their "place or worship" and not 
requiring a conditional use pennit. 
d. Disparate Recognition of Value of Free Exercise of Religion 
On June 30, 2005, a request for an administrative exception was granted to the Summum 
religion. One of the reasons relied upon to grant the same was to allow the church the "fi·ee 
exercise of religion". (City 33) It is not apparent that at any time the Mission's "free exercise of 
religion" was factored into the City's dealing with the Mission. 
3. Violation of United States Establishment Clause 
In addition to the violation of the third prong of the Lemon test noted under the facial 
challenge, when these examples of disparate treatment are taken together or individually, a 
violation of Establishment Clause has been demonstrated. As applied to the M ission, such 
conduct violates the first and second prong of the Lemon test. 
a. Abandonment of Secular PUI])OSe 
As noted above, the City's ordinances have been interpreted as favori ng one perspective 
of "religi ous worship" as an "accessory use" over other perspectives that are also understood to 
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be "religious worship ." While the use is claimed to be secular in purpose by the City, the 
continuation of the Interfaith favoring practice without amending the ordinances to clarify the 
all owabl e parameters places in question the purpose of the application of the City ordinances. 
The proffered "purpose" of the legislation is evaluated by an objective observer who is 
presumed to know the (I) "hi story and context of the community," (2) " historical context of the 
[govemmen( action]", (3 ) "specific sequence of events leading to its passage", and (4) 
"implementation" of govel1unent action47 " ' [TJhe question IS what viewers may fairly 
understand to be the purpose of the [action], ,,48 and whether it ""makes outsiders of non-
adherents .' ,49 Based on the hi story of the City's interaction with Interfaith and the Mission, one 
could sUI111i se that there has been an abandonment of a "true" secular purpose: "religious 
worship" involving the poor and tbe needy is acceptable if it meets specific criteria, a dominant 
one of which is that the persons come from the local community (and not be transient), be an 
intact fam ily, and have no addictions. While such restraints may keep the "not in my backyard" 
syndrome ("NIMBY") to a minimum while simultaneously reaping tbe benefit of private charity 
ass isting the homel ess rather than government, when implemented in a way that favors such 
"" religious worship," and no clear demarcation as to what is favored and unfavored secular 
conduct, the original secular "purpose" of the ordi nance is disclosed in advance by ordinance, 
policy or rule, the real purpose of tile applicati on of the terms is , at best, suspect. 
Lemon's "purpose" requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental 
deci sionmaker- in this case, Congress-from abandoni ng neutral ity and acting 
47 A4cCreCllJI County, Kell/l(cky v. Americ(ln Civil Liberties Unio ll o/Ken/ueh.)!, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2737 (2005). 
(quotation omitted.) 
48 Jd at 2738 (quotation omi tted.) 
" Jd. at 273 5. 
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with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters . . . [Ilt is 
a signifi cant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial 
liability, to predict which of its activiti es a secular court will consider religious. 
The line is hardly a bright one, and an organ ization might understandably be 
concemed that a judge would not understand its reli gious tenets and sense of 
miss ion. Fear of potential liability might affect the wayan organization carried 
out what it understood to be its religious mi ssion. 50 
Both the Mission and Pastor Wilson seek clarification of the City's requirements before 
proceeding forward. 
b . Favoring One Religion Over Another 
"[TJhe 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal government ... can pass laws which ... prefer one religion over 
another. "S I The "First Amendment mandates neutrality between rel igion and religion"s2 " 
"Lemon's" purpose requirement aims at preventing [govemmentJ from abandoning neutrality 
and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters ."S] 
Favoring one religion over another, undennines the "understanding, reached ... after decades of 
religious war, that liberty and social stabi lity demand a religious tolerance that respects the views 
of all cit izens .... "S4 The express acts of the City favoring of the Interfaith' s view of "reli giolls 
worship" over that of Pl ai nti ffs vio lates the second prong of tile Lemon test. 
50 Corporation oJlh e Presiding Bish op a/ lh e Church oj Jesus Christ ofLatler-day Saill ts v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
335-336,107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed .2d 273 (1987). 
" Everson v. Board oj Ed"calion oj Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) rehearing 
denied 330 U.S. 855 , 67 S.C! 962 (1947). 
"Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104,89 S.C! 266, 21 L. Ed.2d 228 (19 68). 
53 COIporatjon of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jeslis Christ oj Laller-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 
107 S.Ct. 2683 , 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) . 
"Zelman v. Simmons-Hoeris, 536 U.S. 639, 718,122 S.C! 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). 
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B. Due Process Vagueness Cha ll enge 
By showing the following six "vagueness" applications of the City ordinances to the Mission, 
Plaintiffs demonstrate the validi ty of the Plaintiffs' "as appl ied" chall enge. 
First, in September 14, 1999, Randy Taylor originally found that the Mission's practice 
of providing emergency she lter in life-threatening circumstances would constitute an accessory 
Lise to the primary uses of a place of worship and a boarding house. He later reflected that "any 
reasonable person" would have interpreted the ordinances that way so long as those in need did 
not come in "hordes". (Deposition of Randy Taylor __ Appendix Exhibit 5.) On the other 
hand, on September 8, 2003, the Mission was advised that the emergency overnight stay of a 
single homeless person would qualify the Mission as a homeless shelter. see Omitted Facts # 
supra) . It remains unknown whether or not the sleeping of persons at the Mission dUling 
Christmas Eve 1996 would be a violation as defined September 8, 2003. 
Second, there was a significant di fference in perspective as to what was required to issue 
and admin istrative interpretation. This is significant because Randy Taylor insisted tha t he 
fo ll owed the requirements of City ord inances regarding the submi ssion of Administrative 
Interpretations. (Deposition of Randy Taylor _ _ , Appendix Exhibit 5.) Nonetheless, there was 
no evidence that the mandatory, limit ing application procedures were foll owed when lssUlng 
what he considered to be administrative interpretations (see Omitted Facts # , supra.) Wayne 
Mills, on the other hand, would not characteli ze his June 2 1, 2004 lettcr as being and 
admi ni strative interpretation because, in part, Pastor Wilson never filled out the fon11 or paid the 
fee. (Deposition of Wayne Mills 31 :2-13, Appendix Exhibit 8.) 
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Third, the impact of the change in city policy was viewed differently by different zoning 
administrators. And again in 1999, the existing city policy regarding the decentralization of 
services for homeless people was specifically relied upon as a basis to notify the Mission that its 
proposal woul d not receive a positive recommendation. Later, under Mayor Anderson's 
administration, the Ci ty changed its policy to reflect centralization of services for homeless 
people. This is fraught with the potential to facilitate or frustrate the "religious worship" of the 
Mission under one situation, the Mission's factual submissions from their 1999 request for a 
conditional use pennit could be revaluated and considered again in 2003 . In another, the Board 
of Adjustments ruling would effectively bar any application submitted by the Mission without a 
change in what it intended to do at the Rosewood Terrace facility. Randy Taylor, zoning 
administrator tluough 2000, testified that such a change in policy would provide the factual basis 
necessary to allow for a re-evaluation of the Board of Adjustments determination in 1999 that 
classified the Mission's proposed use at the Rosewood Terrace Building as a homeless shelter. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 38: 12-24; 4 1 :13-42:2 Appendix Exhibit 5). On the other hand, 
even on June 2 I, 2004, Wayne Mills, acting Zoning Administrator, issued an infonnal letter to 
the Mission indicating that because their was an absence of a "factual" change in the proposal of 
the Mi ssion, precluded reconsideration of the Miss ion's prior submi ssion on the Rosewood 
Terrace Building. (Deposition Exhibit # __ ; Deposition of Wayne Mills, Appendix Exhibit 
8). 
Fourth, on September 10, 1999, tluee draf1s of a letter regarding the potenti al use of the 
Mission at the Rosewood Terrace Bui lding (167 North 600 West) were prepared fo r Randy 
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Taylor's signature. One provided the Mi ssion was a church, one provided the Mission was a 
church and boardinghouse, and one provided the Miss ion was a church, boardinghouse, and 
homeless sheller. These letters were the results of discussions with Brent Wilde, Bil l Wright, 
and Lynn Pace. "To the best of [Rand y Taylor's] knowledge, [the draft letters] seem to represent 
how the Mission could have been classified at that time. (See Omi tted Fact _, supra.) 
Fifth, certain words and phrases remained standardless or diffi cult to understand even for 
Zoning Administrators. For example, Wayne Mill s indicated he could m ake a "new" review of 
the classi fi cation of the Mission as a "homeless shelter" by the Board of Adjustment at the 
Rosewood Terrace Building if the Mi ssion would submit a "new proposal" regarding the 
propeliy showed there was a "chan ge" from the previous submission. The criteria to detenlline 
if there was a "change" could be "anything". 
Q What type - what criteria do yo u use to detenlline if there' s been a 
change? 
A It could be anything, [ would have to see the proposal. 
Q Tell me what you mean by anything. 
A It depends upon what is being proposed. 
(Deposition of Wayne Mills 20: 13 - 18 . Appendix Exhibit 8.) Randy Taylor also struggled to 
provide definite criteria to explain the meaning of an aspect of tbe City Code that had been 
quoted in the April 20, 1999, administrati ve int crpretation letter to the Miss ion. When asked bow 
a "negative impact" on the neighborhood was di stinguislled from the same impact on "the city as 
a whole," he stated: " I just -- - 1 guess that the neighborhood, being pa rt of the ci ty as a whole, is 
... how I would respond to thaI." (Deposit ion of Randy Taylor, 43:11-19, Append ix Exhib it 5.) 
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Sixth, equally critical to this case was that neither the interplay between an "accessory 
use" of a church and a "homeless shelter," nor the difference between the Miss ion's church 
functions, "religious worship," and services to the homeless, were understood by Randy Taylor 
after months of review". Randy Taylor perceived the "use" classification in the Mission's case 
as being complicated because of "the level of services and so on to homeless and to --- and the 
substance abuse and all being considered conditional uses in most locations ." (Deposition of 
Randy Taylor, 60:10-14 Appendix Exhibit 5.) Pastor Wilson or some of his staff talked with 
Randy Taylor about the Mission being a church, with part of its mission being to feed and clothe 
the needy because to do so is feeding and clothing Jesus, and, thereby, is an integral part of their 
religious worship . (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 29:25-30:5 Appendix Exhibit 5.) As the 
Zoning Administrator, "to the extent that --- that as a church activities like substance abuse and 
homeless services of various kinds would be considered allowed uses under the umbrella, if you 
wi ll , of the church, that part of it was complicated to me." (Deposition of Randy Taylor, 61 :2-6 
Appendix Exhibit 5.) The compli cating lack of clarity was exacerbated by the question in Randy 
Taylor's mind about the distinction between a miss ion and a church. Some aspects of the 
Mission clearly appeared to be church and/or worship activiti es; whereas, counseling, referrals, 
providing meals, and other social aspects would be classified by Mr. Taylor to be activitics in 
which a mission would engage - related, but di stinctly separate from worship. 
" 
Well, yes, there was some question in my mind . There was quite a bit of 
discussion about mission versus church. And I didn't pretend to understand fully 
what a mission is, but J had an idea. But they celiainly sounded like a church in 
many, many, many ways and did church-related things ... what I thought a mission 
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was was a --- you, know, the kinds of things that they do. They provide services 
of valious kinds to folks who need them, a I unch, a --- some counseling, some ---
some refelral to help of various kinds ... 1 viewed it probably more as a --- you 
know, you've got your church and the worship services, and then you've got the 
social aspects on the side or along with thal. And I viewed them as different 
things, related but different. 
(Deposition of Randy Taylor, 75:2 I -76:20 Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Confli~ting interpretations among those charged with enforcing zoning laws that impact 
First Amendment freedom of religion is sufficient to establ ish a violation of RLUIP A and rel ated 
constitutional doctrines of vagueness and unbrid led discretion that accompanies prior restraints. " 
When a[n] [ordinance] implicates First Amendment rights, we may consider the 
risk of arbitrary enforcement-the possibi li ty the statute will chill expression .... 
[Konikov] presented evidence that tends to show that the law does delegate too 
much authority to those charged with enforcing it. Two members of the Code 
Enforcement division differed in their opinion of what frequency would trigger a 
violation. According to Officer Caneda, two meetings per week would not trigger 
a violation, but three probably would. George LaPOIte, the manager of the 
division, on the other hand, opined that even one meeting per week could 
constitute a violation. Although the officers do not make a fina l detennination of 
violation, they have discretion to initiate an investigation into a possible violation, 
which can lead to discriminatory enforcement. Because Konikov has produced 
evidence that the Code has an inherent risk of discriminatory enforcement, he has 
established the vagueness of the Code. For this reason, we reverse the di strict 
court's grant of summary judgment on this claim." 
As in this case the Mission has shown not a risk of arbitrary enforcement but actual, 
di scriminatory enforcement a/or/fori the City's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
56 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that when "unbridled discretion" is shown as a matter of prior 
restraint analys is, then fa cial unconstitutionality on grounds of vagueness as it relates to arbitral), enforcement has 
been establ ished. See ACO RN ele. v. Tulsa. 
" KO llikov v. Orange Counly FloridC/ , 41 0 F.3d 1317, 133 0-1 33 1 (1 I" Cir. 2005). 
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C. " Prior Restraint" of Free Exercise of Religion Challenge 
In 1940, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a state statute 
that required obtaining a certificate from a government official prior to soli citing for a religious 
cause. 
It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an application to the secretary of 
the public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to detennine if the 
cause is a religious one, and the issue of a certificate depends upon his affinnative 
action. If he finds the cause is not tbat of religion, to solicit for it becomes a 
crime. He is not to issue it as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it 
involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the fonnation of an 
opinion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he detennines that the cause 
is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of detennining 
its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and 
included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth .. . 58 
(A 1975 Court opinion found that "[t]he elements of a prior restraint were clearly set forth" by 
the foregoing language. 59) The 1940 COUli continued: 
The line between a discretionary and a ministerial act is not always easy to mark 
and the statute has not been construed by the State COUJi to impose a mere 
ministerial duty on the secretary of tbe welfare counci l. Upon his decis ion as to 
the nature of the cause, the right to solicit depends. Moreover the avai labi li ty of a 
judicial remedy for abuses in the system of licensing sti ll leaves that system one 
of previous restraint which, in the field of liee speech and press, we have held 
inadmissible. A statue authorizing previous restraint upon the exercise of the 
guaranteed freedom by judicial decision afier trial is as obnoxious to the 
Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action ... 60 
[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views of 
system s upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a detcll11ination 
by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidd en burden upon 
the exercise ofliberty protected by the constitution ... 61 
" CCIIl/lVell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2 13 (1940). 
"SoLllh easlel'll Promotions, Ltd. v. Conl'Qd, 420 U. S. 546, 554 ,95 S.Ct. 1239 ,43 L. Ed.2d 44 8 (1975). 
60 Cantwell v. Sta te of Cunnecticut, 3 10 U.S . 296, 306, 60 S.C!. 900, 84 L.Ed. 2 13 (1940). 
" Call/well v. State of Connecticut, 31 ° U.S. 296, 307. 60 S.C!. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2 13 (1940). 
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A 1980 Court opinion characterized the J 940 opinion as holding the statute unconstitutional as 
an "invalid prior restraint on the free exercise of religion.,,62 In 1990, the COUJi recognized the 
1940 opinion as an example of a hybJid claim of fi'eedoms of speech and religion that merited 
protection under a " licensing system ... under which an administrator had discretion to deny a 
li cense to any cause he deemed nOJU"eligious.,,6J 
However, laws dealing with zoning and the issuance of permits (as distinct from licensing 
religious speech) require an "as applied" situation to bring the claim because they are presumed 
to be removed from the regulation of First Amendment expression. 
For example, a law requiring building pennits is rarely effective as a means of 
censorship. To be sure, on rare occasion an opportuni ty for censorship will exist, 
such as when an unpopular newspaper seeks to build a new plant. But such laws 
provide too blunt a censorship instrument to warrant judicial intervention prior to 
an all egation of actual misuse. And if such charges are made, the general 
application of the statute to areas uJU"elated to expression will provide the COUltS a 
yardstick with which to measure the li censor 's occasional speech-related 
decision" 
Fear of prosecution if religious beliefs were exercised and subsequently determined to not be an 
"accessory use ... for religious worship" has limi ted the religious practice of the Mission and 
Pastor Wil son. Refusal of the City to publicly define what the "accessory LIse" standards are as 
compared with those of a '11Omeless shelter" on ly has exacerbated the problem. (Affidavit of 
Wayne Wilson , ~ 44, Appendix Exhibit 12). 
62 Village ujSchawnberg v. CiJi:ens jor A Beller EnvironmenJ, 444 U.S. 620, 629, IDa S.C l. 826, 63 L.Ed. 2d 73 
( 1980) 
63 Employment Division. Deparlment of Human Resources a/Oregon v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 88 1, J 10 S.CL 1595 . 
108 L. Ed. 2d 87 6 ( 1990). 
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I. Unbridled Discretion 
The previous facial and six examples of "as applied" vagueness as it relates to noti ce and 
standard of enforcement noted above are incorporated herein by this reference. This is in 
accordance with ex isting precedent establishing that the "vagueness" and "unbridl ed discretion" 
under a plior restraint chall enge are interchangeable." 
2. No Time Constraint for Pre- judi cial Review 
The City does not have any time constraints under which it must issue an infonnal or 
fonnal administrati ve ruling regarding a particu lar use on specific propel1y. The City has taken 
longer to classify the Mission vis-a-vis the secular categories used to detennine applicable "use" 
than other entities. For example, while it nom1ally takes two to three weeks to detem1ine a use, 
see Omitted Facts # , supra, the incomplete classification of the use of the M ission in 1999 
took at least five weeks (March 12, 1999, through Apri l 20, 1999). The informal reques t for 
classification as a church took at least thi lieen weeks (July 1, 1999, through September 14, 1999) 
to receive an answer. Usi ng the second request in 2004 for an informal request fo r classifi cation 
as a church, it took over seven weeks (May 3, 2004, through June 2 1, 2004) to recei ve a 
response. The 1998 by Randy Taylor rcquest for more informati on regarding the Andrews 
Avenue location was accompanied by an open ended with no time constrai nt on when a use 
wou ld be determined. 
" 71Je Tool Box. Inc. v. City o/Ogden, 355 F. 3d 1236, 1242 (10'" CiT. 2004) quoting Cily 0/ Lakewood v. Plaill 
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 76 1, 108 S.C\. 21 38 , 100 L.Ed.2d 77 1 (1988). 
" See A CORN v. Cil), o/Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 741 n.1 (1 O'h Cir. 1987). 
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The City never provided the Mission with the document to be signed by the 
neighborhood counci l as part of the pre-appl ication process (see Omitted Facts # , supra.) 
There is no time constraint as to when the Zoning Administrator is to provide this document. 
The Mission was required to re-present to the Rio Grande Community Council in April of 
1999 as well as delay its filing of an application in August of 1999 because of the failure of the 
Fairpark Community Council to meet that month (see Omitted Facts # , supra .) There are no 
time nor procedural constraints in the City ordinances addressing how these delays are to be 
treated so as not to burden the religiously based applicant. 
Pre-1999, the Mission was impeded in its effOlis to apply for approval when community 
councils were either not scheduled (by PZD) or refused to issue velification of a presentation 
(see Omitted Facts # , supra.) On the face, there is no time constraint as to when the 
neighborhood counci l or other entity must (1) hear the presentation of the church, (2) or act on 
the church's explanation. 
Based on the foregoing, the Mission may bring an action seeking relief against the City 
for imposing a "prior restraint on fi'ee exercise ofreligion". 
D. Violation of Free Exercise of Religion 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court made the following statemcnt: 
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and 
upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from 
animosity to religion or distrusts of its practices, all officials must pause to 
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the lights it secures. 
Those in office must be resolute in resisting impol1unate demands and must 
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are 
secular. Legislators may not devise mechani sms, ovel1 or disguised, designed to 
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persecute or oppress a religion or its practi ces. The laws here in questi on were 
enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are vo id 6 6 
As applied to the Mission, the Mission was impeded in its religious mission by the following 
conduct approved by City policymakers: (1) the City followed the " unus ual" practice of having a 
landlord seek to evict the Mission in 1994 as a nui sance in violation of zoning laws instead of 
doing it themselves as was n01111all y done (see Omitted Facts # , supra); (2) the City had staff 
oppose or debate with the Mission during its presentation at every community council meeting 
(see Omi tted Facts # , supra); (3) the City took very ex tended periods of time to determine the 
Mission's use classification (see Part VI(B), supra); (4) the City imposed the conditional use 
pennit burdens on the Mission regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building. When had the Mission 
only applied as a secular boardinghouse, it would never have had to go through the conditional 
use process (See Omitted Fact # , supra); and (5) the City used a non-applicable 
determination by the Board of Adjustments to determine where to send the Mission fo r 
relocation purposes (see Omitted Facts # , supra) . 
E. Denial of Equal Protection 
While equal protection claims under zoning provisions are norm all y evaluated on a 
rationa l basis test, the 
'rational it y' in the law of equal protection is not in fact a single standard , though 
the courts have been coy about admitting this. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Livil1g Cel1ter, lnc., 473 U. S 432, 105 SCI. 332349, 8 7 L. Ed.2d 313 (1 985), like 
this a zoning case, and decisions following it ... identify a category of sensitive 
uses or acti vities, where j udges are to be more alert for unjustifiable 
di scrimination than in the usual case in which govcmment regul ati ons are 
66 Church o/the Lllkumi Babalu Aye v. City a/Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547,113 S.C!. 2217, 124 LEd.2d 471 
(J993). 
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challenged on equal protection gTO unds .... Previous decis ions of this court and 
oth er courts of appeals have recognized that the Cleburne line of cases expands 
the boundaries of "rationali ty" review .. .. Churches are no less scnsitive a land 
use than homes for the men tally retarded. 07 
The reasons reviewed above establish a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that of the Utah Constitution whose protections may be greater than the 
federal. r,' 
F. Denial of Due Process By Subseq uent A pplication of the November 19,1999, 
Board of Adjustment Hearing Aga inst the M ission 
After the Mission' s departure fro m the Central Christian Church, it initiated dialogue 
with the City both as to re-consideration of its request to use the Rosewood Terrace Building and 
what "use" the Miss ion wou ld be classified as . On June 23,2003, the Mission met with Mayor 
Anderson and the Planning Director Luis Zunguze. On June 24, 2003, Phi l Arena submitted 
additional information regarding the Mission to Director Zunguze. 
After the owners of the Rosewood Ten'ace Building confinn ed in writing to the Mission a 
wi llingncss to complete the transaction proposed in 1999, the Mission met with PZD staff and 
counsel on November 8, 2003 . V/hile the City' s policy on concentrating services fo r the 
homeless had changed, counsel for the City informed the M iss ion that if its uses at the Rosewood 
Terrace Building had not changed, the Mission would rcmain class ified as a homeless shelt er and 
unab le to qualify for the 3-1 Zone. The Mission requ irements and change in the City ordinance 
to refl ect current practices regarding homeless. 
"' Civil Liberries/or Urban Believers v. Cily a/Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 768 (2003) (Posner, J., dissent ing.) 
"' See Blue Cross Blue Shield v. Slole, 779 P.2d 634 (U"h 1989). 
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In response to the Mission's second request to the City to be considered as a church, on 
June 21, 2004, Zoning Administrator Wayne Mills infonn all y notified the Mission that without 
showing a change in use, the Board of Adjustments classi fi cation would stand and preclude any 
relocation at the Rosewood Terrace Building because of the previous classification of the 
Mission's proposal as a homeless shelter. On June 21, 2004, the Mission and Attomey M ichael 
Hutchings met with Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the Planning Director in an eff0!1 to 
address relocation effDli s. After the meeting, in response to the Mission's discussion of City 
practices with Interfaith churches, on June 24, 2004, Vickie Neumann, Executive Director of 
Interfaith, met with Wayne Mills, and on June 29, 2004, provided him with additional 
information. On July 19, 2004, the Mission and Attomey Michael Hutchings met again with 
Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the PZD, but they were unable to resolve the impact of the 
Board of Adjustment lUling classifying the Mission as a "homeless shelter." 
After either the June 21,2004, or July 19, 2004, with Mayor Anderson, at his direction, 
the City PZD staff provided the Mission with a map of the zones of the City where the M ission 
could look to relocate. The map was restricted to the D-3 and CG zones of the City where 
"homeless shelters" are a conditi onal use. At no time has the City ever notified the Mission it 
could locate in all of the areas where churches are a permitted use or conditional use. (See City's 
Memorandulll at 19-20; Affidavi t of Cheri Coffey, ' I~ 6, 7.) The Rosewood TClTace Building 
was subsequently purchased by another party and the Mission lost the donation. 
The City's use of the Board of Adjustment proceedings against the Mission is a denial of 
due process. 
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In 2005, the Utah Supreme Court re-affimled that the legal doctrine of res judicata refers 
to the overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be given to judgments .... '[R]es judicata has 
two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.,69 As plinciples of claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion apply to administrative hearings:" Whether the impediment of res judicata is 
consid ered as a matter of claim preclusion or issue preclusion as to fact or law, as a matter of 
Utah law, the Mi ssion is bound by neither as it relates to the Board of Adjustment ruling. 
"Claim preclusion involves tbe same parties or their Pli vies and the same cause of 
action."" Collateral estoppel , on the other hand, "'prevents parties or their pri vies from 
relitigating [factual or legal] issues which were once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted 
in a final judgment These doctrines do not apply because tbe Mission was not in privity with the 
City. 
Neither the Mission nor tbe tben property owner requested or paid for an administrative 
interpretation as required City Ordinance. 
The Zoning Administrator, subject to the procedures, standards and limitations of 
this Cbapter, may render interpretations, including use interpretations, of the 
provisions of this Title .. . Applications for interpretations may be fi led only by a 
property having need for an interpretat ion or by the propeliy owner' s agent. 
(Sa il Lake City Code §§ 21A. 12.020, 2IA.12.030) Contrary to the asserti ons of Randy 
Taylor, as a matter ofl aw, he was unauthorized to issue either "administrati ve letter" of Apri l 20, 
1999, or September 14, 1999. Wi thout the authority the City's continued use of the same to 
69 Brigham Young UniversifY v. Tremco Consu/lallfs, Inc., J 10 P.3d 678 ,686, 2005 UT 19 P 25 (citations omitted.) 
10 Career Service Rel'Iew Bourd v. Utah D eparlment a/Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 938 (U tah 1997). 
71 BlIckner v. Kennard, 99 PJd 842, 846, 2004 UT 78 '112. 
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justify the acti on is void. " 'If a judgment is void, it is open to collateral attack' .... [T)he portion 
of the [civil) decree that was vo id is not res judicata. "" 
As a practical m atter, the City not only failed to involve the Mi ssion in the 
preparation of evidence to present to the Board of Adjustment, but it also chose to frame the 
legal issues in such a way that both the hearing and any subsequent appeal would be 
outcome detennin ative against the Mission. For example, the Board of Adjustm ent did not 
address Rand y Taylor' s classification of the Mi ssion use as a "boarding house." However, 
the Board did find that the previous non-confomling use of the property continued as a non-
confomling use. If the Mission was really not a church, as the Fairpark Community Council 
claimed, then the portion of th e application relevant to the non-confonning use would have 
been considered to be secular. If secular, a continuation of a non-conforming use could be 
applied and a buildin g permit issued to the Mission without a condi tio nal use permit hearing. 
In addition, had the City's practi ces regarding "accessory use" that were being 
applied to the Participati ng Churches with In terfaith been disclosed to the Board by either the 
City staff or counsel, an obvious exception in practice to what by ord inance was defined as 
"a homeless shelter" would have been evident. Consid erin g the na rrow limitati ons Rand y 
Taylor had placed on the Church 's protectin g the "homeless" onl y overni ght when in "life 
threaten ing" situations, and limiting the Mi ssion's ad verti sing o f the homeless shelter 
ava il ability at the loca ti on, the Board of Adjustments could well have determined the 
72 Farley v Farley, 19 Utah2d 30 1, 307, 309 , 43 J P.2d 133, 137, 139 (1967). 
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proposed " use" simil arly constituted an "accessory use" of a church rather than a "hom eless 
sheller". See Omitted Facts ## , inFa. 
V B . DAMAGES 
The argumcnts of the City that the Mi ssion' s has no claims for damages misstates 
the nature of damages that can be awarded for injulies caused by a violation of constitutional 
ri ghts . Damages against the City can be nominal or compensatory. 
First, deprivation of any constitutional right merits an award of no minal damages." 
Common-law courts have traditionally vindicated deplivations of celtain 
'abso lute' rights that are not shown to cause actual injury through an award of 
nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such lights actionable for 
nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the 
impUIiance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed[ .f4 
Plaintiffs contend tJlat their previous application of facts to federal and state law establish a 
prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of depri vati on by the City of the Plainti ffs' First 
Amendment ri ghts protected by the establishment clause and iiee exercise clauses as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and equal protection clauses. 
Compensatory damages, on the other hand, 
may incl ude not onl y out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such 
injuries as "impairment of reputation ... , personal humili at ion, and mcntal 
anguish and sufferin g." Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 350, 94 S.CI. 
2997, 30l2, 4l L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). See also Carey v. Piphus. supra, 435 U.S " at 
264. 98 S Ct.. at 1052 (mental and emotional distress consti tute compensable 
injury in § 1983 cases. ) .. 
" See Searles v. VlIll Bebber, 25 1 F.3d 869, 879 ( I O'h Cir. 2001) cerl. denied 536 U.S. 904, 122 S.Ct. 2356, 153 
L.Ed.2d 279 (2002). 
"Carey v. PljJlllIs, 435 U.S. 247 , 266, 98 S.Ct . 1042,55 L.Ed .2d 252 (1978). 
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* * * * * 
Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a 
supplement for an award that fu lly compensates the all eged injury. When a 
pl ainti ff seeks (;Ompensation for an injury that is *31 1 likely to have occurred but 
difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may poss ibly be 
approPliate. See Carey, 43 5 U.S., at 262, 98 S.C!., at 1051; cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greemnoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760-76 I, 105 S.C!. 2939, 2946, 86 
L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (opinion of POWELL, J) ; Gertz v. Robeli Welch, Inc., supra, 
418 U.S., at 349, 94 S.Ct., at 3011. In those circumstances, presumed damages 
may roughly approximate the hann that the plaintiff suffered and thereby 
compensate for hanns that may be impossible to measure. 75 
Regardless of whether damages are nominal or compensatory, Pl aintiffs would still considered to 
be prevailing parties fo r purposes of this litigation. 
When a court awards nominal damages, it neither enters judgment for defendant 
on tl,e merits nor declares the defendant' s legal immunity to suit. ... A judgment 
in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's 
behavior fo r the plaintiffs benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of 
money he otherwise would not pay76 
75 Memphis COn1l11l111l/), School Dis/rict v. EdwCII'd J S/ochllra 477 U.S. 299,106 S.Ct. 2537,91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) 
16 FalTor v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 1 12-113, 113 S.Ct. 266, 12 1 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). 
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CONCL US ION 
Having withdrawn with prejudice as it applies to the C ity (reserving the same against 
the RDA,) claim s under the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action with for al l the 
reasons set forth above, the remaining claims [or equitab le, declaratory and monetary relief 
under RLUIPA, the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution are valid and 
should be heard. Accordingly, the City's M otion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
DA TED this 24 th day of March, 2000. 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES 
Matthew Hilton 
Craig L. Taylor 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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in support of its Motion for Summary .Judgment in this case. 
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legal argumcnts. lhey raise only tangential attacks. Perhaps most importantly. plaintiffs offer no 
valid reasons why the bulk of the ir claims are not ripe. Most of this lawsuit CJn be dismissed on 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTE D FACTS 
The following facts of record remain undisputed in thi s case: 
1. Plaimiffs are persons affilialed with Ihe Sail Lake City Mission (hereinajier 
. " Pla imiffs" or Ihe "Mission 'J. Clnol7cienominUliolial religious group who provide service 
primarily 10 Ihe homeless and impoverished (Deposit ion Exhibit 78; Sail Lake CilY Mission web 
page. Appendix Exhibit A) 
Although plaintiffs Jlurport (0 dispute this fact, their statement is merely a longer version 
of what the City stated. 
2. In 1999, Ihe Mission was located in a building at approximalely ~66 Wesl 200 
Sowh in what has become the Careway area of Sail Lake City. The Iv/ission had a month~lo~ 
monrh lease with its landlord (Depo sition Exhibits 6, 14) 
Not disputed 
3. During the summer uf 1999, the Mission '.I' !andlord gave notice 10 Ihe Mission 
Ihal il was terminating the Mission 's lease. (1d.) 
Not di spu ted 
4. Laler Ihal year, the Sail Lake City lI edel'elojJI11 el11 Agency (Ihe "/IDA 'j 
purchased Ihe property. (Deposition Exhib it 35) 
Not disputed. 
j . The City and Ihe /IDA are separate gO \'em memal enlities. (U CA. §§ 1 7B~.f-
]0 J and 67- 1 a-6 j .; 
No t disputed. 
6. The Cily was nOI re,ljJonsible/or Ihe lerminalion o/Ihe Mission's lease, for Ihe 
purchase oflhe properly, ur Ihe needfor Ihe Mission's relocalion. (Deposilion 0/ Wayne 
Wilson, pages 374-75, Deposilion o/Valda Tal'bel, page 63. Appendix Exhibils B and C) 
Not disputed . 
7, The Missionfiled a claim/or reloCCIlion expenses againstlhe RDA, The 
Mission never filed any claim/or relocCllion expenses againsl Ihe eily. (Deposi tion Exhibils 
J 9, 26) 
This fact is irre levant now that plaintiffs have withdrawn their c laims for relocation 
expenses against the City, Nevertheless, plaintiffs admi t that they did not file a t imely and 
proper notice of claim with the City, 
8, On several occasions, Ihe Mission inquired about various possibilities/or Ihe 
relocalion 0/ its /acilily and was in/armed as 10 the process Ihar would be required/or such 
an application (Deposilion Exhibils 2 & J J) 
Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fac t but do nol provide a citation to any record 
evjdence,l 
9. The Cily alsu pro\'ided the Mission wilh blonk applicolion/orms. (Deposiliun 
Exhibils 63 & 64) 
I The purported dispute of this Statement of Undisputed Fact cites to "legal analysis, Part 82: and 
C. 80-82, infra, and attendant deposition' " , However, the cited legal analysis and page 
numbers do not exist. [n addition, the purported citation to the record is blank. Althouuh 
Plaintilfs delayed filing thei r Memorandum in Opposition for an additional 10 days beyond the 
deadline agreed upon . their Memorandum is lilled with blank citations to the reco rd, incorrect 
citations to the record . andlo r citations to a non-existent exhibit. Specijically, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
9 is incomplete, and Exhibits 11 . 15.].7.33,38,42,43.44.71 and g4 are simply missing. 
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Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact stated. They add other facts, but the fact stated 
stands . 
JO. On at least two occasions, pursuant to in/ormation provided by the Mission, 
the Cit)' has issued an administrative classification of the ivfission·s proposed activities. 
(Deposition Exhibits 2 & 28.) 
Plaintiffs do not di sp ute the fact stated. They add additional racts but the fac t stated 
s tands undisputed. 
11. The Mission proposed to move into a building located at 580 West 300 South. 
ThaI building was 10CCIted in :one D3. Based on the deSCription of the uses of the building, the 
City determined Ihatl!?e A1ission would be a Place of Worship, which was a permilled use in Ihal 
:one, and a Homeless Shelter, which was a conditional use. (Deposition Exhibit 2.) 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact stated. The reference to "the April 20, 1999, letter 
speaks fo r itseW does not dispute that the statement of fact correctly summarizes the le tt er. 
J 2. The Missionneverfiledfor a condilional use with regard to Ihe proposed /ocalion 
at 580 West 300 Soulh. (Af/idavil of Cheri Coffey, 11 J 5, Appendix Exhibit I ) 
Not disputed. 
J 3. A permilled use is one Ihat is allowed merely byfilingfor a pennil and meeling 
applicable City codes. (Coffey Al/idovil, ~ 3.) 
Plai ntiffs do not dispute the fac i stated. They add add iti onal facts bu t the fact s tated 
stands undisputed. 
1-1. .4 condilionoilise is determined by Ihe Planning Commission afier considerolion 
of on ClpplicCllion, slCiffreport, and afier a public hearing where the applicant can .Ipeak and the 
community can speak 
A conditional use is a use which has potential adverse 
impacts upon the immediate neighborhood and the cit)' as a 
whole. !t requires a careful review of its location, design, 
configuration and special impact to det ermine the 
desirability of allowing it on a pClrticular site. Whether it is 
appropriate in a particular location requires a weighing, in 
each case, of the public need and benejit against the local 
impact, taking into account the applicanl 's proposals for 
ameliorating any adverse impacts through special site 
planning, development techniques and contributions to the 
provision of public improvemel1ls, rights of way and 
services. 
Any applicant who seeks a conditional use permit must appear before the affected 
neighborhood's community council. (Coffey Affidavit, ~ 4.) 
Plaintiffs do not di spute the fact stated . They add additional fact s but the fact stated 
stands undisputed. 
15. Pursuant to City ordinances, the Mission was required to present its proposal 
jor a conditional use permit to the local Community Council to obtain non-binding input and 
recomll1endations. (lei. and Deposition Exhibit 76) 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fac ts stated. They add additional facts, but the fact sta ted 
stands undi sputed. 
16. All other appliconts/or a place ofll'urship hcn'e hern required to comply with 
this proces.1 (City Docl/ment 327, Appendix Exhihit H) 
Plaintifrs purport to dispute this fncl. but the record e\'idence cited (Paragraphs 1)8. 
I 18 and 13:2) are non-responsi\'e to this issue. Accordingly. this rae\ remains undisputed and 
7 
s hou ld be deemed admitted. 
} I. Permifled uses are oppropriole anywhere in [/ :;(JJ7e as lung as Ihe)' meet CilY 
codes [-{oHlever, sume uses ore conditional uses because, in general, Ihey may be more 
appropriule in specific areas based on various Ihings including whar olher uses are in Ihe 
vicinily, traffic pall ems. capacily Dfstreets, exisling infi-aslruclure, impocls(rOtJ1 Ihe subjecllvpe 
of use on abulling properties, geographical features ele. These Ihings all pluy a role in 
determin ing whatrypes of uses should be allowed in whar areas and whelher a condiriu/'Iaillse 
should be allowed Due to the porel1lial for impaClS, a conditional use is required so Ihell each 
use can be examined and a decision made on a case by case basis. (Coffey Affidavit, '1 5.) 
Not d isputed. 
i 8. Ultimately, a conditional use is determined by whelher Ihe proposed use is 
compatible wilh Ihe neighborhood and will it have a material net cumulative ad,'erse impact on 
the community or Ihe city as a whole. (Deposilion (if Randolph Taylor, p age -10 line 23-page-li 
line 12, Appendix Exhibit D.) 
Not dispu ted. 
19. Places of Worsh ljJ are allowed in Sull Lake City as a mailer of rig hi inlhe 
j(J/lowing ~ones: Commercial C IJ. CC, CS, CSHBD, CG, Downtown D- J, D-2, D-3. D--I: 
G'aleway GMU; and Special P1Irpose RP, BP, J, U1. MU These ~ones comprise appruximately 
i 0.8% of Ihe area ojSair Lake Cily (wilhoUi including Ihe Cily Creek area) . (Co/fey AlJidavil, ~ 
6.; 
Although Plaintiffs purport to disrute Paragraph 19 . they cite to no reco rd evidence in 
8 
suppon of their dispute . 
10. Places oj Worship are also allowed as a condilional use in aLI residential cones, 
in Ihe Neighborhood Commercial zone (C!I~ ond in Ihe Ugh! Induslrial Zone (M-J). (Coffey 
A[ftdOl'il, ~ 7) 
Although Plaintiffs purpo11 to dispute Paragraph 20, they cite to no record evidence 10 
support the ir dispute. 
21. Under Sail Lake City ordinances, a homeless shelter is classified as a building or 
port ionlhereofin which sleeping accommodCllions are provided on an emergency basisfor Ihe 
temporarily homeless. (Toylor Deposi!ion, page 8 lines 12-23; poge 34 line 23-page 14 line 3) 
Altbough Plaintiffs purpo11 to dispute this fact, tbe only record of eviuence cited is a 
recitati on of the definitions contained in the Salt Lake City Code. Accordingly, this fact remains 
undisputed. 
22. Homeless Shellers are ,dlowed as a condilional use in the D-3 and Ihe CG coning 
dislric ls. Salt Lake Cily has nol prohibiled Ihe laealion afhomeless shellers inlhe CilY. The 
CilY has severul operClling homeless shellers. (Cojfey A[ftdavil, ~ 8) 
Plaintiffs do not di spute the fact stated. They acid addit ional facts, but the fact stated 
stands undisputed. 
Alone lime, Cit)' policy discouraged Ihe cOl1cel1lralion ~lhomeless shellers, 
Sllhs{CI !7Ce abuse (reo/men l ce l7lers Lind similar uses in the !)Ul<\'l1fuwn und Guteway area (the su 
culled "l71urC//oriull1 "). However. Ihe policy did nOI/urbid sllch uses, provided Ihal an "pplicClllI 
or Ihe Mi.l.lion uppliedji)/ ' C/ wl1ciiliol1Cd use permil. (/)epu,liliun ExhihiIS], -19. (J(J und Tuylur 
9 
Deposil ion. page 37.) 
PlaintiJfs cite to no record evidence to support their first statemenL since the Hilton 
afjidavit docs not exist. Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts stated. They add additional facts, but 
the fact stated remains undisputed. 
24. Sail Lake City has regulated all homeless shellers. regardless o/their ownership 
or a!filial ion (Coiley Affidavit, ~ i 0) 
Plaintiffs dispute this fact, arguing that the City has not regulated church es that 
paJ1icipate in the Interfaith Hospitality Network. However, the record evidence by Plaintiffs 
contradicts that asse rtion. Sp ec ifically, Plaintiffs ' Fact 33 acknowledges that the limited services 
provided by the 1l1lerfailh Hospitality Churches is regarded as an "accessory use" of those 
churches, such that they are not classified as "homeless shelters ." Thus, Fact No. 24 as asserted 
by the City remains undisputed. 
25. The regulation a/homeless shelters is l770livated by wholly secular cancerns, nul 
religious concerns. (Deposilion Exhibits 49. 88) 
Although Plaintiffs purport to dispute this fact, none of the record evidence they cite 
disp utes the Ci ty's allegation that the regulati o l1 of homeless shelte rs is motivated by wholly 
secula r cOl1cerl1s. Accordil1gly, that ract remains undisputed. 
::6. in Seplember 11)99, /he Missionjiled "'7 applicalion/or a conciilionul lise 
perm/ljor " place uj'wur.lhip. The proposed toea/iun was Ihe /armer Rosew()od Terrace 
nllrsing home located al 158 .Nor/h (,00 West. Soil Lake Citv (hereinafier rej'erred 10 us 
"Rosewo()d Terrace "). rDeposilion Exhibils -18. -8.) 
to 
Not disputed. 
27. Rosewood Terrace was loealed in :one SR I, a :oning caregol)' eSlOblished by Ihe 
Cily which was a limiled reside11licd :one Ihal allowed Places of Worship only as a condilional 
use. (Jaylor Deposilion, page 67 lines J 4-20.) 
Not disputed . 
28. In general Places of Worship inheremly involve large numbers of people 
congregaling together with the artendantnoise and trajjic. Such a use has the potential to have 
more negative impacls on reside17l ialneighborhoods andfewer impacts in lhe zones where 
Places o.f Worship are permilled as a malleI' of right Thus, in many areas Places of Worship are 
a conditional use 10 cdlow Ihe specific/acl based de lermination a/whether they are appropriate 
for thaI area, particularly residenlial areas. (Coffey Ajjidovit, ~ 9) 
Plaintiffs do not d ispute the fact assel1ed . Although they add o th er additional facts, the 
fact asserted by the Ci ty remains und isputed. 
29. Ploil1tiffs appliedfor and were heord regording 0 conditional use oflhe 
Rosewood Terroce property where Ihey wished 10 IOCClle their Place of Worship. (Deposilion 
Exhibils -18, 84 Clnd Coffey AUie/avil, 11 J -land Ihe a!/achll1enls Ihereto) 
1)luiI1liffs do not dispute the fac l stated. They asserl other facts and arguments, but the 
ract stated rem ains undisputed. 
30. On OC/ober 7. 1999, Ihe Cily Plonning Commission denied Ihe Mission's 
applicalion/or a COIle/ilionlil Lise pennillo reioc[l/e ils/acilily 10 Ihe Rosewood Terrace 
BUilding I'Illi11liff\' were l1ul grU/1Ied II col1dililJllul use III Rosewoud ferroce because orlhe 
II 
imjJacl on Ihe neighburhood ond Ihe inC/bililY 10 miligOie Ihm impacl. The Plw1I1ing Comrnission 
dClermined Ihal Ihe neighhorhood was I()oji-agile 10 supporl Ihe aClivilles proposed by Ihe 
1\1issiol1. The Planl1lng Commission delermined Ihw Ihere were likely 10 be heavy imjJacls on Ihe 
ncighlJorhoodji-om Ihis proposed LlSC. the !l1ission plan wos 10 have 25-30 residcnls on a scmi-
permanenl basis in 0 boarding hOLise {[/ Ihe sile as well as 10 bus in up 10 200 oflhe "homeless-
poor" al vorious times during Ihe day for a varieo' of counseling. rehobilitolion services, 
religiOUS devolionols and chapel services. While il wasfeli Ihollhe !l1ission could conlrol whal 
WCl1t on in ils bu ilding, it was dClermined Ihal il likely would not be able 10 cOl1lrol whal wenl 011 
outside. This was based on objective evidence. In ils p rior localion the Missio ll Iwd a histOJY of 
alieaSI 58 police calls per yeur Clnd os high os i 22 cedis per year. il was sletied by plainliffs "WI 
Ihe 1\1ission would be pel/orming similar activilies inlhe Rosewood Terrace iocwion so il was 
I'CIlionally delermined thallhe Mission would bring wilh illhis higher needfor police 
inlerven lion. This wus of particular concern 10 Ihe neighborhood surrounding Rosewood 
Terrace because Ihey were /lying 10 recover/i'o1J7 aClivilies which had required pulice inlhe 
pas I. The neighborhood included Ihe Guadalupe neighborhood Clnd the Fa;ljJark community 
Burh communities were working on reviving from prevhn{s rimes qldrug houses ond high u";me. 
The goal was to eSlublish safe. slahie ond cohesive neighborhoodsfor which progress was being 
made. It was determined Ihat Ihe impacl oflhe Mission wOlild reverse Ihat progress. Thus. the 
Planning Commission concluded !i1Cl11he needfor Ihe condilioneil lise did nol oU/weigh Ihe 
pOlemial impaC! on Ihe communily and il would 1101 be pOSSible 10 miligwe Ihe delrimen!Cl1 
impaci Iho l Ihe Missiun wOllld impose upun Ihw/i'ugile neighborhood (Sail Lake Cily Planning 
• 
Commission SwffRepor/ allached 10 Ihe Coffey Affidavil, and Deposilion Exhibils 79 & 84.) 
Although Plaintiffs have included a dispute to th is allegalion, that " dispute" 
acknowledges tbe facts asserted. 
31. 1n Seplember 1999, Ihe Communily Councilf/led an appeal challenging Ihe 
Cily's adminislralive classification o/Ihe fvfission 's proposed aclivilies. (Deposi lion Exhibil 
55.) 
Pl a intiffs do not dispute the fact asserted, notwithstanding thei r attempt to list it as a 
"disputed" fact . 
32. 111 cOf1neclion wilh Ihal appeal, Ihe .Mission received nolice of, hud Ihe 
opporlunity Clnd, in/acl, did presenl evidence allhe Board of Adjustment hearing. 
(Deposilion Exhibils 81 & 41.) 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the fact assel1ed . They add other additional facts, but the fac t 
stated remains undisputed 
33. 1n November J 999, the Board o/Acljuslmenl held Ihatlhe Mission's proposed 
activilies conslituled a pluee (~rworship and a humeless shelle r. (Deposilion Exhibit cf2.) 
Plaintiffs do nol di spute the facts slated. They altempt to assen legal arguments, but the 
fact as slaled rema ins undisputed. 
34. f'loinliff\' did nol limely oppeul Ihe Plunning Commission '.I' denia l o/Ihe 
condiliolled use/or Ihe Rosewood Terrace locolion olihough Ihey could hove hy ojJpeulillg 10 Ihe 
LUlld Use Appeals Bool'd Alier Ihul Ihe mol/er could have heen uppeoled IU Ihe COUI'IS. (Coifey 
A/fidm'i l, ~ I i) 
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No twithstanding its "dispute", Plaintiffs admit the fact as asserted by the City. 
35. The Mission did nOI file a limel), appeal of lh e decision oflhe Planning 
Commiss ion or Ihe Boord ofAdjuslmenl. (Coffey Alfidavil, 11 J J.) 
In their "d ispute", Plaintiffs admi t the fact as asse rted by the Ci ty. 
36. P/ainrijfi had nOlice of and could have used Ihe condilionCiI use process for olher 
10eOlions. Allh ough the Mission mode several inquiries 10 the City, il only.filed one 
applicalion with the Cily, seeking to relocale ilsfacilities 10 Ihe Rosewood Terrace Building 
locoled 01 158 Norlh 600 West. (Depositio n Exhibits 63, 64, Coffey Affidavil, ~ 15.) 
Plaintiffs have eited no record evidence in opposition of Fact 36 . Accordingly, those 
facts should be deemed admitted. 
37. [This paragraph inlellliollally left blank.} 
38. Plail1lijJs have 1701 beenjlagged in Salt Lake Cily comp ulers as being largeledfor 
exira scrul in)" il is nol poss ible 10 jlag persons or associm ions, only properlies CW7 be jlagged. 
(Taylor Depos ilion, page J 8 line IS-page J 9 line 2: Deposilion of Roger Evans, page 7 tine J 3-
page 8 tine I, Appendix Exhibits D and. E.) 
Pla in tiffs do not dispute the fact stated , thaI plaintiffs were not flagged in SLC computers 
as being targeted for ex tra scrutiny. Although Plaillliffs assert other facts, the fac ts as slated by 
the City remain undisputed . 
39. Plainlilfs ' proposa/for /he Rosewood Terrace b1lilding ",as, in pari, a Place ul 
Worship for people Hho did not live in /ha l neighborhood. plainli/J, slated Ihal/hey w01lld be 
IJ7I.\ing in mosl oj/he IIsers oflhe b1lilding (Depo.lilion Erhihil :8.) 
1-1 
Plaintiffs do nOl cite any record evidence in opposition to Fact No. 39, which should be 
deemed admitted. 
40. Ultimately, plaintiffs relowted fheir Place of Worship, and carried ouffheir 
proposed activities in conformity 'with their religious belief" in the Central Christian Church 
located at 370 Easl300 Soulh in Sail Lake City. (Wi/son Deposition, page 267.) 
Plaintiffs do dispute a portion of Fact No. 40, asserting that the Mission was unable to 
carryon its own worship services at the Central Cluistian Church. However, the record evidence 
cited reveals that church services were held "on a limited basis." (See Deposition of Wayne 
Wilson, page 170, lines 16-25, Plaintiffs' Appendix Exhibit I), and that the Mission "was unable 
to have its own worship services in the sanctuary of the church. (See Deposition of Wayne 
Wilson, paragraph 48.) However, Plaintiffs' own evidence further indicates that during this 
same time period Plaintiffs were able to conduct bible studies and other group sessions. Indeed, 
PlaintiHs' own evidence indicates that after moving to the Central Cluist ian Church, Plainti ffs 
were able to increase virtually all of the services they provided. (See Exhibit 8 attached to 
Affidavit of Wayne Wilson. ) Thus, the primary fact that Plaintiffs were able to continue their 
religious activi ties of the Central Christian Church is not disputed. 
41. The 20nin15 ordinances and Iheir regulation o(temporwJ' housing/or the 
homeless have 0 secular purpose, to limit the impact on neighborhoods to 0 reosonoble level. 
(Cliffey Affidavit, 11/2) 
Plaillli rfs have not cited any record evidence in opposition to Fact 4 J, which should 
therefore be deemed admitted. 
15 
n. Several Salt Lake area churches parliclIX"e in Ihe Il7Ier/LJitit f/OSpilOlily 
.fllelwork. (Depos ilion Exitihil 32.) 
Pl aintiffs' purported dispute ac tually confirms the fact stated in Fac t No. 42 . 
-13. {hose il1lerfailit Hospitality churches operOie wilhin cerlain guidelines 
Pursuant 10 Ihose guidelines, each church may house a maximum of 4-6 homeless families (a 
maxim1lm of 16-20 persom) for one week, fou r orfi ve times a year on a rOlaling schedule. 
(ld) 
Plaintiffs have not cited any record evidence which supports tbeir dispute of Fact No. 
43. Indeed, Depositi on Exh ibi t 32, ci ted by Plaint iffs in thei r response, is dated Marcb 2000. 
cN. The Cily is willing to allow lite .iV!ission or any oliter church to operale 
according to Ihese same lnl eljailh Hospiralily guidelines. (C ily Response 10 Req uesl fo r 
A dmission No.9, Appendix Exh ibit 6.) 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the accu racy of the City's statemen t. Whil e Plaintiffs argue 
th at they should not be required to operate according to the guidelines for the Interfaith 
Hospitality Network, they have not disputed the fac t that the City wou ld allow them to do so 
if they so desi re . 
-/5. The Mission itas ackno",ledged Ihal i l does nol inlend 10 operale ils "clivilies 
]1Iil17in I/wse /l1Ieljailh J-IIiSpilOlily g1lidelines. (Wi/su n Deposil ilJn, pp. 390-95.) 
Although Plaintiffs purport to dispule Fact No. 45 . in thei r response they do not 
dispute the fac ttil a t they do 110t intend to operate their act ivi ties wi thin the guidelines used 
by the Interfaith Hosp itality Churches. 
16 
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-16. Th e Religious Land Use and JnslirZlt ionali~ed Persons Act was passed in 
Seprember 2000. (Second Amended Complain!, " 129) 
Not disputed. 
-17. VirruCilly all ofrh e events described in the Mission's Second Amended 
ComplCiint occurred before September 2000. (.')econd Amended Complain t, n 9-88) 
Plaintiils do not dispute the accuracy of the facts asserted in Paragraph 47, although 
Pl aintiffs asse11 that additional conversations and meetings with the City occurred after 
September 2000, those additional facts do not dispute the accuracy of the facts contained in Fact 
No . 47. 
48. Plaintiffs have designQred aeeoun{[[nr John Ravarillo as their .ljJokesman on 
damages. (Ravarino Deposition, page 209 line J 6-page 210 line 8, Appendix Exhibit F) 
Plaintiffs purp0l1 to dispute Fact No. 48, but fail to cite any record evidence to support 
their all egations. (The citations listed all refer to a blank exhibit number.) In addition, the record 
ev id ence ci ted by the C ity contains a specific acknowledgment by counsel for Plainti Ffs that Mr. 
Ravarino was the only person who wou ld talk abou t damages. (See Deposition of John 
Ravari no, page 209, line 16-page 2 10, line 8, City Appendix F.) !\ccordingly, Fucl No. 48 
should be deemed admitted . 
-19. Pleril1f ifJy herve su!Jmi fl cd ,ljJeciol domage eleril17sfor rhe rime period of October 
1999 when they muved OW ()/their long rime loearion rhrough 2001l1'hel7they were rel()cerred w 
the Cel1trul Chrlsrian Chlireh, ro Emr 300 Sourh, Sail Luke City, Utah. (Depositiun Exhihir 
19) 
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Again. Plaintiffs failed to cite any record evidence to Supporltheir alleged dispute of that 
fact. 
50. Plaintiffs' claim/or .ljJecial damages consists o/expenses involved in moving, 
abandonment ofimprovemel1ls to their priorlocatiol1, foss ofpropeny in the move, lost 
COl'llribUlions and improvemel7ls to its new building (ld) 
Plaintiffs purport to dispute Fact No. 50 based upon the record evidence cited in response 
to Fact No. 48. However, as discussed above, Pl aintiffs have failed to cite any record evidence 
in support of their disagreement as to Fact No. 48. 
51. Phtintiffs lost the feme on their old /oc(t{ion because of the actions of their 
landlord und not Sull Lake City (Deposilion Exhibit 1-1, Wilson Deposilion, pp. 374-75) 
Not disputed. 
52. During the period of time for which they claim special damages, the Mission hod 
incume (maney coming intu the Mission) of $673,920.57. (Ravarino Deposition, page 19-1 line 
15-page 197 line 25, and Deposition Exhibit 19, page RDA0(807) 
Not disputed. 
53. The Mission hod expenses during that time period o/3e1'3, 793.66. (Rovarino 
Deposition. page 197, and Exhibit 19. page RDA 0081 02 ) 
' The deposition actually has a typographical errol'. listing expenses as "283,000 some odd 
dollars." The correct number is shown in Exhibit 19 that is being referred to. Using the correct, 
higher number operates to plain tiffs ' benefi t. In addilion . Ravarino did tes tify, although with a 
lack of precision, that the expense figures for the time period for which damages were being 
claimed did not include some items totaling $ 45,4 56. Ravarino Depositi on. page 198 line 24-
page ~03 line 12 and Exhibit 19 . 
ts 
• 
Not disputed 
54. The Mission hod nel income, or a nel swplus, of$19D,116.91. (1(avorino 
Deposilion, page 198 lines 1-6, ond Exhibil 19, page RDADD810 
Not disputed. 
55. During a comparable period oUlside of the lime frame fo r lvhich Ihey are claiming 
.ljJecial domages, the Mission had income of $80.7,456.57, expenses of$563, 356.7 j, and 0 
surplus of only $14-1,0.99.86. (Ravarino Deposition, poge 197 line 1-page 198 line 11, and 
Exhibit j 9, page RDA 0.0.80.7 and 81 D) 
Not disputed. 
56. Ravarino did lesli!y, somewhCll inexoctly, Ihatthe expensejiguresfor Ihe lime 
period for which damages were being claimed did not include some iTems appearing to ToTal 
$-15,456. (RCIvarino Deposilion, page j 98 line 24-page 20.3 line 12, and Exhibit j 9) 
Plaintiffs do not directly dispute these facts . Rather, they come up with a differen t total 
amount which is less than the City set forth . Ultimately, this fact is irrelevant because plaintiffs 
do not contest that they have no special economic damages. 
RESPONS E TO PLAINTIFFS' LIST 01< OM ITTED FA CT S 
In their Memorand ulTl , Plaintirfs assert a voluminous list of what they represent to be 
omit ted facts.' Due to the delay in receiving Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, and due 10 
the voluminous nature or Pla intiffs' Statement of Omitted Facts, the City has not had an 
'The list or omilted facts consists of 148 numbered paragraphs. comprising in excess of 39 
pages. 
ty 
oppO I1Unil), 10 review every fact, IOgether Wilh Ihe record evidence cited in SUpp0l1, to verify the 
accuracy of Plaintifis' allegations. Nevertheless, the Cit y has idelllitied numerous factual 
a llegations which should not be considered based uponlhe absence of any record evidence cited . 
or because the record evidence cited does no t support the factual allegat ions made. 
With regard to alleged Omitted Facts that do have some support, the City disagrees with 
many of them. Nevertheless, for the purposes of th is Motion only, the City does not dispute 
tbose facts because tbey are irrelevant, and do not create a genuine iss ue of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. The additional omitted facts offered by Plaintiffs mostly provide 
background informati on, they do not pel1ain to the lega l issues raised by the City' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This, together with the facI that the relevant facts set forth by the City have 
not been successfully disputed, means tbat summary judgment should be granted . 
4 . The documents referenced speak of public "hearing" procedures. 
S. Plaintiffs have cited to no record evidence to support the fact stated. 
6. The evidence cited by Plaintiffs does not suppOl1 the a llegation made. 
12. No such ci tat ions (Chapter 19) exist within the Salt Lake City Code. Most 
definiti ons are found in Chapter 21A.62.040. In additio n, Plaintiff's ' s tatement thai th ere is no 
definit ion for a homeless she lte r is incorrect. (Pl aintiffs' Fact I. ) 
J 3. Plaintiffs have cited to no record ev idence supporting their al legations. since rhe 
Affidavit of Mall hew Hilton is non-existent. 
J 4. Plaintiffs have failed to ci te 10 any record evidence to su ppOl1 the allegation. 
34. Pla intiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence to support rhe last sentence in 
that paragraph. 
36. Plaintiifs have failed to cite to any record evidence to suppon those allegations. 
41. The evidence cited does not support the first statement made. 
42. Plaintiffs have failed to cit e to any record evidence, since the Hilton affidavit does 
not exist. 
44 . Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence, since the Hilton affidavit does 
not exist. 
45. Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any record evidence to suppon their factual 
allegations. 
4~. The record evidence cited does not suppOJ1 the allegations made. 
52. The record cited does not suppOJ1 the allegations made . 
59. The City disputes the allegation set fonh in paragraph 59 because at the Board of 
AdjLlstment hearing, Wayne Wilson discussed with the Board of Adjustme nt the practices of the 
Interfaith Churches. (See Deposition Exhibit 43 at pages 0544-0545.) 
63 . No record evidence cited . 
64 . The Ci ty d isputes the a ll egati on set forth in paragraph 64 because Pl aintiJTs 
confuse the di stincti on be tween a "not ice to cease and desist" and a "notice and order." 
80. The Ci ty disputes the allegatio n set fo rth in paragraph 80 because they fa il to 
distinguish betv..reen an adm inistrative interpretation and an administrative decisjon. (See 
Deposition Exhibit 94 and Sal t Lake City Coele Section ~ 1 A62 .040 and Section 21 A 16010 .) 
86. The City di sputes the allegati on set fo rth in paragraph 86 because the record 
ci 
ev idence cited does not support all the allegations ll1ade. 
87. The Ci ty disputes tbe allegatio n se t fo rth in paragraph 87 because the record 
ev idc nce cited does nOl support the al legations made. Speci ficall y, Depos ition Exhibil 97 sta tes 
lhat lhe Community Council provided a statement in suppon oflhe proposal. 
92 . The reco rd evidence cited does not supp011 the state ment made. Speci fi cally , the 
depos itlon testimony indicates that the handwritten notes are Bill Wright's , but there is no 
indication tilat the letters were written by him . 
95 . No record ev idence ci ted . 
98 . The record evidence cited does not supp0l1 the statement made . 
101. No record evidence cited. 
105 . The documents cited do not supp0l1 all of the statements made. Specifically,lhe 
representation as to the proposed class ification of Plaintiffs' uses does not match the description 
set fo rtb in the documents. 
110 The City objects to tile fact set forth in paragraph 110 because it assumes facts 
that are not in ev idence . Specifically, it has not been established that a charitable organizatio n 
woul d be a perm itted use in an SR- I zone . 
116. No reco rd evidence cited . . 
111''1. 
119. No reco rd evidence cited. 
120 . No record evidence ci ted. 
125 . No reco rd ev iden ce cited. 
126. The ev idence cited does not sllppon the faulla l stateme nts made. Specifica lly . 
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Cherri Coffey testified that when conditional use proposals were forwarded without having gone 
to the Community Council iirst, the Planning Commission sent them back. (See Deposition of 
Cherri Coffey, page 56, Plaintiffs ' Appendix Exhibit 10.) 
127. No record evidence cited. 
13 0. No record evidence has been cited to support the statements made. In addition, 
the statement contains argument rather than facts. 
138. No record evidence cited . 
139. No record evidence cited . 
141. No record evidence has been cited to support the statement made in the first 
sentence. 
142. No record evidence has been cited to support the allegation, since the Hilton 
affidavit does not exist. 
143. The City ack.nowledges that it opposed the temporary restraining order requested 
by Pl aintiffs, but denies the remaining allegations set forth in that paragraph. In addition. 
Plainti1fs have fai led to cite to any reco rd evidence to suppOJ1 their allegations. 
144. No record ev idence ci ted. 
146. No record evidence cited . 
147. No record evidence cited. The City is unaware of any document or exhibit 
identi1ied as "City 33 ." 
148. No record evidence cited. 
ARGUME NT 
r. PLAINTIFFS' C O NSTIT UTIONAL CL AIJVIS S HO ULD BE DI SMiSSeD. 
A. Summary Judgmcnt Should Bc Gran ted Dismiss in g All Of Plaintiffs' 
Co nstitutional Claims and RL UJPA Claim Because They Are No t Rir e. 
I. RLUIPA Claims Are Not Ripe. In responding to the City" s ripeness 
argument, Plaillli ffs admit that RL UIPA WQS not applicable to any of the events that occurred in 
or prior to 1999, prior to the enactment orthe Acl. Thus, the only claims to which RLUIPA 
could possibly apply are to those decisions made by the City after September :WOO 
1 n tbe preseI1l case, tbe events which occurred after September ~OOO are set forth in the 
Affidavit of Wayne Wilson, paragraphs 56-70. However, beyond idelllifying those events. 
Plaintiffs make no fu rther eff0l1 in tbeir Memorandum in SUppOi1 to exp lai n why their RLUIPA 
claims are ripe forjudici al review. Indeed, an analysis of the facts of this case reveals that they 
are not. 
The only decision rendered by tbe City after September 2000 is set forth in a letter dated 
.June 7,2004 addressed to Plaintiffs. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 57 and Wil son Affidavit, 1169.) 
Plaint iffs did not make any effort to appea l tbat decision to the Board of Adjustment. (P laintiffs 
have subl11itted nothing showing any appeaJ.) Plaintiffs have also made no attempt to modify 
their proposed activities to comply with the requirements of City ordinances. (See City Fact 
Nos. 44 and 45.) Plaintiffs have made no altempt to find another location for thei r activities in 
either a D3 or CG zone where homeless shelters are allowed . (See City Fact No. 22) . Nor have 
the plaintiffs Illade any altemptto file a new conditional use application. (See Ci ty Fact No. 36.) 
As sueh. Plai ntiffs have f":tiled to ubta in a final decision fi'om the City as to acceptable activities 
and 10cJtions. 
In Murph\' v. New Milford ZoninQ Commission, 402 F.3d 342 (2 nd Cir. 2005), the cOUr! 
dismissed the plaillliffs' claims under RLUIPA based upon a finding that the claims were not yet 
ripe for judicial review. In that case, the plaintiffs had been issued an informal letter by the city 
advising them that the prayer meetings they were holding in their home violated zoning 
regulations. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the attempt to enforce these zoning regulations 
violated RLUJP A. In reviewing this issue, the Second Circuit Coun of Appeals dismissed the 
case because the homeowners had not appealed the zoning violation to the local zoning board of 
appeals and had failed to obtain a fina l decision from the ci ty on this issue. 
Thus, the Murphys [plaintiffs] may not proceed in federal court until they have 
obtained a final, definitive position from local authorities as to how their propel1y 
may be used. Because such a decision has not yet been rendered, we lack 
jurisdiction.. The zoning board of appeals possesses the au thority to review the 
cease and desist order de 170VO to determine whether the zoning regulations were 
properly applied. Hence, the Murphys' claims are not ripe . 
ld. at 352-53 . 
For these same reasons, P·lainti fTs..' RLUIPA claims in this case are also not ripe and 
should be dismissed . Plaintiffs have not yet obtained a (in'll decision from the City as to the 
decision reOected in the June 7, 2004 letter. Plaintiffs have also not obtained a final decision as 
to whether or not any modification of their proposed activities would comply with City 
ordinances. Fina lly . Plaintiffs have also nOl attempted to find another prOpeJ1y that might be 
suitable ror Iheir proposed activities . and they have not fi led any other appl ications ror a 
conditiona l use permit. Uncle r these ci rcumstances. Plaintiffs have simply failed to obta in a final 
decision rrom the CilY on any of these issues. and their claims for a violation or RLLlPA are 
simply unripe. 
2. Constitutional Cla im s Are Not Ripe. There are essentially four situations 
in this maner upon which plaintiffs base their Constitutional clalms. First plaintiffs sough t a 
location for their Mission in Salt Lake City prior to the year 2000 but made only informal 
inquiri es, never going through the conditional use process that Salt Lake City provides fo r the 
location of a use in a non-permitted area (except once, discussed below). As to this situation, 
because plaintiffs did not go through the conditional use process, plaintiffs did not obtain a final, 
definit ive decision by Salt Lake City authorities. Second . plaintiffs sought a location for their 
Mission in Salt Lake City after the year 2000. Again, they made only informal inqu iries, never 
filing a formal application or going through the conditional use process and did not obtain a 
final, definitive decision by Salt Lake City authorities . Third, plaintiffs did apply for one 
conditional use with regard to the Rosewood Terrace propcl1y in 1999. However, plainti ffs do 
not deny that they did not appeal the adverse dec ision to the Land Use Appeals Board as they 
could have done. Thus, as to this situation. plaintiffs did not obtain a final, ddinitive decision by 
Salt Lake City autborities. Fourth , plaintiffs did obtain a final decision from the Board of 
Adjustmen t as to whether the uses to which they proposed to put the IZosewood Terrace pmDe11y 
were a place of worship with an a ll owable accessory use or a place of worship and a homeless 
shelter. Only this fourth situation is ripe. 
PlaintiJTs argue as to the iirst three situat ions that they can stililitigale those situations 
despite the lack of ripeness. First. they argue that they need not exhaust administrative rem eciies 
before bringing Consti tuti onal claims (both lecieral and state) because they will su ffer irreparable 
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harm. Memorandum in Opposition at page 6.' The problem with thi s argument is that 
irreparable harm is not an exception 10 ripeness and plaintiffs fa il to raise a factual issue as to 
whether they suffered irreparable harm. 
The general ru le is that state Constitutional claims, including equi table claims, not only 
must be ripe but a plaintiff must also exhaust admini strati ve remedies. See Utah Code AnJ1. § 
10-9-100 1 (1) [former law]; Utah Code AIUl. § 1 0-9a-80 1 (1) [current law j; Patterson v. American 
Fork Citv, 2003 UT 7, ~~ 17-21,67 P. 3d 466, 471 (Utah 2003). Plaintiffs provide no Supp0!1 
that irreparable harm will excuse a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Pl aintiffs cite to 
Snyder v. Murrav Citv Crop. , 2003 UT 13,73 P.3d 325 but that case does not supp0!1 their 
position because it was not a zoning case where the plaintiff had a defined process to foll ow to 
obtain approval. Instead Snvder involved an individual who sought to present a prayer at a City 
Council meeting. The prayer was rejected by the City Council and there were no other 
administrati ve steps plaintiff needed to follow. Exhaustion was never addressed in the opinion. 
In addi tion, plaintiffs [ail to show that they will even suffe r irreparable harm which 
requires rejection of their argument. See Patterson, 2003 UT 13 at ~120 .' In fact. plainti tTs' 
4 The Ci ty notes that in di,cussi ng '·failure to ex baust" plaintiffs do not di rectly address the issue 
raised by the C ity . Tbe Ci ty did not contend that plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative 
rcmedies, the Ci ty contended the claims were not ripe. Although similar, ripeness app lies even 
where exhaustmllm8)' not because ri peness is more of a prudential concern and is well 
recogn,zed In land use cases. See Murphy v. New Milford Lonine Com'n. 402 F.3d 342, 347-
35:; (2nd C II". ~005) discussed in the Ci ty·s Memorandum in Support. 
' ··In support thereof, Patlersons offer on ly the cursory assertion that C it)' officials are hostile to 
their rights and that they have "clearly pleaded sufficient facts indicating irreparable harm and 
the futili ty of any future a\tempts Ito pursue admi ni strative remedies]." We decl ine the apparen t 
invitation to peruse Patlersons' lengthy list of allegations in search of specific facts support ing 
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submission in opposition to summary judgment show they are not sufferin g irreparable harm, 
they continue to operate and provide service althougb perhaps at a lesser extent lhan they would 
perhaps like. See, e.Q ., Memorandum in Opposition at page xlvi (converts in 2006 projected to 
be 500,500 needy families distributed pantry food, 5,000 pieces of goods provided for needy 
people, etc .). 
With regard to the federa l Constitutional claims, this is not an exhaustion question. The 
Ci t)' argued th at the claims were not ripe because plaintiffs have never obtained a fina l decision 
from the City so there is nothing yet to chal lenge, the City's final decisionmaker could grant 
their requests. Ripeness is different than exhaustion." Plaintiffs do not cite any suppOl1 that 
irreparable harm wil l excuse a lack of ripeness and make no showing of irrepamble harm . 
Plaintiffs' second argument with regard to ripeness is a claim that it would have been 
fut il e to pursue a conditional use permit. While this is a recognized exception to ripeness , 
plaint iffs do not create a genuine issue of material fact on this point. With regard to their futility 
their claims of irreparable harm and futil ity. We note only tllat allegations of unfairness in the 
day-to-day relationship between Patlersons and City staff do not support a claim that the emire 
admin istrative appeals process is inoperative or unavailable ," 
, Patterson stated " Indeed, Pattersons correctly point out that they need not exhaust their 
administrative remedies before pursuing their federal § 1983 claims" citing to Felder v. Case\', 
487 US . 131 , 147 (1988) . 2003 UT 13 at ~ 18. However, Patterson suggests tllalthis was 
inapplicable to a ripeness challenge because it later stated "Because we upho ld the trial court's 
dismissal of Parte rsons' § 1983 claims on the ground that no deprivation of a protected liberty or 
propeny interest has occurred, we need not reach the questi on of whether or not those claims 
were ripe fo r decision." 2003 UT 13 at 1128 n.3 . Felder also was not a case similar to this one, it 
considered whether a state law requiring a notice of clai m prior to suing a goven1111ental emity 
applied and held that such a state remedy need not be exhausted before sui ng under 42 USc. 9 
1983 in rederal or state COUI·t. It did not reach the issue of ripeness. 
L{000 
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claim . plaintiffs discuss only one anempt to relocate, to the Rosewood Terrace building, they do 
not contend that seeking conditional uses for any other location would have been futile. See 
Memorandum in Opposition al pages 7-8 . Wi th regard to Rosewood Ten'ace, plaintiffs' only 
evidence of futility is their statement that the ir lease for that build ing expired prior to the time 
they cou ld have appealed the decision to the Land Use Board. This does not show futility . "A 
propeJ1y owner, for example, will be excused [rom obtaining a final decision if pursuing an 
appeal to a zoning board of appeals or seeking a variance would be futile . That is, a property 
owner need not pursue such applications when a zoning agency lacks discretion to grant 
vari ances or has dug in its heels and made clear that all such applications will be denied." 
Murphv v. New Milford Zoning Com'n, 402 F.3d at 349. P laintiffs have not set forth any facts 
that the City's zoning agency lacked di screti on to grant variances or dug in its heels and made 
clear it wou ld deny all of plaintiffs' applications. (In fact, plaintiffs could not prove thi s, they 
never gave the City a chance to rule more than once.) 
Plain tiffs' third argument against ripeness is that they deserve equ itable relief under the 
Utah Constitution to prohibit the Gon ti nued use of alleged unlawful practices. However, even 
equi table state cla ims require admin istrative exhausti on. Patterson, 2.003 UT 7, 1119. 
[' o r the foregoing reasons, the Court should d ismiss all of pl aimi ffs' claims except as to 
the decision from the Board of Adjustment as to whether the uses to which they proposed to put 
the Rosewood Terrace property were a place of worship with an allowable accessory use or a 
place of worship and a homeless shelter. The other matters will not be "ipe until plaintiffs pick a 
location. apply for a conditional use. and obtain a Jinal determination on that. It is only at that 
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lime that the Coun and the panies will know what would have happened and whether any 
constilutional violations have occurred . 
B. Summ a ry Jud gm ent S hould Be G r a n ted Dis m issin g Plaintiils ' Du e Process 
C la im Bee:lll sc Sa lt Lak e C ity ' s Zo nin g Ordinan ces A re N ot A rbitra ry O r 
Unreason a b le A nd Plaintiffs W ere Provid ed Th e O pp ortunity T o Be H eard 
W h en T he Ordi na n ces W er e A ppli ed T o Th em. 
Plaintiffs do not dispule Sal t Lake City" s arguments that its zoning ordinances as applied 
to plaintiffs did not violate due process rights-that the ordinances are not arbitrary or 
UllJ'easonable, that plaintiffs had notice and an oPPOliunity to be heard , and the ordinances were 
not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner to the sole application for a condi t ional use 
that plaintiffs made. (In fac!' plainti ffs do not even address those arguments.) 
Plaintiffs do PUl forth two other arguments about due process . First, they argue tllat rhe 
ord inances are vague both facially and as applied. Plaintiffs do not state exactly why they 
bel ieve Ordinance § 2IA .62 .040 is vague but allude to the fact that the Ord inance requires a 
determination of what is an accessory use that may permissibly be undertaken at a place of 
worship without apply ing for a conditional use based on genera l crileria . 
The Colorado Supreme Court add ressed a simi lar situation and [ound that a zon ing 
ordinance regulating where religious institutions could be located was not vague. The court set 
forth helpfu l standards to address a claim of vagueness : 
A statute is vague 011 its face if it is "impermissibly vague in a ll its applications;" 
lhat is, lhere is no conduct lhat it proscribes with sui'ficiem clarilY. Village ul 
!-Joiii"an EI/(lIcs v Flipside. /-Iuffrnol7 ESfO/es, Inc , 455 U.s. 4~9, 495 , 102 S.C1. 
1186.1191. 71 L.Ed.2d 362 ( 1982); People v. Milne, 690 P2cl829 (Colo. 1984): 
L. Tribe, American CunsfilUfionol Law 1033- 35 (1d ed. 1988) . A Slalute is vague 
as applied if it dues not. with sufficient clurity . prohibit the conduct aga inst which 
it is to be enforced. Pulmer v eify u/E1Iclid, -101 U.s. 544 . ':! I S.C1. 1563, ::'9 
• 
• 
L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); L Tribe, supra at 1033-35 . A party may test a law for 
vagueness as applied only with respect to his particular conduct; if a statute is not 
vague as applied to that particular conduct, it will be enforced even though the 
la w may be vague as appli ed to the conduct of others. Hajjina/? ESIClfes, 455 U.S. 
489, 102 S .Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Parker v. Levy, 417 U .S. 733, 94 
S .Ct. 2547,41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Milne, 690 P 2d at 836; L Tribe, suprct, at 
1036 . 
Citv of Colorado SprinQsv. Blanche, 761 P.2d 212,2 19 (Colo. 1988) (dismissing vagueness 
claim). 
In add ition, in making this determination the Court should keep in mind that the amount 
of discretion afforded a zoning board in determining whether a particular land use is permissible 
is exceptionally high because zoning is an inherenily discretionary system. See AT & T 
Wireless PCS _ Inc. v. Winston Salem ZoningBd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 
1999); Gardner v . City of Baltimore Mayor & Ci ty Council, 969 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that land-use decisions are a core function of local go vernment and that subd ivisio n 
control is an inherently discretionary system) . The Court should also be mindful that 
"[vJagueness challenges to statutes nol threaten ing First Amendment interests are examined in 
light of the rac ts of the case a\ hand; the statl.!te isjudged on an as-applied basis_" Mavnard v. 
Car1\vri"ilt, 486U .S. 356. 361 ( 1988) . 
The cha llenged ordinance is not unconstitutional ly vague on its face. The ord inance 
adequatel y defines a " place of worship" and adcquately del ines an "accessory use," as well as 
can be done in the zoning context: 
"Place of worship" means a church . synagogue_ temple , mosque or other place of 
religious worship: including any accesso ry use or sl ru cture used for religious 
\\ orshi p. 
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"Accessory use" means a use that: 
A. Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal use; 
B. Is customarily found as an incidem to such principal Lise; 
C. Contributes to the comf0l1, convenience or necessity of those occupying, 
working at or being serviced by sLich principal use; 
D. Is. except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions ofrhis title , 
located on the same zoning lot as sLich principal use; and 
E. Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use. 
Thus, looking at the ordinance it can be easily determined that a chapel fo r weekly 
services is al lowed, classrooms for Sunday School are allowed, kitchens to provide food for 
church functions are allowed, and a retail store to sell donated items is not all owed as an 
accessory use, it would not be subordinate nor is it customarily found as an incident to the 
principal use as a place of worship. Even plaintiffs' proposed homeless shelter can be 
determined on the face of the statute, in this case it was determined that the homeless shelter was 
not "subordinate," it was a primary use taking it out of the category of an accessory use. 
P laintiffs' further contention that the ordinance is vague because it has three potential 
meanings is based on their omiss ion of words. When looked at as a who le, the ordinance states 
clearly that a place of worship includes "any accessory use or structure used for religious 
worship. " 
Plaintiffs' as applied vagueness challenge is premised on what they say are six instances 
of inconsis tent application of the City'S rules and regulations. Where th is argument fails is that 
Lhe instances they cite were not linal determinations. While the decisions of certain lower level 
administrators might have been inconsistent, al l vagueness problems as applied would have 
disappeared had plaintiffs followed the process through to its end. For example. plaintiffs 
complai n tha i zon ing administrator Randy Taylor did not undcrstand certain things ur found Ihe 
YOlO 
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maller complicated . However, Taylor was onl y the first level of review, the matters were 
clarified by the PlallJ1ing Commiss ion and ul til11mely decided by the Board of Adjustment in the 
only instance that the process was followed to a conclus ion. See Statement of Und isputed Fact 
Nos. 3 I -32 and the exhibits cited therein. 
finally, plaintiffs argue that the zoning deci s ions imposed a prior restraint on their 
activities and thus a higher standard applies to their vagueness challenge. The cases plaintiffs 
cite to involve permits to solicit for religious causes, plaintiffs do not cite to a single case 
applying a prior restraint analysis to a zoning law. Zoning cases are not examined under the 
prior restraint doctrines if there is no absol ute ban on where a church can locate but instead 
conditional uses are allowed if applied for. Citv of Colorado Springs v. Blanche rejected a 
similar argum e nt because there, as here, the zoning ordinances did not flatly prohibit places of 
worship, they allowed conditional uses . See 761 P.2d at 216 and n.5 C Here, as in City of 
Englewood, the zoning ordinance at issue is the "perm issive" type. A maj orit y of jurisdictions 
have held these types of ordinances to be consti tuti onal [ci ti ng cases]" and "Our conclusion that 
Colorado Springs' permissive zoning scheme is constitutional is bolstered by the United States 
Supreme Coun's repeated dismissal of appeals ii-om sta le co1ll1 decisions upholding the 
constituti onality of zoning laws which restrict the location of religious institutions. The Court 
d ismissed the appeals in the rol lowing cases for wanl ora substantiul rederal question [citing 
cases)'} 
Plain tifTs raise a second due process argumen t. See Memorandul1l in Opposition al pages 
~O--l4. Plaintifls ,tate that the\ ·-initi ated dialogue "ith the Cit"·· to reconsider the J 999 request 
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to lise rhe Rosewood Terrace Building and the City's determination that what they want to do is 
a homeless shelte r rather than an accessory Llse . ['Iaimiffs complain that the City informed them 
that i[the proposed uses of the Rosewood Terrace building had not changed then the City 's 
determination thar they were a homeless shelter would not change. Pl ai nti ffs argue that the use 
of the prior Board of Adjustment proceedings against the Mi ssion is a den ial of due process. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that in 1999 they received notice of, had the opPoltunity to and , 
in fact, did present evidence at the Board of Adjustment bearing. Statement of Undisputed fact 
Nos. 31 -3 2. Thus, plaintiffs received due process at that time. Af1er that point in time. plaintiffs 
have not come forward with any changed circumstances, they have represented to the City that 
they wish to use the propelty in the exact same way. See Memorandum in Opposition at pages 
40-41 discussing renewed efforts to change their classifi cation as a homeless shelter but not 
presenting any change of use. Not only was it consistent with due process for the City to not 
change its pos ition, unde r well established law absent a change in circul11stances the City cannot 
chan ge or alter its prior decision. See Root v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Twon of l'vladi son, 
565 A2d 14 , 15-1 6 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1989) (a zoning board of appeal s is prohibited from 
reversing a previous decision unless the facts and ci rcumstances have materially changed); 
Rhema Chri st ian Center v. District or Colu mhia Board of Zoninfl Adj. , 515 A 2d 189. 193 (D. C. 
App. 1986) ( traditional zoning law incorporates the prec lusion concept. when a variance is 
denied and the appl ican t resubmits the same or a substantially similar ~Ippli cati o n. the app licant 
must demonstrate lhat conditi ons have changed). 
Plaintiffs argue that the Ci lY in not changing its pos iti on is making an imp ro per 
• 
o 
application of res j udicata because, they argue. plaintiffs were not parties to the ori ginal deci sion. 
This is not true, the undisputed facts show that plaintiffs were a paliy because they fully 
paliicipated in the proceedings and presented ev idence. ]-Iowever, even if this point were 
accepted, that would not mean that there was a due process violation . Plaintiffs could have 
sought a new, formal administrative interpretati on. As pari of this process they could have raised 
their argument about res judicata not being applicable. They also could have raised the argument 
they make in their Memorandum in Opposition, that they feel there were deficiencies in the prior 
hearing before the Board of Adjustment because there was no presentation of the City practices 
regarciing accessory use that were being applied to the Interfaith Churches. Even if a ruling was 
made the same as the "informal" rulings they say they received hom PZD staff and counsel, 
Administrator Wayne Mills, and the Mayor, they could then have gone to the Board of 
Adjustment for a fina l, determinative decision from the City. The fac t that they did not pursue 
this does not show a due process violation, it sho ws that the process was available but they just 
failed to pursue it. In addition, it shows that the matter is not ripe . 
C. S ummary Judgment Should Be G ranted Dis miss ing 1) I"intiffs' F"ce Exe r cise 
of Reli gio n C laims Because T he C ity Is Not Regulating Religious Belief, It Is 
Regulatin g Co nduct. 
Plaintifrs completely ignore the City' s arguments on this poin t, lilat Messiah Baptist 
Church v. COUIllV of Jeffe rson, 859 F. ld 820 (10th Cir. 1988) applies and requires de ni al of 
plainti ffs ' Free Exercise claims. Ins1ead. pl ai nlJJfs raise irrel evant issues o r argul11t,nts made 
undn other claims (for example. plainti ffs reiterate thei r vagueness challenge under the Free 
Exercise heacii ng and claim \\ ithout support that there are no time constraints for pre-judicial 
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review). Plaintiffs also list five actions it perceives as showing hostility to it and concludes that 
th ese actions were motivated by its particular brand of religion . As to these, plaintiffs bilto 
suppon by citati on to evidence that any of these things happened ' much less present any 
evidence at all that religion was the moti vation. Because plaintiffs fail to dispute the City"s 
arguments on tbis point. summary judgment should be granted dismissing the Free Exercise of 
Religion claims. 
D. S umm ary Jud g ment S hould Be G ranted Dis missi ng Plain ti ffs ' J~qua l 
Protect ion/Es tablishment C lause C la ims Because Sa lt Lake City Has Not 
Es tabli s hed A ny Religion , P laintiffs Are No t Bein g Treated Differ ently T han 
Similarly S ituated Orga nizatio ns, And Any Difference In Treatment [s 
Because They Arc Not Similarly S ituated. 
Plaintitis claim that City ordinances are a fac ial violation of the Establishment Clause 
becaLlse there is an excessive entanglement of the City with religion because tbe City determines 
for zoning purposes what constitutes religious worship, an accessory use of religiolls worship. 
and whether that accessory use is customary for tbat religioLls worship. Memorandum in 
Opposition at pages 18-19 discussing City Ordinance § 2 I A.62.040. Plaintiffs complain that any 
church introducing any new aspect of religious worship tbat included conduct would be at risk. 
This argument fails because Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 6 I 4 ( 197 I) itself 
recognized that building and zoning regulations of necessity require some necessary and 
' The City makes this statemcnt because the support cited by plail1liffs is "(see Oillined Facts it 
~~, slIpra)". Plaintiffs do not fill in any orthe blanks. Even if the City and the Court were to 
read the 148 statements of Om itted Facts and fill in the blanks for plaintitfs . the exhibits upon 
which those facts rely are often missing with a statelllcill mude ··To be supp lied.·' 
permi ss ible contacts beTween the governmelll and re ligion . The Ordinance" plaintiffs object to 
has an acceptable level of enlanglement, it defines "places of worship" in very broad terms, not 
attempting to pass on acceptableness of the proposed worship and does not req uire that the City 
inquire as to the particulars of worship or pass judgment on acceptable forms. With regard to 
"accessory uses," the Ordinance also has an acceptab le level of entanglement, it sets fo rth a 
broad definiti on making most subordinate uses accessory. Thus, the Ordinance is not on its face 
unconstitutional. 
Pl aintiffs apparently recognize thi s so they also raise their claim "as appl ied." As 
applied, tbe Ordinance is equally valid . As app lied, the City has not determined what are and 
what are not valid religious worship practices of the plaintitfs. All the City does has done is 
determine at what level the plaintiffs ' proposed conduct of housing the homeless went beyond 
what the neighborhood could suppOli and then declared that at that point that housing the 
homeless was no longer an accessory use, it was a homeless shelter. The only real decisions the 
City has made are purely secular. is housing the homeless on the proposed scale subordinate in 
area, extent and purpose to the proposed place of worship. The City has made no decision on 
""Place of worsh ip" means a church , synagogue, tern pie , mosque or other place of 
reli gioLis wo rship, including any accessory use or st ructure used for religious worship. 
"Accessory use" means a use that: 
A. Is subordinate in area. extent and purpose to . and serves a principal use: 
B. Is cListomaril y found as an inciden t to such principal use: 
C. Con tr ibutes to the comfort. convenience or necessity of those occupying, working 
at or being serviced bv such principa l use: 
D. Is . except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions of this title. located 
on the same zon ing lot as such principal use: and 
E. Is under the same ownership or comrol as the principal use. 
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whethc:r housing the homeless is a proper pan of worship . plaintiffs are free to practice that 
conduct whether it is religious or not. they just have to do it in a zone where homeless shc:lte rs 
are all owed. "A church has no constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning regula tions 
nor does a church have a constitutional right to build its house of worship where it pleases." 
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d at 826. 
Plaintiffs also assen that the City has delegated governmental functions to a religious 
association and favors certain religions over the Mission. The problem with this attack is that the 
City has not delegated any decisions. As explained in the City's Statement of Undisputed Facts, 
the City has determined that the housing of the homeless on a lim ited basis is acceptable because 
of tile limited impact on the neighburlluutl. See Statelilent of Undisputed Facl Nos. 41-45. The 
City has offered to allow any group to do this including plaintiffs. Statement of Undisputed Fact 
No. 44. Th is is not done because of any religious reasons, it is clone due to the secular reason of 
limited impact on the surrounding neighborhoods. Statement of Undisputed Fact No.4 I. 
Plainti ffs seem to say that because they fallon one side of the line and the Interfaith 
Churches on the other, the City has delegated to the lnterfaith Churches the right to set the cutoff 
point for when housing the homeless moves beyond an accessory use. This is not supported, 
what is supported by undisputed facts is that the line was drawn by the Ci ty for secular reasons. 
there was no delegation to any religious group. 
Pla in tiffs also seem to say that the City should not accept the Interfaith Churches 
representat ions of what they are doing and whether they are within the parameters established. 
As long as there is no evidence that the City has turned a blind eye to misrepresentations or 
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violations (and there is no evidence whatsoever of either misrepresentations and violations or 
ignoring such conduct) this simply does not state a violation of the Establishment Clause. The 
cases pla intiffs cite do not support such a proposit ion. 
Plaintiffs next argue that allowing limited housing of the homeless favors Interfaith 
Churches over plaintiffs. However, the City has shown that it applies the same rules to all 
groups who wish to house the homeless, as long as it is limited it is allowed. The City has 
offered plaintiffs the same ri ght and plaintiffs even did this for a number of years in the Central 
Christian Church building. Statement of Undisputed Fact Nos. 40, 44. 
Plaintiffs also argue that they are being treated differently from the Interfaith Churches 
because the Interfaith Churches house families from the area without addictiuns whereas 
plaintiffs propose to house all including singles, transients and the addicted. They asse l1 that this 
shows that the secu lar purpose has been abandoned. They also seem to complain that there are 
no standards for when the homeless can be housed and when they cannot without obtaining a 
cond iti onal use for a homeless shelter. 
The p roblem with this argument is that it ignores the undisputed facts in this case. The 
Cit)' has establi shed that there is a sec ular pu rpose behind its actions, the impact on Ihe 
neighborhood. As long as there is limited impact, housin~ the homeless is allowed without a 
conditional use being sought and obtained. Housing fal1Jilies versus single men. local people 
versus transients. the down Oil their luck versus addicts are all val id indicators of the likely 
impact on a neighborhood. There are also standards lor when housing the homeless is clearly 
acceptable. the Cit) has set furth that standard and uffered plaintiffs the opportunity to house the 
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homeless on the same terms and conditions as the Interfaith Churches. 
Plaintiffs a lso raise these issues as an equal protection challenge. raising perceived 
instances of different treatment of them from other churches. Ench of thei r nrguments, however, 
are withoutmeril. 
Plaintiffs' first assen that they have been treated differently from the Interfaith Churches. 
However, plaintiffs fail to point out that the interfaith Churches provide food and shelter to 
individuals in need on a very limited basis with minimal impact to the sUlTounding 
neighborhood. (Only 4-6 families, maximum of 16-20 people, for one week, four or five times a 
year on a rotating schedule.) (See City Exhibit 32.) In contrast. plaintiffs were proposing to 
house 30 people on a permancnt basis, together with meals fo r 60-80 people every day, which 
would have a significant impact on the surrounding neighborhood. (See City Exhibit 78.) Thus, 
nny discrepancy in treatment is based not upon the religious entity providi ng the service, but 
upon the magnitude of the services provided and the impact to the community. In addition, the 
C il Y has offered to al low pla illl iffs or any other entity to operate on the same limited basis as the 
Interfaith Churches, but plaintiffs have declined to do so. (City Facts. 43 -44.) 
PlaintiHs also complain thut the Zions Lutheran Church and several of the Inlerfaith 
Churches have bccn allowed to expand existing conditional uses with on ly administrative 
approval required. rather than complying with the Community Co unci I and Planning 
Commission process ordinar ily required for the approval of conditional uses. However. 
plaintiffs' asscJ1ions undermine its own argument. In c:ach of the cases cited . administrative 
approval was granled for the expansion of a pre-existing use. The standard lo r the expansion of 
a pre-existing use is different than the standard for the approval of a new use. (See Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 70.) Thus, the mere fact that plaintiffs' attempt to estab lish a new conditional use was 
required to utilize a process different than churches seeking an expansion of an existing use, is 
not evidence of unequal treatment. 
Plaintiffs also complain that the Church of the Madeline and the Jewi sh Community 
Center were treated differently before the Board of Adjustment. Specifically , plainti ffs allege in 
the case involving the Church of the Madeline, the City encouraged and allowed delays, but that 
in plaintiffs' case the City refused to postpone the Board of Adjustment hearing, even though the 
appellant had requested the delay. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, pages 26-27.J 
Plai ntiffs ' argument on thi s point is disingenuous. In tbe [all of 1999, plaintiffs flied an 
application for a temporary restraining order with the coul1, seeking to fo rce the City to process 
plaintiffs' application without waiting for plaintiffs to make a presentation at the local 
community council, because doing so would delay making a deci sion on plaintiffs' appli cati on. 
(Plaintiffs' Fact J 43.) Although the court did not grant pl aintiffs' request for a restraining order, 
the City became aware that plaintiffs were time sensitive, and thus, in deference to plaintiffs' 
in tcrests, the City denied appellant's request to postpone the Board of Adjustment hearing. 
Thus, if anything, plaint i ITs recei vcd treatment that was preferentia l to the Church or' the 
Madeline. 
Plaintiffs also complain that in the Board of Adjustment case involving the .Je"ish 
Community Center. the Board of Adjustment was provided an opportuni ty 10 c"aluate the scope . 
nature and eX lent of accesso ry uses. However. the same 0PPol1unilY existed at both the Planning 
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Commission and Board of Adjustment hearings in this case. At both of those hearings. plaintiffs 
thelllseives introduced evide nce ale rting the Plan.ning COlllmission and the Board of Adj ustment 
to the practices of the Interfaith Churches. (See Depos iti on Exhibits 82 and 43. ) 
Finally. the Mission complai ns thal an administrative exception was granted to the 
Summum Church in deference to its free exercise of religion , asseliing that no such 
accommodation has been granted plaintiffs. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, page 
27.) This argument overlooks an impol1ant distinction between the nature of the request from 
the Summum Church and the nature of the request from plaintiffs. The S ummum Church made a 
request for authorization to mUlllmify and store dead bodies as pm1 of its religious activit ies . 
Under City ordinances, the storage of dead bodies carulot occur anywhere in the City outside of a 
cemetery. In contrast, plainti ffs ' request involves a place of worship, boarding house and 
homeless shel ter, which would be allowed in the 03 and CG zones. (See C ity fact No. 22.) 
Thus, the religious activities of the Summum Church could not be accol11modated anywhere in 
the City without an exception. In contrast plainti ffs' religious activities can be accommodated 
within the zo ning districts which provide for such uses. 
Pl aintiffs ' equa l protect ion challenge is even weaker because, as plaintiffs admit, equal 
protection is determined on a rationa l basis test. The City has put fo rth rat iona l reasons [o r any 
differing treatment of plaintiffs from the Interfaith and other chu rches. Thus. plaintiffs' equal 
protection cluims should be dismissed. 
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II. THE MJSS10N HAS NO CLAIM FOR RELOCATION EXPENSES AGAINST 
THE CITY. 
and 
JJl. THE M lSSION HAS NO CLAlM AGA1NST THE CITY FOR Tl-IJRD PAHTY 
BREACH OF CONTRACT OR QUANT UM MEH UIT. 
Plaintiffs abandon their Fifth, Sixth and Sevel1lh Causes of Action against the City . 
See Plaintiffs ' Memorandum In Opposition To Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. page I. This would also include the claim in the Fifth Cause of Action for third 
party breach of contract and quantum meruit. Thus, summary judgment shou ld be granted to 
the City on these causes of ac tion, discussed at Points II and III of the City's Memorandum 
In Support. 
IV. THE MISSION HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR A VIOLATION OF 
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 
OF 2000. 
Even if SLlch claims are ripe, Plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to state any legitimate 
cla im for a violation of RLU IPA. 
As discussed above. Plaintiffs have acknowledged that they have no legiti mate claim 
for a violation of RLUI PA l'or any events which occurred prior to September 2000 . Plainti ffs 
have also acknowledged that they have no claim for a violation of Subsection (a) of 
RI_UI PA. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition . pagcs 2-3.) Notwithstandin g thcse 
admiss ions. however, Pl aintiffs asscrt three RL UIPA claims . 
First, P lain tiffs cl aim that the Ci ty has vio latcd Subsection (b)(2) of the Act bv 
di!>crimimlling agains t the Miss ion in its implementation of its land use regulations vis-il-vis 
the participating illlerfaith Churches. (See PlaiI1liffs' Memorandum in Opposition . page ~.) 
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This argument, based essentially on equal protection grounds, is without merit. The record 
evidence indicates that the Interfaith Churches operate on a much smaller scale and with 
much less impact upon the community than would Pl aintiffs. (See City fact No. 43 and City 
Exhibi t 32.) Specifically, the Interfaith Churc hes house a maximum of 4-6 homeless ram i lies 
(3 maximum of 16-20 persons) [or one week, four or live times a year, on a rotating 
schedule. Meals are prepared only for those staying at the church. In contrast, Pl aintiffs' 
proposed activities would involve approximately 30 people living on-site ),ear ro und, 
together with daily breakfasts for approximately 60-80 people, man)' of whom would be 
bussed to the site. (See City Exhibi t 78.) Thus, Plaintiffs' complaint that they are treated 
differently than the Interfaith Churches is simply based upon the fact that their proposed 
activities, and the impact of those proposed activities upon the community, are dramatically 
different. 
Moreover, the City has offered to allow Plaintiffs to cond uct activities on a scale 
similar to those conducted by the Interfaith Churches. Plaintiffs have thus far declined that 
offer. (See City fact Nos. 44-45.) These facts are insufficient to forl11 the basis of a claim 
for discrimination unde r RLUIPA. 
Plaintiffs also clail11 the City has violated Subsection (b)(3) or RL UIPA by imposing 
regulations that unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions or structures . 
SpeciJ;c,dly . Plaintiffs assert that it is unreasonabl e for the City to require PlaintiJTs to incur 
the expense of finding, locating and temotively securing a location as a prerequisite to 
apply ing for an acimini stra ti\e interpretation. (See Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Oppos iti on . 
page 4.) This argument is presumably based upon the City's ordinance oUllining the process 
for obtain ing an administrative interpretation. (See Deposition Exh ibit 94.) This argument is 
also deficient. 
In making this argument, Plaintiffs apparently confuse the distinction between 
adm ini strati ve interpretations (discussed in Section ~ 1.A.12.01 0, et seq. of the City Code) 
and administrative decisions (defined in Section 21 .A.62.040) . While City ord inances 
inciicate that only a property owner or the owner's authorized agent may seek an 
administrative interpretation, there is no limitation as to who may request an administrative 
decision. Appeals from both administrative interpretations and admi ni strati ve decisions are 
heard hy the Board of Adjustment. (See Section 21 .A.12.040D and 21.A.16.01 0.) 
In the present case, Plaintiffs requested and received several administrative 
interpretations or decisions, including a letter dated April 20, 1999 (Ci ty Exhibit 2), a letter 
doted September 14, 1999 (C ity Exhibit 28) and a letter dated June 7, 2004 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 57). Pl aintiffs could have appealed any of th ose decisions to the Board of 
Adjustment, but elected not to do so. In any even!. however, the administrative processes set 
rorth in City ordinances cio not impose an unreasonable lim itation on Plaintiffs' reli gious 
assembly, institution, or structure. 
Pl uinti lTs ' final Jrgumenl is thJt the City has vio lated RLU1PA due to past 
"'di scrimination or unfair deluy." Plaintiffs do not cite any control ling legal authority ror that 
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proposition." As to discrimination. Plaintiffs have never cited any evidence to suggest that 
Plaintiffs are treated differently than other non-religious entit ies. Thus, the onl" evidence of 
nny discrimination offered by Plaintiffs is their argument thnt they have been treated 
differently than the interfaith Churches . For the reasons discussed above, those differences 
in treatment, based upon signiiicant differences in practice and impact, do not constitute 
disc ri mi n ati on. 
Plaintiffs also have failed to produce any record evidence demonstrating unreasonable 
delay. During the course of this case, the City issued several administrat ive decisions, a 
decision on Plaintiffs' request for a conditi onal use permit, and a decision on the appea l fi led 
by the local Community Council. None of those decisions was unreasonably delayed. 
(a) April 20, 1999 Administrative interpretation: Issued 39 days after first meeting 
on March 12,1999. (See City Exhibi t 2 and Affidavit of Philip Arena, paragraphs 3-8, 
attached as Exhibit 9 to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition.) 
(b) September 14, 1999 Administrative dec ision: Issued 13 days following the filing 
of Plaintiffs' conditional use application on Septembe r I, 1999. (See City Exhibit::>8 and 
City Exhibit 48.) 
(c) October 7,1999 Planning Commission decision on cond itional use applicJtion: 
Isslled 36 days following the filing of the application. (See City Exhibit 48 and Ci ty Exhibit 
84) 
"The authority cited by Plaintiff's in suppOrt of this position is an isolated sta temeJ1l from the 
legislative history cuntained in the congressional record. Such a statement of indi"idual 
legislators is at best advisory only. 
(d) November IS, 1999 Board of Adjustmen t decision on appea l of City 
administrative decis ion: Issued 42 days after appeal was filed. (See Ci ty Exhibits 42 and 
55 .) 
(e) June 7, 2004 Adm ini strative decision : Issued 35 days following wri tten request 
on M ay 3, 2004. (See P lai ntiffs ' Exhibi t 57 and Deposition Exhibi t 61.)10 
These time periods required fo r issuing City decisions, ranging hom 13 to 42 days , 
given the complexity of the matters at issue and the requi rements for providing notice of 
public hearings, are not unreasonable and do not provide a basis for claiming a violation of 
RLUIPA. 
V. SHOULD ANY CLA TM SURVIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE GRANTED THA T PLAINTIFFS HA VE NO SPECIAL 
DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have no evidence of special damages (economic 
losses). 
Plain tiffs argue that they can show at trial, if that occurs, that the y have nom inal 
damages. The City does not disagree with thi s, the Ci ty has moved for summary judgment only 
as to specia l, econom ic damages of whi ch plain ti ffs have none. 
Plaimiffs also argue that they can show at tri al general damages such as impairment of 
reputation. personal humiliation, mental angui sh and suffering or ·'p resum ed" damages. Again. 
10 Although PlaintiiTs sent a letter to the City dated Ju ne 24 . 2003 (Deposition Exhibil GO), thai 
letter merely provided ··some basic ill/ormation about the Sal t Lake City Mission.'· Ii did not 
request any response from the City. I'lail1lilTs did not make such a request until their letter of 
May 3. 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 61). 
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the City does not disagree with this (although this will be an issue potentially subject 10 a 
directed verdict. The City seeks a ruling at thi s time only that plaillliffs have no special. 
econol11 j c damages. 
CONCLUSJON 
For all the reasons set forth above, the Mission's Second AJ11ended Complaint fails to 
Sla te any cognizable claim fo r relief aga inst the City. Acco rdingly, the City's Moti on for 
Sumll1ary ./udgment should be granted. and all claims which the Mission asserts against the 
City should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 3 I 51 day of March, 2006. 
e;;L?U= 
MORRIS 0 HAGGERTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sal t Lake City Corporation 
CERT1FJCATE OF SERV1 CE 
J hereby certify that on thi s 31 st day of March, 2006, I caused a true and co rrect copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Matthew Hilton 
472 N orth Main Street 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Fax No. (80 1) 544-9977 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Jones, W aldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City , UT 84 101 
Fax No. (80l) 328 -0537 
John A. Snow 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
SO South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Sal t Lake City , UT 84145-0340 
Fax No. (80 1) 534-0058 
/ U.S. Mail 
Hand De livered 
Overnight 
Via Facsimile 
_01_ U.S. Mai l 
i 
v 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Via Facsimile 
US.Mail 
Hand De Ii vered 
__ Overnight 
Via Facsimile 
Tab 3 
Craig Tay lor and A ssociates 
Craig Taylor (#4421) 
Matthew Hil ton (#3655) 
472 North Main Street 
Kaysville, UT 8403 7 
Telephone: (801) 544-9955 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Salt L ake City Miss ion, et. aI. , 
v . 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE C. WILSON 
Salt Lake City, et. aI. , ) Civil No. 990908945 
Defendants ) Judge: Joseph C. Fratto 
Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency, ) 
Third-Pali y Pl aintiff 
v . 
McDonald Broth cr s In ves tmcnts, a 
) 
) 
Utah Gcncral Part"ncr ship, ) 
Third-Paliy Defendants . ) 
COMES NOW Wayne C. Wilson, under oath a nd penalty of peljury, and states that the 
following is true: 
I . am over eighteen years of age, of sOll nd mind and body, and make this 
affidavit based on my own personal kllowledge and as Pastor and Execlltive Director of the Salt 
Lake City Mission. 
2. On April 16, 1986, as a church, the Spectacular Ministries of the Lord 's 
Servants, was recogni zed as a non-profit, spiritual corporation by the state of Utah. The purposes 
stated in the Articles of Incorporation are a reflection of God's reli gious vision to me. The 
corporation at present is in good standing. 
3. On July 26, 1988, the Utah State Tax COimnission granted exemption from 
franchise tax to the Mission. A copy of the notice of this decision is attached hereto as Exhibit I. 
4. Upon inquiry, the Interna l Reven ue Service notified me on behalf of the 
Mission that it is their practice to not require churches to apply for tax-exempt status because it is 
automatically gran ted. It is my understanding that counsel for the Mission has telephonica lly 
confi rmed the same. 
5. Beginning January IS, 1994, the Mission opened its doors at 466-468 West 
200 South, Salt Lake City. The propetiy on which the Mission premises were located was owned 
by McDonald Brothers Investments , a Utah general partnership. 
6. During April and May of 1994, the Mission was served with a Notice to Quit by 
our landlord McDonald Brothers Investment. The Amended Eviction Not ice dated May 3, 1994, 
stated that a basis for the Notice to Quit was that the Mission was "causing or suffering premises 
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to be used as residence in violation of zoning laws." On May 19, 1994, an agreement was 
reached in court, with the Judge, that provided the Mission could continue doing what it was 
doi ng as a church, and continue caring for the homeless provided certain matters were improved 
as outlined in the written order of the court . After the trial was over o n May 19, 1994, James 
McDonald told me~that he was sorry the proceedings had been brought and that he had been 
pressured by city officials to do S0. The Mission received a 'ibul1ding pennit from the city to 
proceed forward with the renovations ordered by the court. 
8. The RDA relies on the provisions of UCA § 78-36-3 (1)(d) to state that the 
Mission was in unlawful detainer. That subsection states that 
[a] tenant of real property for a tenn less than life (like the Mission's month-to-
month tenancy) is guilty of unlawful detainer: ... [w ]hen he assi gns or sublets the 
leased premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commits or permi ts 
waste on the premises, or when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on 
or in the premises, or when he suffers, pennits, or maintains on or about the 
premi ses any nuisance, including nui sance as defined in Section 78-38-9 and 
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days ' notice to qui!.. 1 
9. After the reso lution of the judicial proceedings in 1994 brought by MBI against 
the Mission for unlawful detainer, the Mission was allowed to remain in the MBl premises. 
10. At no time subsequent thereto was the Miss ion served with a three days' notice 
to quit by MB I under U.C.A. § 78-36-3(d). 
11. At no time thereafter did the Mission or Pastor Wilson 
Lease[] premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or commit[] or pe11l1it[] 
waste on the premises, or set[] up or can'Y[Y] on any unlawful business on or in 
the premises, or suffer[], pennit[], or maintain[] on or about the premises any 
, U.C .A. § 78-336-3(1 ltd) . 
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nuisance, including nui sance involving controlled substances, gambling, criminal 
activity, parties that interfere with the comf0J1abie enjoyment of life or propcl1y, 
prostitution, and criminal fireanns (all as defined in Section 78-38-9). 
J O. On May _ _ , 1994, although the city did not appear to agree with the Icgal 
arguments and factual representations my counsel had made for me, the criminal charges wcre 
dismi ssed by the city. I understood that then city attomey Roger Cutler was aware of and spoke 
publicly regarding the dismissal. 
J J. Subsequent to the criminal charges being di smissed by the City, I continued to 
notify the police depar1ment of criminal conduct that I, and the staff o f the Mi ss ion, would 
observe occurring on the block between 400-500 West and 200 South. A significant number of 
phone calls made from the Mission to the police department were made by persons seeking 
refuge in the Mission. It is likely that thi s oceun'ed because there were no public telephones 
within this one block area. I sensed irritation when I talked to some of the officers regarding 
these complaints, but the majority suppolied police chief Ortega's request that citizens report all 
crime of which they were aware. 
12. On December 24, 1996, I was given a Notice of Zoning Vi olation by Sherie 
Reich. After receiving the Notice, I called Harvey Boyd ofthe City 'S enforcemen t di vision of the 
planning and zoning department and inquired about its cnforcement. I-Ie told me not to WOlTY 
about it. A copy of the Zoning violation is hereto attached as Exh ibit 2. That night Traveler' s 
Aid (Road Home) sen! over a mother and her baby child to the Mission to secure emergency 
shelter. A pol ice officer brought. by another person released from the hospital with no place to 
go. 
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13. On December 26, 1996,1 was given a Criminal Citation by zoning enforcement 
official Kent Mickelson for violating the City Zoning Ordinances by maintaining a homeless 
shelter. A copy of the Criminal Citation is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
14. On December 28, 1996 Sherie Reich, Kent Mickelson, and Harvey Boyd came 
to the mission and told me I had to close down my homeless shelter. 
15 . Beginning on January 15, 1997, I was represented in the criminal proceeding 
regarding the Zoning violation by the present Counsel for the Mission in this case. I understood 
Judge Hutchings ruling in the 1994 unlawful detainer proceedings established a lawful nature of 
my presence at the Missions address . I also understood the result of the court proceedings to 
mean that engaging in religious worship tluough presentations in the Mission and outreach 
ministties to "feed and clothe Jesus" by ministering to the needs of the homeless and poor, 
regardl ess of family status, addiction, or residency, was lawful at the Mission 's location. 
16. On May _, 1997, the City Prosecu tor's Office dismissed the criminal charges 
against me. 
17. On May 23,1997, the Spectacular Ministries of the Lord 's Servants filed a dba 
with the State of Utah, using ' Salt Lake City Mission' as its name. 
18. On July 18, 1997, the Utah State Tax Commission granted the Mission a sales 
tax exemption number because it qualified as a religious or charitable institution. A copy of the 
notice of this decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 
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19. On August 12, 1997, the United States Post Offi ce gran ted the Mission postal 
privileges as a non-profit organi zation. A eopy of the notice of thi s decision is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 5. 
20. On August 14, 1997, the Mission' s counsel and I met with Lynn Pace of the 
City Atto rney's Office to learn about the requirements to locate a homel ess shelter in the city. On 
August 20, 1997, Mr. Pace wrote a letter to the Miss ion ' s counsel ex plaining that such lISCS were 
li mited to the D-3 and CG zones of the city. In addition he reconfilllled the ex isting pol icy of the 
city against further concentration of homeless services 
within one geographic area. For that reason , it is more likely that your client 
wou ld obtain approval of a proposal if his proposed shelter were located outside 
of the downtown area since there is already a large shelter and several suppOli 
facil ities in that area. 
Nonetheless, the City Attorney assured the Mi ssion's counsel that: 
[i]f your cli ent has a specific proposal he would like us to review or if he would 
like to have a general discussion as to the range of poss ible sites, we would be 
happy to discuss that matter with him. If you and you r client would like to 
discuss thi s matter, please contact me so that we can arrange an appropri ate 
meeting time. In contrast, if your client would like to meet without attorneys, 
pl ease have him contact Brent Wilde at 535-6180, who has assured me that he 
wil l make himself available to meet with your client. 
A true and accurate copy of th is letter from counsel is attached hereto as Exhibit 6. 
2 1. By the winter of 1998, the Mission was acti vely looking to relocate to a 
pellllanent location that the Mission could purchase. 
22. The Miss ion's presentations at vari ous community councils before 1999 were 
opposed by members of the Mayor's office and uniformed members of the police depal1men t. 
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23. Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to the Sutherland Building located at 
405 South Redwood Road. I made a presentation at the Poplar Grove Community Counci l. A 
unifonned police officer appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mission. After the 
presentation, chair indicated that the Mission would receive a letter of detennination in about a 
week; thereafter, however, he refused to send the Mission a letter. In the absence of the same, 
staff at PZD refused to allow the Mission to file an application for a conditional use penni!. I 
have produced to the city true and accurate copies of documents marked with numbers 0708 MIS 
to 0737 MIS that show efforts of the Mission to prepare for the submission of a conditional use 
pennit appl ication and presentation to the Community Council. 
24. Before 1999, the Mission wanted to move to 1515 South 400 West (fonnerly, 
Travelers Aid Society; now, The Road Home). I made a presentation at the People's Freeway 
Community Counci l. The Community Council offered to assist the Mission to locate outside of 
their Community Council area, but would not approve the requested location. One of the 
officers who had appeared at the Mission offices and told the Mission that the Mayor's Office 
wanted them shut down appeared at the meeting and spoke against the Mission. The Community 
Counci l never sent verification of the presentation or their decision to the Mission. Despite 
having made the presentation, thereafter staff at PZD twice refused to allow the Mission to file 
an application. I have produced to the city tme and accu rate copies of documents marked with 
numbers 0746 MIS to 0756 MIS that show efforts of the Mission to prepare for the submission 
of a conditional use permit application and presentation to the Community Council. 
Page 7 of 23 
25. Before 1999, the Mission wanted to relocilte at 850 West 1600 N0l1h (ilt the 
Superfund site). PZO staff refused to notify Capital Hill Community Council that the Miss ion 
needed to be on their ilgenda to make a presentation; thereby, justi fying the Mission's belief that 
the preparing of an application would also be futile. 
26. In the early part of 1999, the Mission detennined that it would like to acquire 
the Cohen Building located at 580 West 300 South. At the time of the inquiry, a Church was a 
permitted use in the 0-3 zone where the property was located. A building pennit was requested. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Randy Taylor, Zoning Administrator, encouraged the Mission to 
make a presentation to the Rio Grande Community Council. Previously the Mission had 
requested a building pennit for the renovation of the Cohen Building located at that address , but 
had been delayed in receiving a response because the city wanted to clarify what classification of 
use they would assign to the Mission at that location. While the Mission was infom1ed that 
attendance was not mandatory, in an effOli to cooperate, we agreed to attend the Rio Grande 
Community council meeting on Mareh 17, 1999. Phil Arena of the Mission made the 
prcsentation. The prescntation was disrupted by Marge Harvey of the Mayor's Office who spoke 
out against the presentation. Other uniformed police officers in attendance spoke out against the 
Mission as well. The Mission was asked to milke another presentation at the next meeting on 
April 21,1999. 
27. On Apri l 20, 1999, staff of the PZO brought to the Mission an administrative 
interpretation of the uses of the Mi ssion at the Cohen propeliy located at 580 West 300 South. 
The admini strative interpretati on letter cl assified the Mi ssion as being something that required 
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state li censure as well as a homeless shelter. We had been visited by the State Department of 
Human Services Office of Licensing on April 13, 1999, for an inspection requested by the City 
PZD. On April 19, 1999, the li censing offi ce wrote the Mission a letter that indicated licensure 
was not applicable to our religiously based activities. A true and accurate copy is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 7. We received thi s letter on the morning of April 21, 1999, and immediately faxed a 
copy to the PZD and the office of Mayor Corradini. 
28. Notwithstanding our commitment to make a second presentation at the Rio 
Grande Community Council on the night of April 2 I, 1999, after the Mission and I read the letter 
from Randy Taylor at PZD, we felt that it would be futile to apply for a conditional use permit 
regarding the Cohen property. We concluded this for two reasons. First the location of our 
church needed to be accessible to those persons in need of spiritual and temporal assistance. 
Because of the city policy opposing the concentration in the city of any additional services for 
the homeless, it seemed that no matter what we submitted regarding our relocation, the staff 
would find that our proposal would have a negative impact on "the city as a whole." Second the 
letter contained an unsolicited offer to assist the Mission in relocating in Salt Lake County 
(instead of assisting us to remain in the city.) 
29. On April 2 1, 1999, the Mission again presented at the Rio Grande Community 
Council. Brent Wilde of the PZD was in attendance and di sputed if not debated the Mi ssion's 
claim it was only a church rather than all of the use classifications contained in the April 20, 
I 999Administrati ve Interpretation letter that were contrary to the use classifications explained by 
the Mission . 
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30. On April 22, 1999, I obtained for the Mission, by facsimile from the Mayor's 
Office a li sting of all Community Councils and their respective chairperson. 
3 1. Check # 2375, dated June 4, 1999, was subm itted by the Mission to MBI as the 
$600 June 1999 rent payment and cleared the Mission's checking account on June J I, 1999. 
The month-to-month tenancy was redefined by agreement among the parties and MBI's 
acceptance of check # 24 J 3, dated June 17, 1999, for the rent payable for July 1999. Although 
the check did not clear the Mission 's bank account unti l July 9, 1999, the acceptance of the 
check in June J 999, and subsequent cashing of the same prior to the execution by MBI and RDA 
of the July 2 1, 1999, Sale and Purchase Agreement, was sufficient to establish a tenancy that 
began on July J, and according to the Parties ' agreement dated July 3 I, 1999, continued through 
September 30,1999. 
32 . DUling the middle of the summer, the Mission detem1ined it would try to 
relocate in the Rosewood Terrace Building at 168 North 600 West located in the Failllark 
Community Council area. I was unable to reach the Chairman of the Failllark Community 
Council during early August 1999 because he had gone of vacation. Unbeknown to the Mission, 
the Faiq}ark Community Council meeting for August 1999 had been cancelled because of 
vacat ion schedules. The Mission's counsel and J notified the PZD and City Attomey's Office of 
the Mission's inability to meet with the Fairpark Comm unity Council and the urgent need to 
begin processing its application for a conditional use regarding Rosewood Terrace propeliies. 
33. At no time did I or the Mission receive /Tom staff of the plalming and zoning 
depaliment of the city the f0l111 that I was to give a community council chairperson to execute so 
Page 10 of23 
as to acknowl edge that the Mission had made a presentation regarding a proposed conditional 
use by the Mi ssion in that paliicular area of the ci ty. At no time until the Mission's counsel 
became involved in the Miss ions conditional use permit application of September 1, 1999, 
(regarding the Rosewood Terrace Building) did I understand that the community council did not 
have the authority to withhold approval or prevent the Mission from applying for a conditional 
use penni!. My experiences of being opposed at these presentations by individuals identified as 
being city employees of the Mayor's office or police department led me to believe that approval 
of the community council was a prerequisite to filing a conditional use permit application with 
the city. 
34. On June 25, 1999, when Philip Arena requested a permit application for the 
Cohen property, staff at the permit counter was uncooperative, knowing that the Mission could 
not obtain a pemlit on the "Cohen" property without clearance from Randy Taylor, Zoning 
Administrator. The experience of Philip Arena on June 25, 1999, at the PZD permit counter 
closed the door on the Mission ' s efforts to receive city approval and relocate at the Cohen 
propeliy. Based on the foregoing, the Mission concluded it would be futi le to proceed with a 
conditional use pell11it applicati on on the Cohen propeliy. 
35. I believe that had the Mi ssion been allowed to file an application during the 
August 1999, it is likely that what the Mi ssion perceived in the staff report as bcing reli giously 
discriminatory against ti,e Mi ss ion (and raised in either the Moti on for a temporary restrai ning 
order, or at the October 7, 1999, presentation by Mission' s counsel before the Commission) 
could have been addressed and resolved so as not to violate the constitutional rights of the 
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Mission. Because of the extrem ely negative publicity encouraged by city employees in the 
Fairpark Community Council area, the Mission and I did not deem it worthwhile to postpone the 
Comm ission's hearing on our proposal until the following month. 
36. The September 14, 1999, administrative interpretation letter was neither 
requested in accordance with City ordinances nor expected by the Mission. The Mission's 
counse l had infol111al1y asked for clarificat ion regarding the impact of non-state licensure on the 
zoning administrator's April 20, 1999, letter. If the September 14, 1999, letter was wr itten in 
response to that request, it took _ _ weeks for the City to issue the advice. 
37. On September 14, 1999, the Mission was notified by the Fairpark Community 
Counci l that a vote would be taken of those attending the Community Council meeting scheduled 
for September 23, 1999, to determine whether or not the Community Council would be in favor 
of the Mission's presentation. No fonn from the Zoning Administrator or PZD was disclosed to 
or provided to the Mission for the City Chair to complete, acknowledging that the Mission had 
made a presentation regarding the proposal. 
38. As to the federal relocation assistance, the RDA never provided the Mission 
with a "notice of intent to acquire" or " notice of el igibility for relocation assistance," prior to 
"commitment of Federal financial assistance" or "initi ation of negotiation" as defined by the 
federal regu lat ions impl ementing the federal Uniform Relocation and Assistance Act. The RDA 
failed to provide the Mission "as soon as feasible" with "a general written descliption of the 
displacing agency's relocation program" at all, much less in mandated detail and notification of 
right to appeal the Agency's determination of an application for assistance. 
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39. The RDA failed to provide the Mission with services as mandated, including, 
through a personal interview, (1) detennining the relocation needs and preferences of the 
Mission, and (2) providing an explanation of (a) the relocation and other payments or other 
assistance for which the Mission may be eligible, and (b) procedures for obtaining such 
assistance. The RDA failed in its continuing duty to provide infomlation on available 
commercial properties and locations as well as minimizing the hardships of the Mission by 
providing "such other help as may be appropriate." 
40. The Mission filed a claim with the RDA seeking payment for actual reasonable 
mOVIng and related expenses as required by 49 CFR 24.303 and reestablishment expenses 
required by 49 CFR 24.304. Because of the failure of the RDA to provide proper notice of 
eligib ility, the RDA Defendants failed to allow the Mission to demonstrate the need for advance 
relocation payment. The RDA failed to provide "reasonable assistance [to the Mission] to 
complete and file any required claim for paymen\." 
41. H ad the Mission been notified of its right to seek an advance relocation 
payment, it would have done so and received the benefits thereby. (Affidavit of Wayne Wilson ~ 
) Havll1g failed to piovide the MISSIon wlth proper notrce, the MISSIOn carmot be charged 
with failure to give notice to the RDA of a "self-help" move because it never was notified by the 
RDA as required to do so . Having failed to give proper notice of the ability to file a claim in 
advance, the RDA can be charged with a failure to review tIle Mission ' s claim in an "expeditious 
manner" and "promptly notify the Mission as to any additional documentation that is required to 
SUppOli the claim." If the RDA disapproved all or pari of the advance payment claimed by the 
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Mission, they were under a duty to "promptly notify the claimant in writing of its determinati on, 
the basis for its determination, and the procedures for appealing that detennination. " Finally, 
having failed to give notice of the right to request an advance relocation payment, the RDA 
fa il ed to m aintain adequate records of their treatment of the Mission's request for relocation 
assistance. 
42. RDA 's proffered fact #42 clarifies thi s statement, stating "[ o]n October 9, 1999, 
the Mi ssion finally vacated the Subject Property." For clarifi cation regarding the factual basis 
indicating an absence of need to vacate the property June I I , 1999, see response to Di sputed Fact 
# 32, inji-a. 
43. Vv'hile the City Attollley's Offi ce forwarded a copy to Mi ssion's counsel of the 
October 4, 1999, appea l filed by the Fairpark Community Council, to the September 14, 1999, 
administrative interpretation; neither I nor the Mission were notified by the ci ty of (1) the 
appell ants request to postpone the November IS, 1999, hearing, and (2) the opti on to appeal the 
Board of Adjustments ruling within thirty (30) days after the time the deci sion was made. 
The PZD staff never consulted with me nor with the Mission regarding the needed eviden ce 
on ap peal or how the appeal wou ld impact the Mi ssion. [n addition, counsel for the Mission 
received a copy of the minutes of the November 15, 1999, meeting after the time for appeal 
had run. 
44. The Mission and I believe that had the City invo lved the Mi ss ion in the 
appea l, and had the City desired to assist the Mi ss ion's efforts to remain in the city, the 
issues of the appea l co uld have been more favora bly framed as follows: (a) The status of the 
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boardinghouse would have been specifically addressed and considered for approval. Had the 
missionary training (disciple of Christ) program been approved as an ongoing non-confomling 
use, there would have been no need for a conditional use pennit because it would not have been 
required had the boardinghouse been used for secular purposes. (b) Had the Board of 
Adjustment found the Mission to be a church or "place of worship," and the City 's pract ices 
regarding "accessory use" and the Participating Churches with Interfai th been disclosed to 
the Board by the City staff and/or counsel, an obvious exception in practice to what by 
ordinance was defined as "a homeless shelter" would have been evident. Considering the 
narrow limitations Randy Taylor had placed on the Church 's protecting the "homeless" only 
overnight when in "life threatening" situations, and limiting the Mi ss ion 's advertising of the 
new location, the Board of Adjustments could well have detennined the proposed "use" 
similarly constituted an "accessory use" of a church rather than a "homeless shelter. " 
45. Even had the Board of Adjustments denied the refrarned issues, the record 
woul d have been established to facilitate an appeal. As it was, the City's framing of the 
issues in such a 'way as to preclude consideration of these factual and legal questions made an 
appeal based 011 the City's record of ev id ence futile. 
46 . In the meantime, the Mission had relocated in tbe basement of Central Christi an 
Church at 370 South 400 East. After significant expense and eff0l1, the Mission was able to 
renew part of its religious worship and service to tile community. 
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47. As pal1 of compliance to City ordinances the Mission was inspected by the City 
County Hcalth Department, the Fire Department, Division lor Building Code Enlorcement, and 
police officers on a frequent basis. 
48. Despite the success the Mission experienced at this new location, it was unable 
to have its own worship services in the sanctuary of the church. Notably, however, the Mission, 
staff, and voluntcers were ab le to provide emergency overnight temporary hOllsing lor the 
homeless at the Central Christian Church, as well as other religious services. An ou tline o f 
estim ated totals of persons assisted by the Miss ion for the years before, during, and after the 
Missions stay at the Central Christian Church are included as Exhibit 8 to this affidavit. These 
totals reflect the sp iritual and temporal expression of officers, staff, vulunteers, and members of 
the congregation who reached out to others as they worshiped Jesus Clmst by feeding, clothing, 
providing shelter and t.he hope of the Gospel to those in need. 
49. The Mission and I believe that being required to restrict and redefine its 
religi ous mission to fit within categOIies that do not reflect its biblically hased Mission is an 
affron t to God. Nonetheless, neither I nor the Mi ssion desire to engage in civil disobedience and 
desire to have our rights and duties under the past and current city ordinances declared and 
clari fied. 
50. The Mission does not facially object to opera. il.1g within limits declared 
app licable to certai n uses and properties by fire, health, and related authorit ies, as well as 
objective criteria arti culated in City zoning regulations. (Deposition of Wayne Wilson, 
482:2 I -24; Exhibit 9.) 
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51 . Interfaith and its Participating Churches serving the homeless "share our faith 
by action, not by words, bringing hope to those without." My religious convictions and those 
shared by the Mission also illustrate :hat "faith without works is dead," (James 2: 1 7), but offers a 
different perspective on what it means to "feed Jesus [and] clothe Jesus," believing "[e]ven as ye 
have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." (See Matthew 25: 40.) 
52. While perhaps based on "logical" assumptions, the City's ad hoc detenninations 
of what constitutes acceptable amounts of "religious worship" of a church by offering to allow 
the Mission to confonn to the Interfaith "standard" ignores key aspects of differences in the 
perspective of the two religious groups regarding religious worship that focuses on issues beyond 
numbers of people assisted and duration of stay. 
53. The Interfaith guidelines operate not only in terms of numbers of homeless 
sheltered, and the duration of the stay, but also as to who is served. Interfaith only serves 
families (single- or two-parent families with children); the Mission serves families and 
indi viduals. Interfaith will not serve those with addictions; the Mission will. lnterfaith 
implicitly was understood to focus on residents of the City and Salt Lake Valley; the Mission 
also serves those W110 are transient, those initially not residents of the City or Valley. The 
Mission will not turn away a homeless person in a life threatening position (twenty degrees 
(20°) or below outside) when there are no other avai lable options in the City; Interfaith has 
no provi sion for such ass istance. 
54. Th e Missi on also has strongly resisted efforts to use government fund ing for 
social service providers. To imply or require affiliati on with an entity that serves God and the 
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homeless with Caesar rather than separating the two is not part of the Chri sti an m ission of 
the Miss ion. (See Depositi on of John Ra varino, 108:2 I -24, Exhibit 10.) 
55. The Mission and I believe that even assuming the City wo uld approve the 
Mission's "accessory use" of our religious worship within the numeric restrictions and timeframe 
establi shed by the Participating Churches with Interfaith, the Mission is still discriminated 
against because no Partici pating Church with Intcrfai th either (I) has bcen required to 
individually app ly for the approval, or (2) be subject to City regulation rega rdin g the same 
afterwards. 
56. Contrary to the City's claims, several meetings and in terchanges wi th City 
staff including M ayor Anderson occurred on May 3, 200 I , June 23, 2003 , June 21, 2004, and 
Ju ly 19, 2004. 
57. Other meetings with counsel and ranking staff of the PZD occurred on 
September 8, 2003. Notes from the meeting in Deposition Exhibit 11 refl ect aspects of the 
discussion held September 8, 2003. 
58. At no ti me was the Mission asked by the City PZD to follow the requirements 
in the Ci ty ordinances to obtain an administrative interpretation. 
59. The Mission did not file a request for an admi ni strati ve interpretati on regarding 
the Cohen property in 1999, nor the Rosewood Terrace propetiy in 1999, 2003, or 2004 . 
(Deposition of Wayne Mills 31:2-13, Exh ibit 12.) 
60. On June 30, 2002, the Mi ssion moved out of the basement of the Central 
Chri stian Church because it could not afford to pay the continuall y esca lating rent. On July 5, 
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2002, the Mission relocated its administrative offices at 342 West 200 South. At this new 
location, the Mission was unable to hold church services or prov ide homeless ovemight services 
in emergency, life- threatening conditions. 
61 . After the Mission's departure from the Central Christian Church, it initiated 
dialogue with the City both as to re-consideration of its request to use the Rosewood Terrace 
Building and what "use" the Mission would be classified as regardless of the location. On 
62. June 23, 2003, Phil Arena and I met with Mayor Rocky Anderson and Luis 
Zunguze, Plann ing Director, to di scuss issues associated the relocation of the Mission a short 
meeting addressing the desire of the Mission to relocate in the Rosewood Terrace Building. On 
June 24, 2003 , Phil Arena forwarded additional information regarding the Mission and its 
programs to Luis Zunguze. (672-674 MIS) On both June 24, 2003, and July 13 , 2003 , Matt 
Hilton wrote Lynn Pace and asked regarding procedures to amend City ordinances regarding the 
homeless. (467-472 MIS) Neither of the City Attorney's responses of Jul y 25, 2003, nor August 
19, 2003, addressed the Mi ssion's inquiry regarding amendment of the City ordinances and 
poli cies regarding the homeless. (473-477 MIS) 
63. On September 5, 2003, the owners of the Rosewood Ten'ace Propeliy 
reconfinned to the Mission in wliting that they would like to complete the transaction proposed 
in wliting in 1999. 
64. On September 8, 2003, Phil Arena, counsel for the Mi ssion, Lynn Pace, Louis 
Zunguze, Cheli Coffey, Brent Wilde, and I met at the City Offices. During that m eeting, the 
Mission raised the following issues: (1) City administration has changed its policy on use, need 
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for homeless services, and their location. The Miss ion wanted to know what the policy now was. 
(2) Is there was any way to determine that the Mission was just a church and recognize the non-
conforming use of the locat ion? (3) The owners o f the Rosewood Terrace Building will donate 
the same to the Mi ssion as a one million five hundred thousand dollar ($ 1,500,000.00) donat ion. 
(4) At the Central Christian Church location, the Mission fed four hundred (400) people a day as 
a church and were to ld they did not impact the area. (5) Homeless do not go to shelters that are 
not downtown; homeless stay downtown. (6) If the Miss ion tightened up the cond ition under 
wh ich the persons cou ld be there who aren' t in the discipleship, would they still be a homeless 
shelter? and (7) Is the City aware the other shelters in 0-3 and CG zones al low anyone in the 
Winter Overflow to keep them fi·om freezing? 
65. Louis Zunguze wanted to know how the Mission (a) classified its use, (b) what 
it was proposing to do , and (c) indicated he wanted a fOJ1l1al proposal. Matt Hilton indicated that 
"[il f the C ity al lows providing shelter for families on a temporary basis, then the City should 
pass a policy that includes this as [being] o.k. in defini tion of churches." Lynn Pace responded 
that "[i]f you open [your] office etc. to someone who needs shelter [i s different than] advertising 
sheller fo r the homeless." Lynn Pace stated (a) if the proposed use had not changed the Mission 
would still be looked at as a homeless shelter; (b) have to demonstrate change in circumstanccs 
before can ask for same thing again, and (c) the City will class ify the use. 
66. Brent Wi lde indicated that (a) if people stay there temporarily, overnight, the 
Mission would be a homeless sheller, and (b) the people in the discipleship program may be 
looked at di fferentl y but don't know. 
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67 . On October 23,2003 , J submitted a written request to Louis Zungune that the 
Mission be classified as a church. J received no response. 
68. Subsequently, the Mission met with PZD staff and counsel on November 8, 
2003. While the City' s policy on concentrating services for the homeless had changed, counsel 
for the City informed the Mission that if its uses at the Rosewood Terrace Building had not 
changed, the Mi ssion would remain classified as a homeless shelter and unable to quali fy for the 
S-J Zone. The Mission requested that changes in the City ordinances be made to reflect current 
practices among Interfaith churches regarding sheltering of the homeless. 
69. On May 3, 2004, I again submitted a written request to Louis Zungune that the 
Mission be classified as a church. Louis Zungunze referred the matter to acting Zoning 
Administrator Wayne Mills. In response to the Mission's second request to the City to be 
classified as a church, on June 21, 2004, Zoning Administrator Wayne Mills infonnally notified 
the Mi ssion that without showing a change in use, the Board of Adjustments classi fi cation would 
stand and preclude any relocation at the Rosewood TelTace Building because of the previous 
classi fi cation of the Mission's proposal as a homeless shel ter. On June 21, 2004, the Mission 
and Attorney Michael Hutchings met with Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the Planning 
Director in an eff0!1 to address relocation efforts. On July 19, 2004, the Mission and Attomey 
Michael Hutchings met again with Mayor Anderson, City counsel, and the PZD, but they were 
unable to resolve the impact of the Board of Adjustment ruling class ify ing the Mi ss ion as a 
"homel ess shel ter." 
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70. After either June 21,2004, or July 19, 2004, at Mayor Anderson's ciirecti on, 
Cheri Coffey, of the City rzo staff, provided the Mission with a map of the zoncs of the City 
where the Mission could look to relocate. Ms. Coffey's attached notes reflected an emphasis on 
the restrict ion of the Mission's locati on to the 0-3 and CG zones of the City. The map was 
restricted to the 0-3 and CG zones of the City where "homeless shelters" are a conditional lise . 
Mayor · Rocky Anderson informed the Mission that its use classifi cation would restri ct its 
locat ion to 0 -3 and CG zones. At no time has the City ever notifi ed the Mission it could locate in 
all of the areas where churches are a permitted use or conditional use. (See City'S Memorandum 
at 19-20; Affidavit of Cheri Coffcy, '1'1 6,7.) The Rosewood Ten-ace Building was subsequently 
purchased by another party and the property was not donated to the Mission. 
Fear of p rosecution if religious beliefs were exercised and subsequently determined to not be an 
"accessory use ... for religious worship" has limited the religi ous practice of the Mission and me. 
Refusal of the City to publicly define what the "accessory lise" standards are as compared with 
those of a "homeless shelter" only has exacerbated the prob lem. 
Page 22 o f23 
---DA TED thi s (j day of March, 2006_ 
C:J(Lr~l/OA)c~ 
Wayne 1Fi1son 
. , 
COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
On March l:i, 2006, Wayne C. Wilson, known to me, personally appeared before me 
and swore under oath and penalty of perjury that hc had executed the foregoing affidavit and that 
the statements contained therein were true, 
DATED and EXECUTED this March I f ,2006:, ,8 ' - " '} I 
,---- 1- ~ "'/ i / ' 
NOTARY PUBLI C 
ROBYN J, NEWBOLD 
2 290 East 3225 North 
l ayt o n. Utah 8 4040 
My CommISSion Expues 
June 15 . 2006 
STATE OF UT A II 
\.-,~_ ------=/~? v,o!tr: ::./) 
<' N ARl~UBLlC 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Clydt! R. Nichol s, Ir. , 
execullve Di rector 
UTArt STATE TAX COMMISSION 
160 L8st Third 50uth 
581t Lake CltV, UtBh 84134 
July 26, 1988 
R. H. Iilln l>en , Chll innon 
Ruger O. Te w, ComlT1\~ s IO!lCr 
loe lL Pa checo , CtIlHruhSIUJlt'1 
C, Ululne DOv\B , CoI1ll1lIs5\()I1Cr 
Account No. 12023 6 
,layne C. Wi Ison 
P.O. Box 250 #16249 
Draper , Utah 84020-0250 
Re: Spectac ular Mi ni strie\ of the L0 r d ' ! Ser"ant~ 
Gentlemen: 
Articles of incorporat ion , which were filed with the Divisi on of 
Corporations by t he subject corporation , have been examined and it is ou r 
opinion that the corpor ation i s exempt from corporation franchise tax under 
the provisions of Section 59-7-105 , Utah Code Annotated 1953 , as amended. 
This corporation fra nch ise tax exemption doe s not extend to Utah sales and use 
tax, 
This exemption shall be effective so long as corporate acti viti es are 
confined to those as authorized by the Articles of Incorporation. In the 
event the activities exceed or dev iate from' th e powers granted by the 
Articles, this exemption shall cease to have effect and the corpora ti on may be 
I iable for the franchise tax . 
In the event of any I.R.S, ru li ng , audi t, redetermination , etc . a copy 
must be forwarded to the State Tax Commission for revie w, 
CF.421mp/1719 r 
Charles Arnold , Supervisor 
Corporation s Group 
Re venue Accounting 
Telephone No. (801) 530-6257 
Blolne W Smith, Dlfector • Ope rati ons Division . 180115>0·4848 
EXHIBIT 2 
\ 
INSPECTION REPORT SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION Building Services and Licensing 
451 SOUTH STATE STREET ROOM 406 SALT LAKE CITY UTI 
Address Lf (0 't? W 2CC S Dale -l t z... :>. <J '1(, 1 cf,~r~f~\" ~ I 
Inspection o Bldg. o Elec . 
~Oning 
o Plbg. Reas~lor -, 0 C II d 
Inspec on a e o Rou tIne A Cc Kind o Mech. o Preinspection 
[] Sign re [] Housing Contractor / \ [] Soecial 
Slage Type of Inspecti o n 
o Partial o Work Approved o Footing o Underground [J Bond B 
o Complete o Work in Violalion [] Foundalion o Rough o Concre 
[] Issued SlOP Card o Do Not Proceed 
Wilh Work 
[] Double Fee D Make Necessary 
Corrections 
o Unable 10 Make Inspeclion 
[] This Inspeclion is Required . Call 535-6436 
Mornings 7:30-8:30 10 Schedule Inspeclions 
.". 24 Hour Notice Required •.• 
---= \ .. 
-
Time _1_\ _ : 5:>( ~ments: 
p ~ ee,_ r,~ 
I SSII? J 
o Frame o Clearance [J Sleel 
o Insulalion [] Final o Colum 
OVoid Ci [] Pr oy r. 
o Reinspection Req. 
n! 
s! 
a o Sheelr 
~rtiliCllle 01 Occupancy \ o Prior Violations Not Correc ted 
'- Shell Only [] Work Musl Be Compleled 
S Permanent 
Within Days C Temporary __ Days 
C No! Required 
.- -
To 
or 
SUIL L II~tI elly 1"" L>tI t h) ! 
-- ._--_ .- ---_. 
2 1'),1' 
: 
EXHIBIT 3 
I : 
HOUSING / ZONI/-. N",PECTION REr 1T 
District 'l -"V---",,-_ _ Final ____ Next Action Due __ _ 
_,ALT LAKE CIT"-CORPORATION 
Building Service .nd licenSing 
451 S. State St. , Room 406 
S.L.C., Ut. 84111 535-643 
Address 
-4' 
INSPECTIONS: 
Complaint 
Operation Paint Brush 
Business License 
Apartment License ... .. .. . 
PERSONAL CONTACTS: 
Phone Call 
Ottice 
Visit 
LETTERS: 
Warning Letters ............... . . 
Certificate of Non-Compliance 
Citation/Summons threat 
Other Let1ers 
CIT A TlONS/SUMMONS: 
Citations 
SUMMONS 
. ..... ..... .... --. '- .... 
INSPECTIONS: 
Complaint ..... . .. . 
Operation Paint Brush ... . . . . . . . 
Business License . . .... .. ..... . 
Apartment License . . ..... . 
PERSONAL CONTACTS: 
Phone Call ...... . 
Office 
Visit 
LETTERS: 
Warning Letters 
Certificate of Non-Compliance 
Citation/Summons threat 
Other Letters 
CITATIONS/SUMMONS: 
Citations 
SUMMONS 
Initial 
o IIC 
0 110 
o liB 
o IIA 
o PCP 
o PCO 
o PCV 
o LWL 
o LCN 
·0 LCS 
~OL SC CSS 
Initial 
o IIC 
0 110 
o liB 
o IIA 
o PCP 
o PCO 
o PCV 
o LWL 
o LCN 
o LCS 
o L/ 
p.-CSC 
tJ CSS 
Progr~s 
D-lPC 
o IPO 
o IPB 
o IPA 
NOTICE AND ORDER: 
EXTENSIONS: 
CERTIFICA TES: 
Case N umber 
Compliance 
o ICC 
o ICO 
o ICB 
o ICA 
. ... 0 NAO 
... 0 EXT 
lien .. . . . . ... . . . . 
. . .. . 0 RTL 
. ... 0 RTN Non-Compliance 
HEARINGS: 
HAAB Board 
. . . . . . 0 HHB 
Board of Adjustment 
... . .. . .... . 0 HBA 
Court ... . ..... . 
. .. . 0 HCO 
PROPERTY OWNER: ________ _ 
Datemme 
/·-:7 7 c... ,/j/ 
Progress 
o IPe 
1:JIPO 
o IPB 
o IPA 
NOTICE AND ORDER: 
EXTENSIONS: 
CERTIFICA TES: 
lien ... 
Non-Compliance 
HEARINGS: 
HAAB Board 
Board of Adjustment 
Court .. 
Case Number 
Compliance 
o lCC 
o ICO 
o lCB 
o lCA 
.0 NAC 
.. 0 EXT 
. 0 RTL 
.0 RH 
. 0 HHf 
.0 HBf 
.0 HC( 
PROPERTY OWNER: _ _ _____ _ 
EXHIBIT 4 
Q t r::l -1 .... ~L r l T +_. -I . . 
U CA. t , \.. .. .) 1 . ) L:: J. 1 J 
UTAH STATE TAX COMlVIlSSlON 
2 10 North 1950 Wl.:st SuIt Lake CIt)', Utah 8<1134 
M LciJl:lel O. Leu v ltL 
Governor 
Olene S Walker 
LI~U"""bn ( ('.ovcn 'Dr 
IN Vul Ovesun . CfllllfUlhn 
Il.lchB.rd B McKeown, CUWlOllSSlonf! r 
Joe B. P"chcCQ, Cu nH"I~SH.IIl Cr 
Alice S),Cl.l fCr, COf1lrni SSIUII~r 
Rodney O . Ml1 r rclli, EHcull " c Director 
WAYNE C WI LSON 
SP ECTACUL~~ MINI STRIES 
468 W 200 S 
SALT LAKE UT 8410 1 
Jun e 18, 1997 
RE: Religious/Charitab le Sa les Tax Exempti on Num ber N 11 839 
D ear Si r: 
Based on the information s ubmitted, we have detennined tilat your organization qua lifies as a reli gious 
or cha ritable ins ti tution and is exempt from sal es/usc tax iJn both purchases and sa les o f tangi ble personal 
property and related serv ices, subj ect to the following qual iiications: 
I) 11,e exemption only applies to purchases and sales for religious , charitable, or other purpose 
sanctioned by Section 50 I (c)(3) oftbe Intemal Revenue Code. Individual s affdiated with the 
organi zation are not authorized to exempt purchases for their own personal use. 
2) Purchases and sales pertaining to "unrelated trades or businesses" as deiined in 26 USCA , 
Section 5 13 are n ot exempt and are subject to Utah sales and income tax provis ions. 
3) Sales of food or drink items to the general public are subject to tax unless sold at an isolated 
or occasional fund raiser, bazaar, etc. Food sales may also be subject to the " restaurant" tax in 
counties where this tax is imposed. 
4) Purchases of construction materials as tangible personal property are exempt. Con tractors 
may purchase tax-exempted cons lnlction materials on behalf of an exempt organi zati on. 
Contractors should contact tJle Tax Commiss ion for addi tional inJomlation. 
Please refer to the enclosed general instructions for tnfonnill ion on exemption certi fIcati on, sales 
tax refund procedure, and record keepulg requirements. 
lJyou have illly quest ions, please contact me at (SO l ) 297-7507 , 1(800) GG2 -4 335, Ext 7507 
or rax (80 I) 297-7697. 
~ruIIY, , u4£1?P¥Jl~ Da;tCI¥n~~~ 
Cus tomer Service Divisio n 
Jf you flCl!d en accommodation IHlder litt AmerICan's wlrh D!sabl!rtlf!5 Act, cor.:Il C{ tlt r Tw; COmmiSSIon 01 (801) 297 -3811 or 
Tclc w mm unlcatl OT! Dculce fur th e Dw( (TUD) (80 I) 297-38/9 I'l ~asr allow threr war/lln.g days {or a response. 
EXHIBIT 5 
UN' - 0 STATES POSTAL SERVICE 
, ,phis. TN 38165-9599 
_J' {' .-
08 1l2/ 9 l 
Authorization No. 06~71 2 2 - RB S 
11 •• 11 111111111111 ,1111111,1111111111 1.111111.,11111" 1111 1111 
SPECTAC ULAR HIN STRIES OF THE LORDS 
SERVANTS 
~6 8 W 200 S 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8~IOI- 11 13 
) ear Postal Custo mer: 
(our application for nonprofit standard mai l rate mailing privilege s h a s b e ~ n 
3Pproved. Effective 0 8/ 05 /97, you r organization is authorized to mail at t he 
1onprofit standar d mail rates at SAL T LAKE CI TY , UT 8~199. 
: v e rything you present for mailing under this authorization must be prep a r e d 
in accordance with the postal regulations that gover n this c l ass of mail . 
rherefore , please note the following requirements, as specified in E670. 6 of 
t he Domestic Mail Manual: 
All ma tter mailed at the Nonprofit Standard Mail rates must identify 
the author ized nonprofit organization. The name an d return address of 
the authorized nonprofit organization must be either on the outside 
of the mailpiece or in a prominent location on the material b e ing 
mailed. P seudonym s or bogus names of persons or organizations may n o t 
be used. If the mailpiece bears any name and return address. it mlJst 
be that of the authorized nonprofit organizat i o n. 
-11is authorization does not extend to mailings made at post offi c es other 
-ha n the one named above-:-Also, please note that under E670.5 o f the Do me sti c 
\ail Ma nual , yo ur organization is authorized to mail only its own matt e r at 
:hese rates. You rn a not dele ate o r lend the use of our non rofit stand a rd 
ta il au t horiza 10n a an a er olng so cou 
e s u~n e revoca 10n a your au 
'r io r ta your first mailing, please contact the above-named post office to 
-nsure all applicable fees are paid . Additionally, you must mail under this 
lu t horization at least once every two years. Unless you do so, your no n pro f it 
_tandard mail rate authorization will be revoked for nonuse. 
f you have not already done s o, please contact the post office named a bove 
a di sc uss entry of your mail under this authorization. 
' LEA SE ClTE YOUR AUTHORIZATION NUMBER AS GIVEN ABOVE IN ALL FUTURE CO RP.ES-
-OIIDENCE WITH US, INCLUDING REQUE STS FOR ADDITIONAL MAILING POI NT S. 
hank yo u for your business. 
d >J a r d W ike r 
ana g er 
ate s and Cla s sific a ti on S ervi ce Cente r 
\ 
EXHIBIT 6 
lOG ER ~. C UTLE R 
Matthew Hilton 
P.O. 781 
Springvi lie . UT 84663 
LAW D E P ARTMEN T 
August 20, 1997 
Re : Location of Homeless Shelters in Salt Lake City 
Dear Matt: 
OEE O E E C:CR RA OI N I 
A \ 
RECEfI!:cr ' ". 
AUG 2 2 19~;- J 
...... ~~ 
fi7' 
.:3'-: . 
This letter is in response to our meeting on August 14,1997. At that meeting, you 
and your client requested that I provide you with some information regarding the 
requirements o f the Salt Lake City Zoning Code with respect to the establishment of 
homeless shelters. Specifically, you inquired as to where homeless shelters would be 
allowed in Salt Lake Citv and what circumstances govern the establishment of such 
shelters. 
I have discussed this matter with Brent Wilde of the Planning Division. Homeless 
shelters are allowed uses in the CG and D-3 zones as conditional uses . You and/or your 
client could review the Sal t Lake Ci ty Zo ning Maps either at the Business License 
counter, in Room 215 of the City & County Building, or you could purchase a set of 
maps for $40 .00. No homeless shelter can be approved unless it is in one of those two 
zoning distri cts. 
In addition, homeless shelters are only allowed, even witmn those rwo zones, as 
condit io nal uses. In order to obtain a conditional use permit, your client would need to 
file an application. a copy of which is enclosed, and would need to attend a Community 
Council meet ing to explain your proposal to the neighborhood and to appear before a 
hearing o f the Salt Lake City Planning Commission. The Planning Commission grants or 
denies conditional use permits based upon a list of specific factors identified in the Salt 
Lake City Zoni ng Code. A list of those facto rs is also enclosed for your review. 
Al though your clien t mav apply fo r the establishment of a homeless shel ter anywhere 
within a CG or 0-3 zone . City policy discourages the high concentration of homeless 
shelters with in one geographic area. For that reason, it i:; more likely that your client 
wO'.;:d obtain approval c·r a proposal If his proposed she lter were located outs ide of the 
downtown :lre:l since the re \s alre::ldv a large shelter and several suppon facilities in thaI 
are~. 
-CLEPHCNE: 801 ~ :::;!;o·7-Be .... ):.: Bal· ~3~· 76 ""O '\ 354MIS 
;;:>, .... .. .. ... ,. 
'-
Matthew Hilton 
August 20, 1997 
Page -2-
If your client has a specific proposal he would like us to review, or ifhe would 
li ke to have a general discussion as to the range of possible sites, we would be happy to 
discuss that matter with him. If you and your cl ient would like to discuss this matter, 
please contact me so that we can arrange an appropriate meeting time. In contrast, if your 
client would like to meet without attorneys, please have him contact Brent Wilde at 535-
6180, who has assured me that he will make himself available to meet with your client. 
I hope this information is helpful tD you. If you have any funher questiDns Dr 
cDncerns, ple:lse let me know. 
LHP:isw 
cc : Brent Wilde 
Bill Wright 
;;::y~)  
t/~~;PACE 
Assistant City Attorney 
(\r L998 4\ LCrrr RS \htlton le ite r Ie nome less shel lers· nug. ~O. 1997 doc) 
1355MIS 
EXHIBIT 7 
Douglas 8 . We:o!t 
O~fI"''''' D .. ~c~nr 
!tela 0 Or ;l m 
D;r~cll" 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF LICENSING 
120 Nortll 200 WO$I, Suile 303 
PO Box <15500 
Sail Lake City, ULlh 0<: 1 <15·0500 
(801) 5J8· /,2;!2 
i:: .'In equal oppol1unity cmploy cr 
~ 
Rev. Wayne Wilson 
The Salt Lake City Mission 
P . O. Box 142 
Sal t Lake City , Utah 84110-0142 
RE: LICENSE NOTICE 
Dear Rev. Wil son : 
Jl.pril 19 , 1999 
The Department of Human Services, Office of Licensing, conducted 
an on -si te review at the Salt Lake City l"1ission fI.pril 16, 1999. 
The Mission does not provide human service treatment as described 
i n the licensing law. ThRrefore, the Mi ssion is not required to 
be licensed by the Department of Human Services. 
The Salt Lake City Mission was set up to help the homeless and 
poor become independent, productive members of society through 
a life centered i in Jesus Christ . The Mission offers long-term 
discipleship training programs. 
If you have questions or conce rns , please feel free to contact 
this Office at 538-4242. Thanks for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
fJ~~ 
Kent Callister 
Licensing Specialist 
0387MIS 
-:, l 3'i 
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EXHIBIT 8 
Call'gory 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Converts to Christ 245 300 300 500 
LOllg~Tcnn 10 15 12 20 
Recovery 
Pantry food 200 250 300 700 
dist ributed to 
needy families 
Goods provided 1500 people, 1500 peop le, 1700 people, 5,000 people, 
fo r needy families 20,000 pieces 20,000 pieces 25,000 pieces 40 ,000 pieces 
J-lohday und other 250 vo lunteers; 300 vo lunteers; 300 volunteers; 500 volunteers; 
meals provided. Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving 
dinners combined dinners combined dinners combined dinners comhined 
3,000 3,000; 3,100; 6,000; Christmas 
Chri stmas dinners Christmas di nners Christmas dinners dinners combi ned 
combined 3,000 combined 3,000; combined 3,000; 5,000; Wrapped 
Wrapped presents Wrapped presents Wrapped presents presents for va rious 
for various fami lies for various families for various rami! ies famili es 1,500; 
900 900; 1000; 
Bible studi es and 500 600 600 650 
ot her group 
sessI ons 
Daily meals 600 meals a day. 600 meals a day. 600 meals a day. 1500 mea ls a day 
served 
Shelter Provi ded Yes Yes Yes Yes/No 
Catc~o ry 2003 2004 2005 2006 (Projected) 
Converts to Christ 200 250 300 500 
. -
Long-Tenn 12 IS 20 20 
Recovery 
Pantry food 100 50 50 500 
dis tr ibuted to 
needy famili es 
Goods provided 500 people; 200 people; 200 people; 500 people; 
for needy peo~le 8,000 pieces 4,000 pieces 4,000 pieces 5,000 pieces 
Holiday and other 400 vo lunteers; 500 volunteers; 500 vo lunteers; 500 volunteers; 
meals provided. Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving Thanksgiving 
meals combined dinners combined dinners combined dinners comb ined 
2,500; 4,000; Christmas 4,700; Christmas 4,700; Christmas 
Christmas dinners dilmers combined dinners combined dinners combined 
combined 2,000; 3,000; 3,000; 4,800; 
Wrapped presents Wrapped presents Wrapped presents Wrapped presents 
for various for various for various for various 
fa milies 1,000; families 1,200; families families 1,700; 
1,500; 
Bible studies and 400 400 400 1,000 
other group 
sessIons 
Daily meals served 100 100 100 100 
Shelter Provided No No No No 
EXHIBIT 9 
JOHN RA VA RINO 
again 50 thai ]'m slire thai J understand them. 
2 A nd I want \0 hand you. if J may , a copy 2 
SAL .. AKE CITY MI SS ION v. SAL"! LAKE CITY 
who th ey are. It's not on the first five pages of 
their book. 
3 
4 
of Exhibit 19 to Mr. Wilson's deposition wh ich is the 3 
document we were working otT of. Do you remember tha 4 
They talk about an FD -- FASB 
Statement 117. Is that what yo u' ve just asked? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
document? 
MR. IIILTON: I'd represent it's the one 
Iha1 we we nt over in the last deposition. 
THE WITNESS ' I recogni zc SOllle of it. yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Rampton) Do you remember whe n we 
were talking :lhotll il hack in October? 
A. I cia. 
Q. Reforc I dive into the nitty-gritty of it. 
J reviewed your deposi ti on transc ript from the last 
time and realized that I understood your t:xplan,:nion 
15 of allocated indirect cos ts much less completely than 
16 I believed I did as I was sining at the table 
13 
14 
17 listening 10 you give it to me. and so si nce someday 
18 you're going 10 have 10 explain this to a court. it's 
19 
20 
21 
~2 
25 
probably a good exerc ise anyway. 
Let me see if I understand what you were 
sayillg. For each of the pages in Exhibit 19. staning 
wi th about page RDA 00791 . you stated the costs 
renec tcd on the various Exhibit A sheets in this 
document were a combination of direct and indirec t 
costs, ind irect costs calculated in accordance with 
Page 105 
I 
2 
3 
F ASB I believe No. 17 that vou stated. 
Do you remember that" 
A. I don't know my FSBs (s ic) by heal1, but I 
know that this first page will say--
Q. Okay . You're referri ng to a document to 
refresh your rec ollection on the question? 
A. There's a lot of FSABs (s ic). 
MR. HILTON: You need to explain what the 
documcnt is. 
THE WITNESS: The document is the 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Q. Yes. Where I was going with the quest ion 
is that you referenced that as 0 standard by which \ ou 
prepa red the exhibits in -- the Exhibit A pages of 
Exhibit 19. and my question was going to be \\'11) \\as I ! 
that you rei ied upon that stanclard in yo ur work " 
A. It's like the Engli sh language. 11 '5 
universal in America and Canada, I just noticed. 
Q. You're referring now to the FASI3 
standards? 
A. I'm referring to thi s guide which 
inculcates FASB 117. 
Q. 117, have I got it wrong? 
A. Well --
Q. 117, okay. 
A. Well , 117 may not be the key one, but it 
20 appears to be one of the major ones. AICPA -- this is 
21 all reciting gene rally accepted accounting practices 
22 for Christian organi zations, so the committee appears C 
23 to be back there in the ivory tower in New York in the 
24 
25 
American Inst itute of CPAs, the people that \'lark II ith 
FASB that write thi s stuff for a guide industrywide. 
Page 107 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
nationwide, Canndian-wide. 
Q. Okay. And what I'm trying to understand 
is does it rel ate simply to Chri st ian ministries or is 
it an accounting practice generally? 
A. Ch ristian ministries. Christi an 
min istries probably are maybe 20 pe rcent of all 
nonprofit organi zations. 
Q. Does the document that you're lOO king at 
there contain the text of FASB 117? 
A. It does and --
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Accounting and Financial Reporting Guide For Christia II 
Ministries . This is administered by the Evangelical 12 
Q. I'm try ing to think how to handl e thi s. 
Is that something I could look at" 
7 ' 
_0 
24 
25 
Joint Accounting Committee. and I can Il1nke this 
available to YOLI. bu t --
Q. (By Mr. Rampton ) The Evangelical what 
Accounting Committee? 
A. The Evangelical loint Accounting 
Commi ttee . 
Q. Who are they? 
A. That's what I'm trying to figure out. 
Thank you for asking. 
You would think, if you copied the li rst 
four or five pages of their document, it would tell 
you. but I believe it's the American Institute of 
CPAs. And that 's all I can tell )' OU until I find out 
13 A. Yes. you could look at it. 
14 Q. Thank you. 
15 MR. HAGGERTY: I'd request. since it's 
16 been referred to in the deposition, to go ahead and 
17 make it an exhibit and get copies at a later lime. 
18 THE WITNESS: May I make a distinction" 
19 MR. HAGGERTY: Pl ease. 
20 THE WITNESS: United Way would account 
21 simi larly. United Way is not a Christian 
22 organization. The American Red Cross would account 
23 sim ilarly. They are not a Christian organization. 
24 Salvation Am1Y is a Christian organization. 
25 Q. (By Mr. Rampton) Okay. I'm not going to 
Page 106 Page 108 
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EXHIBIT 10 
Multi-Page 'M 
Page 480 
)y the drug home. 
Q You have no desire or intention to use the 
Jremises for emergency shelter. Was thal no! true? 
A He £old us nOi to put it --
Q Was not true? 
A Yes. 
Q Is what? 
A We weren't going \0 do it? 1 w~sn'{ going 
\0 use it as an emergency shelter. 
Q You testified a few minutes ago you were 
pUll ing them up on an emergency basis. 
A Not at this facility. 
Q You weren ' t going to clo it at this place? 
A Right. They wouldn't let us . He sa id, You 
can't. 
Q All right. 
A So we were trying to adapt ourselves to fit 
their -- what they say is the ir cookie cutter which 
we did over and over and no maller how we try [Q 
adapt, they won't let us in a facili ty. Oh, if you 
just become more like Interfaith, if we were a cookie 
cutter of Interfa ith, we don't need you. 
Q Who said cookie CUller to you? 
A A cookie cu tter is what --
Q WllO said that to you --
A Nobody. 
(Reporter interrupts) 
Page 481 
Q Sorry. You've been empathic with you r 
church? 
A Yes . 
Q And you testified empath ic that you r 
function and your purpose are to defme the Bible, 
co rrec t? 
A Correct. 
Q Which part of th e Bible~ There 's 1590 pages 
long. I checked over lunch. 
A Okay. 
Q Wh ich part? 
A I would say mainly in the new testamcnt but 
the old , too. It' s written and we read throughout 
the Bible. So the fabric of the Bible. 
Q Would it be your position that your mission 
is devoted to doing whatever is abdicated in any 
porrion of the Bible? 
MR. HILTON: I object to that question . I 
don't th ink it has any bearing on RDA'S duty to 
perform. 
MR. RAMPTON: You can go ahead. 
MR. HILTON: I'll instruct him not to answe r 
unless ordered by the judge. 
I';lgt.: ..j S~' 
MR . RAMPTON: We. can vaCale right now aile! 
2 get an orde r. Is that what you want? 
3 MR. HtLTON: I wa11l to know the basis h()w 
4 it 's rdevanl to what --
5 MR . RAMPTON: We've been in this ca,e fur 
6 six years. There are claims against the RDA for 
7 which if it is the prevailing parry it may have 
8 e11litlement 10 attorney fees if there's lack of good 
9 faith bas is here. I'm trying to understand why you 
10 beli~ve this min istry has the breadth of power ;II ld 
1 t immunity to any kind of regulation? 
t2 THE WITNESS: I don't believe that. 
13 Q (By Mr. Rampton) Well --
14 A Now, you're putting words in my mou th illid 
15 even says they have a right to regulate us according 
16 to the courts. 
17 Q Wllat--
18 A To an insubstantial degree I'm reading wll" t 
19 it says right in law. I read the case of the Supreme 
20 Court says they can zone regu late to an insubstal lli;J] 
21 degree churches for publ ic safety. I don 't have a 
22 problem with us -- regulating us to publ ic safety 111 11 
23 telling me how I can or cannot worship Gnu isn't 
24 right. 
25 Q Okay. Let' s get to that then . Let's get to 
PJge 4 K3 
I that. What do you cons ider to be the worship llf Gou" 
2 A You said right here. 
3 Q Just a moment please. You said in your 
4 prior testimony feed Jesus, clothe Jesus. I assulIle 
5 that refers to the passages in the Bible that say, 
6 Inasmuch as he have done it unto the least of these 
7 my brethren, ye have done it --
8 A Correct. 
9 Q -- untO me, correct? 
10 A Correct. 
II Q You're talking about doing anything for 
12 anybody that ' s the least of Christ' s brethren, 
13 correct? 
14 A Correct. 
Q And whatever you can do [or them, you are 
16 doing for Christ and that' s part of your worship~ 
A Yes. 
15 
17 
18 Q And Iherefore, the city, any governJ1le(lI 
19 agency can exercise only minimal, whatever st anua rd 
20 you articulated, limit the regulatory requirements. 
21 correct? 
22 A Insubstantial degree fo r public safety and 
23 nothing else. I don't have a problem with public 
24 safety. 
25 Q But nothing else~ 
ge 480 - Page 483 DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC (80 1) J2R- Il S:, 
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EXHIBIT 12 
Mills (Exam2nrtion by Mr . Pace) 31 
1 find chat . 
2 Q . Okay . Is there a fo~~al process for a 
3 f o rm or a fee f or requesting an 3~minis~rative 
4 decision? 
5 A . Yes . 
6 Q. So there ' s a form yo~ ~ill out and a fee 
7 y o u have co pay ; is that true? 
8 Yes . 
9 Q . Okay . !'.nd to your ).:~.~·.,ledge, did 
10 Pas cor Wilson ever fill ouc tha: : :)rm o r pay th~ 
11 o r go through that process? 
12 .n. . To my knowledge T i:n 't remembe: the: 
13 ever happe n ing . 
14 Q . Okay . We ' ve talked _ ~ o t, and I d o ~ ' c 
15 mean co prolong the discussion 2t~~c when che Miss~~~ 
16 would be -- would be , as Mr . Hi ~ :~:o puc it, bOi.ind jv 
17 the decision by che Board of Ad·~5:ment, and wh e n c~e! 
18 wouldn ' t . 
1 9 F o r the sake of this 2~scussi on , let ' s 
~ 20 assume that what the Missi on w a~:ed to do was, as 
21 defined in the Board of Adjus~me~ : case , at that 
22 location, if the Mission made a 5~~nifi cant change In 
23 their proposal and wanced to go b3Ck to that l oc ati on , 
24 would the city consider chat? 
25 lL I'm sorry , ask that 2,03in . 
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Tab 4 
Fl l.EO 
: ;" ,T rO U/Y!' 
. " ...... , V I ~ 
~ lI:nD J'; :"d G!':.L DISTfilC T 
~ .'.u LAKE COUN T J 
Craig L. Ti\1Igr,' and Associates U 
Craig Taylor (#4421]1~ i'U TY CLERK ' 
Matthew Hilton (#3655) 
472 North Main Street 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Telephone: (801) 544-9955 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
( 
IN THE TH IRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
7;1" 
Salt Lake City Mission, et ai., 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW HILTON 
Salt Lake City, et aI., ) Civil No. 990908945 
Defendants ) Judge: Joseph C. Fratto 
Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
v. 
McDonald Brothers Investments , a 
) 
) 
Utah General Partnership, ) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW Matthew Hilton, under oath and penalty of perjury, and states that the 
following is true: 
I. I am over the age of 18 and competent in all respects to make this affidavi t. 
further declare under penalty of perjury that J have personal knowledge of the matters stated 
herein and affirm that the matters stated herein are true and accurate. 
2. I am attorney practi cing with the law finn of Craig L. Taylor & Associates which 
represents the Plainti ffs in this action. 
3. I can veri fy that the document attached hereto as Exhibit " 1" is a true and correct 
copy of correspondence dated August 30, 1999 from myself to Steve Swindle, counsel for MBI. 
4. I can verify that the document attached hereto as Exhibit "2" is a true and correct 
copy of correspondence dated September 28, 1999 from Steve Swindle, counsel for MBI, to 
myself. 
5. I can verify that the document attached hereto as Exhibit "3" is a true and correct 
copy of correspondence dated September 19, 2005 from Douglas M. Skie, EPA region 8, to 
myself. 
IREMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK -
SIGNATURE ON FOLLOWING PAGE 1 
• 
DA TED this Icraay of March, 2006. 
Matthew Hilton 
COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
On March I ~2006, Matthew Hilton, known to me, personally appeared before me and 
swore under oath and penalty of perjury that he had executed the foregoing affidavit and that the 
statements contained therein were true. 
NOTA,llY PUBLIC 
ROBYN J. NEWBOLD . 
2290 East 3225 North 
layto n. Utah 840~O 
My Commission Expires 
June 15 . 2008 
STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
1 hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2006, 1 had a copy of the foregoing 
document sent via facsimi le and first class U.S. mail , postage prepaid, to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Fax: (801) 328-0537 
Lynn Pace 
Sal t Lake City's Attorney's Office 
451 South State Street Suite # 505A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 111 
Fax: (801) 535-7640 
John A. Snow 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main Street Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 144 
Fax: (801) 534-0058 
Wayne Wilson and Philip Arena 
Salt Lake City Mission 
342 West 200 South 
P.O. Box 142 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 10-0142 
Fax: (801) 355-9364 
DATED and EXECUTED thi s 28th day of March, 2006. 
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES 
f' r 
EXHIBIT 1 
U8/::0/1 '3' 9 15 : 40 
Matthew Hilton _  
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
1220 North Main Street # 5A 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
(801 )-489-1111 
(801 )-489-6000 (Facsimile) 
(VIA :ACSIMILE 801-534-0058) 
I\ugu: ,t 30, 1999 
St~!ve Swindle 
Van C Cltt, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 So Ith Main Street # 1600 
Salt L. \ke City , UT 84144 
. . . . ' .. - ..... 
, ~E: McDonald Brothers Investment, a Utah general partnership 
PAGE 62 
Salt Lake City Mission (Spectacular Ministries of the Lord's Servants) 
468 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dear M '. Swindle: 
I am he ping you were able to reach your clients regarding my request to at least 
allow tt e Mission to stay through the due diligence period Is for the ROA. I 
underst; md that the Mission has to be out at the closing. 
Thank \ ou for your time and attention to this critical matter that affects the 
continuo tlon of the valuable religious and social services provided by the Mission 
to many who are reached by 110 other private or government program or person_ 
With be5 t regards, I remain, 
cc: P8!;tOI Wayne Wilson 0283Ml iS -?~J-II 
, 
i 
1 
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EXHIBIT 2 
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L AW O F'F' IC ~ S OF 
VA N C O TT, B A GLEY, CORN W ALL & M CC A RTHY 
SUI Tt: QOO . ~" .. r.T· " ~"Ml tSS to I\ I "~"A""C" 
'II''' ' 'IHIO A PROI""ES S ION A L CORPORA TI ON 
.... , . 2<1 0 " WAS ...... C;TO N .. O UL I: II ...... O 
; . • ~ ~. " OOot .. , UTI'," a .... ol SU" ' .. "SH .... LL 6 II .... OLI:Y 
IlIilO ' 8Q~ 
B C"",!:Tl , .. " .. ",n:55. H OW'" 
5VHltA~"'O (. " ... .. con 
11I "'1!i"PO~ 
U1HtA l.>i<NO. y ..... con (,. ", .. LISON 
'W02-l!iIO' 
" ...... ton . " LL ISO" t. ",n:: .. 
' 'iI01- '917 
\I...,. corr. RIl C R " ~A""SWO"T" 
'SI! 1 " ~7 
PHC t-l D . SWI>lOLC 
Matthew Hilton, Esq. 
1220 North Main Street, #5A 
Springville, Utah 84663 
e S TABLI S HE O l e7 ~ 
SO SOU T H M AIN STR EE T . SUIT E 16 0 
POS T O F"F' I C E BOX 4 53 4 0 
SAL T LAK E C I TY, UTAH 64 14 5 - 0 
T E LE P H ONE ( 9 01 ) 5 32 - 3 333 
I" ACS' M IL !: I BOl) 53'4- 0058 
Q I RI: C T DI AL ( 11101 ) ;:37 -0 2 7 0 
September 28, 1999 
A~ RECI::.~I' 
S[P .· . IVEI] 
U LJ "'.-
I'Y':I':I 
IBOII ,394'576) 
,. 
'. 1 ", 
- . 
VILOINO C , SVITt: lOa· ... 
. ~;!OO ~"'A" Allt .. v t 
VJ..<\ FACSIMILE 
(801) 489-GOOO 
Re: McDonald Brothers Investments / Salt Lake City Mission 
Dear Matt: 
I did not hear back from you following our telephone conversation on September 20, 
1999. 
I al so tri ed without success to reach you last Friday and when I tried to reach you 
yesterday I was advised that you were out ofthe office for the day. 
The Agreement which was entered into between your client, Spectacular Ministries of the 
Lords' Servants, and my client, McDonald Brothers Investments, dated July 31, 1999, provided 
that the premises would be vacated no later than September 6,1999. We can appreciate the 
difficulty of your circumstances but, as you indicated to me on September 20, 1999, your client 
iniel1lb tu l,unor its CU lTIinitnient to 1v1cDonald Brothers Invcstlli~ntsJ tind ;t is, therefore, 
imperative that the premises be vacated as agreed. Obviously, if our client's transaction with the 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City does not close by reason of your client's failure to 
vacate the pre mi ses, there could be very significant damages to our client. 
In acco rd ance with the Agreement dated July 31, 1999, any continued possession of the 
premises by your client after September 6, 1999, constitutes an unlawful detainer pursuant to §78-
36-3(1 )(a) of the Utah Code. As you have indicated to me, our client has been most cooperative 
in att empting to meet the needs of your client. We obviously would prefer not to file an action to 
enfo rce this Agreement, but now we feel we are compelled to do so unless the premises are 
vacated no later than Tuesday, October 5, 1999. 
010\1987 46.V \ • .................... & 
Exhibit 23 
-.::2 a .1 / /J 
V AN COTT, B AGLE Y, C O RN \ .LL & M CCARTHY 
September 28, 1999 
Page Two 
lfwe mu st file an action, please let me know whether you will accept service for your 
cli ent. 
Your continued cooperation will be appreciated and if you should have any questions, 
please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
Stephen D. Swindle 
SDS/sb 
cc: James T. McDonald 
O! 0\ 198746. V! 
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UNITED 
Ref: 8EPR-B 
Mr. Mallhew F. Hillon 
STA 
I 
\. 
ES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
REGION 8 
999 18TII STREET - SUITE 300 
DENVER, CO 60202·2466 
Phone 800-227-8917 
htlp:/Iwww.epa.gov/roglon08 
SEP 1 9 2005 
& Counselors at Law Craig L. Taylor, P.C., Atlom]Y 
472 North Mai n S treet 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Re: FOlA Request #313-05 - E A Grants to Salt Lake City 
Dear Mr. Hilton: 
Th is lelt er is in response to y? Freedom of Information Act inquiry dated August 18,2005, 
regardi ng infomlatioll pertait1il g to the Suit Lake City Brownficlds project, morc speci fi ca lly the 
SOO West Park Blocks Targc~e Brownfields Assessmen t (TBA), 
Pcr your conversation 011 A\1L t 31,2005, with Luke Chavez of m y SI"[[, I illll enc losing II copy 
of Contract No. 68-W5-0031ia d the total cost of the expenses incuITed by EPA for the 500 West 
Park Blocks TBA. The tot,,1 f st of the TBA "t $62, 159.87 included the product ionl1nd 
implementation of the Smnpltn :lJlU Analysis Plan (SAP) and the Iinal Analyti t:a l Rcsu lls 
Rcporl. No information was 1[1 und in EPA Region VIII's records identifying any cOllllllunicillioll 
from Sail Lake City Redevelop nell I Agency (RDA) to EPA Region VIn, indic<lting thatllw 
request for assistance d'lled Jlll e 2, 1999, from Salt Lake City RDA was withdrawn, the 
information provided by the ~. lpling and Analysis Plan (SAP) was declined or rejected, or the 
expenses incurred by EPA Re' all V III was repa id or reimbursed by the Salt Lake City JWA . 
If you have further questions r gl.l rding this response please con tact Luke Chavez at (303) 312· 
6512. 
EXHIBIT 
?b 
tfaiJjj 
The lola l cost oflhis respons 
under separat~ cover. 
$80.65. A separate invoice covering these charges wi ll be sent 
Douglas M. Skie, Program II" clor 
Prep<Jreuness, Assessment an mergency Response 
Enclosures 
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21A.12.0 10 Purpose Statement: Page 1 of 1 
21 A.12.01 0 Purpose Statement: 
The interpretation authority established by this Chapter is intended to recognize that the 
provisions of this Title, though detailed and extensive, cannot, as a practical matter, 
address every specific situation to which these provisions may have to be applied . Many 
of these situations can be resolved or clarified by interpreting the specific provisions of 
this Title in light of the general and specific purposes for which those provisions were 
enacted. This interpretation authority is administrative rather than legislative. It is intended 
only to allow authoritative application of the provisions of this Title to specific cases. It is 
not intended to add to or change the essential content of this Title. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-1), 
1995) 
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21A.12.020 Scope Of Zoning Administrator Authority: 
The Zoning Administrator, subject to the procedures, standards and limitations of this 
Chapter, may render interpretations, including use interpretations, of the provisions of this 
Title and of any rule or regulation issued pursuant to it. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-2), 1995) 
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21A.12.030 Persons Entitled To Seek Interpretations: 
Applications for interpretations may be filed only by a property owner having need for an 
interpretation or by the property owner's authorized agent. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-3), 1995) 
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21A.12.040 Procedures: 
A. Application: An application for an interpretation of this Title shall be filed on a form 
provided by the Zoning Administrator and shall contain at least the following information: 
1. Provisions : The specific provision or provisions of this title for which an interpretation is 
sought; 
2. Facts: The facts of the specific situation giving rise to the request for an interpretation; 
3. Interpretation: The precise interpretation claimed by the applicant to be correct; 
4. Statement: When a use interpretation is sought, a statement of what use permitted 
under the current zon ing classification of the property that the applicant claims either 
includes the proposed use, or is most similar to the proposed use; and 
5. Evidence: When a use interpretation is sought, documents, statements, and other 
evidence demonstrating that the proposed use will comply with all use limitations 
established for the district in which it is proposed to be located. 
6. Fees: Nonrefundable fees established pursuant to the fee schedule shall accompany the 
application. 
7. Notification To Recognized And Registered Organizations: The city shall give 
notification, by first class mail to any organization which is entitled to receive notice 
pursuant to chapter 2.62 of this code, that a use interpretation has been determined. 
B. Action On Application: The zoning administrator shall send the zoning administrator's 
written interpretation to the applicant stating any specific precedent or other reasons, or 
analysis upon which the determination is based. 
C. Records: A record of decisions on all applications for interpretations of this titl e shall be 
kept on file in the office of the zoning administrator. 
D. Appeal: Any person adversely affected by an interpretation rendered by the zoning 
administrator may appeal to the board of adjustment in accordance with the provisions of 
chaQler:2jA16 of this part. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-4),1995) 
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21A.12.050 Standards For Use Interpretations: 
The following standards shall govern the zoning administrator, and the board of adjustment on 
appeals from the zoning administrator, in issuing use interpretations: 
A. Any use defined in partY1.,j:haQ1er21A.Q~of this title, shall be interpreted as defined; 
B. Any use specifically listed without a "P" or .. c .. designated in the table of permitted and 
conditional uses for a district shall not be allowed in that zoning district; 
C. No use interpretation shall allow a proposed use in a district unless evidence is presented 
demonstrating that the proposed use will comply with the development standards 
established for that particular district; 
D. No use interpretation shall allow any use in a particular district unless such use is 
substantia lly simi lar to the uses allowed in that district and is more similar to such uses than 
to uses allowed in a less restrictive district; 
E. If the proposed use is most similar to a conditional use authorized in the district in which it is 
proposed to be located, any use interpretation allowing such use shal l require that it may 
be approved only as a conditional use pursuant to part v, chapter 21A.54 of this title; and 
F. No use interpretation shall permit the establishment of any use that would be inconsistent 
with the statement of purpose of that zoning district. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-5), 1995) 
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21A.12.060 Effect Of Use Interpretations: 
A use interpretation finding a particular use to be a permitted use or a conditional use 
shall not authorize the establishment of such use nor the development, construction , 
reconstruction, alteration or moving of any building or structure. It shall merely authorize 
the preparation, filing, and processing of applications for any approvals and permits that 
may be required by the codes and ordinances of the City including, but not limited to, a 
zoning certificate, a building permit, a certificate of occupancy, subdivision approval, and 
site plan approval. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(6-6), 1995) 
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21A.12.070 Limitations On Use Interpretations: 
A use interpretation finding a particular use to be a permitted use or a conditional use in a 
particular district shall be deemed to authorize only that particular use in the district and 
such use interpretation shall not be deemed to authorize any other allegedly similar use 
for which a separate use interpretation has not been issued. (Ord. 26·95 § 2(6·7), 1995) 
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21A.54.010 Purpose Statement: Page 1 ot 1 
21 A.S4.01 0 Purpose Statement: 
A conditional use is a use which has potential adverse impacts upon the immediate 
neighborhood and the city as a whole. It requires a careful review of its location, design, 
configuration and special impact to determine the desirability of allowing it on a particular site. 
Whether it is appropriate in a particular location requires a weighing, in each case, of the public 
need and benefit against the local impact, taking into account the applicant's proposals for 
ameliorating any adverse impacts through special site planning, development techniques and 
contributions to the provision of public improvements, rights of way and services. (Ord. 26-95 § 
2(27 -1), 1995) 
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21 A.S4.020 Authority: 
The planning commission, or in the case of administrative conditional uses, the planning 
director or designee, may, in accordance with the procedures and standards set out in this 
chapter, and other regulations applicable to the district in which the property is located, 
approve uses listed as conditional uses in the tables of permitted and conditional uses found at 
the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of zoning district or districts. 
(Ord . 69-06 § 1, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-2), 1995) 
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21A.54.030 Categories Of Conditional Uses: 
Conditional uses shall consist of the following categories of uses: 
A. Uses Impacting Other Property: Uses that may give rise to particular problems with 
respect to their impact upon neighboring property and the city as a whole, including their 
impact on public facilities; and 
B. Planned Developments: The uses which fall within these categories are listed in the tables 
of permitted and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for 
each category of zoning district or districts. 
C. Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Uses: Certain conditional uses may be 
considered to be low impact due to their particular location and are hereby authorized to be 
reviewed administratively according to the provisions contained in section 21A.54.155 of 
this chapter. Conditional uses that are authorized to be reviewed administratively are: 
1. Applications for low power wireless telecommunication facilities that are listed as 
conditional uses in subsection 21A.40.090E of this title. 
2. Alterations or modifications to a conditional use that increase the floor area by one 
thousand (1,000) gross square feet or more and/or increase the parking requirement. 
3. Any conditional use as identified in the tables of permitted and conditional uses for each 
zoning district, except those that: 
a. Are listed as a "residential" land use in the tables of permitted and conditional uses for 
each zoning district; 
b. Are located within a residential zoning district; 
c. Abut a residential zoning district or residential use; or 
d. Require planned development approval. 
4. Public/private utility buildings and structures in residential and nonresidential zoning 
districts. (Ord. 69-06 § 2, 2006: Ord. 13-04 § 34, 2004: Ord. 81-01 § 2, 2001: Ord . 26-95 § 
2(27 -3), 1995) 
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21A.54.040 Site Plan Review Required: 
Site plan review of development proposals is required for all conditional uses in all districts. 
(Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-4),1995) 
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21A.S4.0S0 Initiation: 
An appl ication for a conditional use may be filed with the zoning administrator by the owner of 
the subject property or by an authorized agent. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-5),1995) 
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21A.S4.060 Procedures: 
A. Application: A complete application shall contain at least the following information 
submitted by the applicant, unless certain information is determined by the zoning 
administrator to be inapplicable or unnecessary to appropriately evaluate the application : 
1. The applicant's name, address, telephone number and interest in the property; 
2. The owner's name, address and telephone number, if different than the applicant, and 
the owner's signed consent to the filing of the application; 
3. The street address and legal description of the subject property; 
4. The zoning classification, zoning district boundaries and present use of the subject 
property; 
5. A complete description of the proposed conditional use; 
6. Site plans, as required pursuant to section 21 A.58.060 of this part; 
7. Traffic impact analysis; 
8. A signed statement that the applicant has met with and explained the proposed 
conditional use to the appropriate neighborhood organization entitled to receive notice 
pursuant to title 2, chaRter 2.62 of this code; 
9. A statement indicating whether the applicant will require a variance in connection with 
the proposed conditional use; 
10. Mail ing labels and first class postage for ali persons required to be notified of the public 
hearing on the proposed conditional use pursuant to part II, chapter 21 A.1 0 of this title; 
11 . Such other and further information or documentation as the zoning administrator may 
deem to be necessary for a fu ll and proper consideration and disposition of the particular 
application. 
B. Determination Of Completeness: Upon receipt of an application for a conditional use, the 
zoning administrator shall make a determination of completeness of the appl ication 
pursuant to section 21A.1 0.01 0 of this title. 
C. Fees: The application for a conditional use shall be accompanied by the fee established on 
the fee schedule. 
D. Staff ReportSite Plan Review Report: Once the zoning administrator has determined that 
the application is complete a staff report evaluating the conditional use application shall be 
prepared by the plann ing division and forwarded to the planning commission, or, in the 
case of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee along with a site 
plan review report prepared by the development review team. 
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E. Public Hearing: The planning commission , or, in the case of administrative conditional 
uses, the planning director or designee shall schedule and hold a public hearing on the 
proposed conditional use in accordance with the standards and procedures for conduct of 
the public hearing set forth in part II, chapter 21A.10 of this title. (See sections 21A.54.150 
and 2~,A.li.1. 1 .Q~of this chapter for additional procedures for public hearings in connection 
with planned developments and administrative conditional uses.) 
F. Notice Of Applications For Additional Approvals: Whenever, in connection with the 
application for a conditional use approval, the applicant is requesting other types of 
approvals, such as a variance or special exception, all required notices shall include 
reference to the request for all required approvals. 
G. Planning Commission And Planning Director Or Designee Action: At the conclusion of 
the public hearing, the planning commission, or, in the case of administrative conditional 
uses, the planning director or designee, shall either: 1) approve the conditional use; 2) 
approve the conditional use subject to specific modifications; or 3) deny the conditional use. 
(Ord . 69-06 § 3, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-6), 1995) 
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21A.S4.070 Sequence Of Approval Of Applications For Both A Conditional 
Use And A Variance: 
Whenever the applicant indicates pursuant to subsection 21A.54.060A9 of this chapter that a 
variance will be necessary in connection with the proposed conditional use (other than a 
planned development), the appl icant shall at the time of filing the application for a conditional 
use, file an application for a variance with the board of adjustment. 
A. Combined Review: Upon the filing of a combined application for a conditional use and a 
variance, at the initiation of the planning commission or the board of adjustment, the 
commission and the board may hold a joint session to consider the conditional use and the 
variance applications simultaneously. 
B. Actions By Planning Commission And Board Of Adjustment: Regardless of whether 
the planning commission and board of adjustment conduct their respecti ve reviews in a 
combined session or separately, the board of adjustment shall not take any action on the 
application for a variance until the planning commission shall first act to recommend 
approval or disapproval of the application for the conditional use. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-7) , 
1995) 
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21A.S4.080 Standards For Conditional Uses: 
The planning commission shall only approve, approve with conditions, or deny a conditional 
use based upon written findings of fact with regard to each of the standards set forth below 
and, where applicable, any special standards for conditional uses set forth in a specific zoning 
district: 
A. The proposed development is one of the conditional uses specifically listed in this title; 
B. The proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes and intent of this title 
and is compatible with and implements the planning goals and objectives of the city, 
including applicable city master plans; 
c. Streets or other means of access to the proposed development are suitable and adequate 
to carry anticipated traffic and will not materially degrade the service level on the adjacent 
streets ; 
D. The internal circulation system of the proposed development is properly designed; 
E. Existing or proposed utility services are adequate for the proposed development and are 
designed in a manner that will not have an adverse impact on adjacent land uses or 
resources; 
F. Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from light, noise and visual 
impacts; 
G. Architecture and building materials are consistent with the development and compatible 
with the adjacent neighborhood; 
H. Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development; 
I. The proposed development preserves historical , architectural and environmental features of 
the property; 
J. Operating and delivery hours are compatible with adjacent land uses; 
K. The proposed conditional use or, in the case of a planned development, the permitted and 
conditional uses contained therein, are compatible with the neighborhood surrounding th e 
proposed development and will not have a material net cumulative adverse impact on the 
neighborhood or the city as a whole; 
L. The proposed development complies with all other applicable codes and ordinances. (Ord . 
35-99 § 95, 1999: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-8),1995) 
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21A.54.090 Conditions On Conditional Uses: 
The planning commission, or, in the case of administrative conditional uses, the planning 
director or designee, may impose on a conditional use such conditions and limitations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to prevent or minimize adverse effects upon other property and 
improvements in the vicinity of the conditional use, upon the city as a whole, or upon public 
facilities and services. However, such conditions shall not be used as a means to authorize as 
a conditional use any use which is intended to be temporary only. These conditions may 
include, but are not limited to, conditions concerning use, construction , character, location, 
landscaping, screening, parking and other matters relating to the purposes and objectives of 
this title. Such conditions shall be expressly set forth in the motion authorizing the conditional 
use. 
A. Violations Of Conditions: Violation of any such condition or limitation shall be a violation 
of this title and shall constitute grounds for revocation of the conditional use approval. (Ord. 
69-06 § 4, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-9), 1995) 
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21A.S4.100 No Presumption Of Approval: 
The listing of a conditional use in any table of permitted and conditional uses found at the end 
of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of zoning district or districts does not 
constitute an assurance or presumption that such conditional use will be approved. Rather, 
each proposed conditional use shall be evaluated on an individual basis, in relation to its 
compliance with the standards and conditions set forth in this chapter and with the standards 
for the district in which it is located, in order to determine whether the conditional use is 
appropriate at the particular location . (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-10),1995) 
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21A.54.110 Effect Of Approval Of Conditional Use: 
The approval of a proposed conditional use by the planning commission, or, in the case of 
administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee, shall not authorize the 
establishment or extension of any use nor the development, construction, reconstruction, 
alteration or moving of any building or structure, but shall merely authorize the preparation, 
filing and processing of applications for any permits or approvals that may be required by the 
regulations of the city, including, but not limited to, a building permit, certificate of occupancy 
and subd ivision approval. (Ord. 69-06 § 5, 2006: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-11), 1995) 
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21A.54.120 Limitations On Conditional Use Approval: 
Subject to an extension of time granted by the planning commission, or, in the case of 
administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee, no conditional use shall be 
valid for a period longer than twelve (12) months unless a building permit is issued and 
construction is actually begun within that period and is thereafter diligently pursued to 
completion , or unless a certificate of occupancy is issued and a use commenced within that 
period, or unless a longer time is requested and granted by the planning commission , or, in the 
case of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or designee. The approval of a 
proposed conditional use by the planning commission, or, in the case of administrative 
cond itional uses, the planning director or designee, shall authorize only the particular use for 
which it was issued. (Ord. 69-06 § 6, 2006: Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-12), 1995) 
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21A.S4.130 Conditional Use Related To The Land: 
An approved conditional use relates only to, and is only for the benefit of the use and lot rather 
than the owner or operator of such use or lot. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(27-13),1995) 
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21A.54.135 Alterations Or Modifications To A Conditional Use: 
Any land use currently listed as a conditional use under existing zoning regulations shall be 
required to obtain conditional use approval subject to the provisions of this chapter if the floor 
area increases by one thousand (1,000) gross square feet or more and/or the parking 
requirement is increased. 
A. Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Use: Applications for alterations and/or 
modifications to a conditional use may be reviewed according to the procedures set forth in 
section 21A.54 .155 of this chapter. (Ord. 13-04 § 35, 2004) 
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21A.54.140 Conditional Use Approvals And Planned Developments: 
When a development is proposed as a planned development pursuant to the procedures in 
section 21A.54.1 50 of this chapter and also includes an application for conditional use 
approval, the planning commission shall decide the planned development application and the 
conditional use application together. In the event that a new conditional use is proposed after a 
planned development has been approved pursuant to section 21A.54.150 of this chapter, the 
proposed conditional use shall be reviewed and approved, approved with conditions, approved 
with modifications, or denied under the standards set forth in section 21A.54.080 of this 
chapter. (Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-14),1995) 
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21A.S4.1S0 Planned Developments: 
A. Purpose Statement: A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use. As 
such, it is intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promoting greater 
efficiency in public and utility services and encouraging innovation in the planning and 
building of all types of development. Through the flexibility of the planned development 
technique, the city seeks to achieve the following specific objectives: 
1. Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible through strict 
application of other city land use regulations ; 
2. Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related physical facilities 
resulting in better design and development, including aesthetic amenities; 
3. Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building forms and building 
relationships; 
4. Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such as natural 
topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the prevention of soil erosion; 
5. Preservation of buildings which are architecturally or historically significant or contribute 
to the character of the city; 
6. Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing environment; 
7. Inclusion of special development amenities; and 
8. Elimination of blighted structures or incompatible uses through redevelopment or 
rehabilitation . 
B. Authority: The planning commission may approve planned developments for uses listed in 
the tables of permitted and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of 
this title for each category of zoning district or districts . The approval shall be in accordance 
with the standards and procedures set forth in this section, and other regulations applicable 
to the district in which the property is located. 
C. Authority To Modify Regulations: In approving any planned development, the planning 
commission may change, alter, modify or waive any provisions of this title or of the city's 
subd ivision regulations as they apply to the proposed planned development. No such 
change, alteration, modification or waiver shall be approved unless the planning 
commission shall find that the proposed planned development: 
1. Will achieve the purposes for which a planned development may be approved pursuant 
to subsection A of this section; and 
2. Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this title and of any plans 
adopted by th e planning commission or the city council. 
D. Limitation: No change, alteration, mod ification or waiver authorized by subsection C of this 
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section shall authorize a change in the uses permitted in any district or a modification with 
respect to any standard established by this section, or a modification with respect to any 
standard in a zoning district made specifically applicable to planned developments, unless 
such regulations expressly authorize such a change, alteration, modification or waiver. 
E. Other Standards: 
1. Minimum Area: A planned development proposed for any parcel or tract of land under 
single ownership or control shall have a minimum net lot area for each zoning district as set 
forth in table 21A.54.150E2 of this section. 
2. Density Limitations: Residential planned developments shall not exceed the density 
limitation of the zoning district where the planned development is proposed. The calculation 
of planned development density may include open space that is provided as an amenity to 
the planned development. Public or private roadways located within or adjacent to a 
planned development shall not be included in the planned development area for the 
purpose of calculating density. 
Table 21A.54.150E2 
PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS 
Table 21A.54.150E2 
PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS 
DISTRICT 
Residential Districts 
FR-1 /43,560 foothills estate residential district 
FR-2/2 1 ,780 foothills residential district 
FR-3/12,000 foothills residential district 
R-1 /12,000 single-family residential district 
R-1 /7,000 single-family residential district 
R-1/5,000 single-family residential district 
SR-1 special development pattem residential 
district 
SR-2 special development pattern residential 
district 
SR-3 interior block single-family residential district 
R-2 single- and two-family residential district 
MINIMUM PLANNED 
DEVELOPMENT SIZE 
5 acres 
5 acres 
5 acres 
5 acres 
20,000 square feet 
20,000 square feet 
9,000 square feet 
Reserved 
9,000 square feet 
9,000 square feet 
RMF-30 low density multi-family residential district 9,000 square feet 
RMF-35 moderate density multi-family residential 9,000 square feet 
district 
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RMF-45 moderate/high density multi-family 20,000 square feet 
residential district 
RMF-75 high density multi -family district 9,000 square feet 
RB residential/business district No minimum requi red 
R-MU-35 residential/mixed use district 9,000 square feet 
R-MU-45 residential/mixed use district 9,000 square feet 
R-MU residential/mixed use district No minimum required 
RO resid ential/office district 20,000 square feet 
Commercial Districts 
CN neighborhood commercial district No minimum required 
CB community business district No minimum required 
CS community shopping district 60,000 square feet 
CC corridor commercial district 20,000 square feet 
CSHBO Sugar House business district No minimum required 
CG general commercial district 1 acre 
TC-75 transit corridor district No minimum requ ired 0 
Manufacturing Districts 
M-1 light manufacturing district 2 acres 
M-2 heavy manufacturing district 2 acres 
Downtown Districts 
0-1 central business district 2 acres 
0-2 downtown support commercial district 2 acres 
0-3 downtown warehouse/residential district 1 acre 
Special Purpose Districts 
RP research park district 10 acres 
BP business park district 10 acres 
FP foothills protection district 32 acres 
AG ag ri cu ltural district 10 acres 
AG-2 agricultural district 4 acres 
AG-5 agricultural district 10 acres 
AG-20 agricu ltural district 40 acres 
A ai rport district 2 acres 
PL public lands district 5 acres 
PL-2 publ ic lands district 1 acre 
I institutional district 5 acres 
UI urban institutional district 1 acre 0 
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OS open space district 
MH mobile home park district 
EI extractive industries district 
MU mixed use district 
2 acres 
10 acres 
10 acres 
No minimum required 
Page 4 of 13 
3. Consideration Of Reduced Width Public Street Dedication: A residential planned 
development application may include a request to dedicate the street to Salt Lake City for 
perpetual use by the public. The request will be reviewed and evaluated individually by 
appropriate departments, including transportation, engineering, public utilities, public 
services and fire. Each department reviewer will consider the adequacy of the design and 
physical improvements proposed by the developer and will make recommendation for 
approval or describe required changes. A synopsis will be incorporated into the staff report 
for review and decision by the planning commission. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no 
such street will be accepted as a publicly owned street unless there is a minimum width of 
twenty feet (20') of pavement with an additional right of way as determined by the planning 
commission. 
4. Planned Developments: Planned developments within the TC-75, RB, R-MU, MU, CN, 
CB, and CSHBD zoning districts and the South State Street overlay. Also planned 
developments within the CS zoning district, when the district is adjacent to more than sixty 
percent (60%) residential zoning (within 300 feet, either on the same block or across the 
street). 
Planned developments within these zoning districts may be approved subject to 
consideration of the following general conceptual guidelines (a positive finding for each is 
not required): 
a. The development shall be primarily oriented to the street, not an interior courtyard or 
parking lot, 
b. The primary access shall be oriented to the pedestrian and mass transit, 
c. The facade shall maintain detailing and glass in sufficient quantities to facilitate 
pedestrian interest and interaction, 
d. Architectural detailing shall emphasize the pedestrian level of the building, 
e. Parking lots shall be appropriately screened and landscaped to minimize their impact 
on the neighborhood, 
f. Parking lot lighting shall be shielded to eliminate excessive glare or light into adjacent 
neighborhoods, 
g. Dumpsters and load ing docks shall be appropriately screened or located within the 
structure, and 
h. Signage shall emphasize the pedestrian/mass transit orientation. 
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5. Perimeter Setback: The perimeter side and rear yard building setback shall be the 
greater of the required setbacks of the lot or adjoining lot unless modified by the planning 
commission. 
6. Topographic Change: The planning commission may increase or decrease the side or 
rear yard setback where there is a topographic change between lots. 
F. Preapplication Conference: Prior to submitting a planned development application, an 
applicant shall participate in a preapplication conference with the planning director and the 
development review team (ORT). A member of the planning commission and the city 
council member of the district in which the proposed planned development is located may 
be invited to attend the preapplication conference. Representatives of other city 
departments and decision making bodies may also be present, where appropriate. 
1. Purpose Statement: The purpose of the preapplication conference is to enable the 
applicant to present the concept of the proposed planned development and to discuss the 
procedures and standards for planned development approval. The conference is intended 
to facilitate the filing and consideration of a complete application. No representation made 
by the planning director, the ORT, the city council and planning commission members, or 
the representatives of city departments or of other decision-making bodies during such 
conference shall be binding upon the city with respect to the application subsequently 
submitted. 
2. Scheduling Of Conference: The planning director shall schedule the preapplication 
conference within fifteen (15) calendar days after receiving the request from the applicant. 
3. Information Needed For Preapplication Conference: At the time of request for the 
preapplication conference, the applicant shall include a narrative summary of the proposal 
and a description of adjacent land uses and neighborhood characteristics. 
4. Action Following Preapplication Conference: Following the preapplication 
conference, the staff of the planning director shall be available to assist the applicant in the 
application procedure for the planned development. 
G. Development Plan Approval Steps: The development plan approval process requires a 
minimum of two (2) approval steps: 1) a preliminary development plan approval; and 2) a 
final development plan approval. An applicant may elect to submit a concept development 
plan pursuant to subsection H of this section before submitting an application for 
preliminary development plan approval in order to obtain guidance regarding how city 
requ irements wou ld apply to the nature and scope of the proposed planned development. 
H. Concept Development Plan (Optional): 
1. Purpose Statement: The concept development plan is an optional step that is intended 
to provide the applicant an opportunity to submit and obtain review of a plan showing the 
basic character and scope of the proposed planned development without incurring undue 
cost. At the election of the applicant, the concept development plan may be submitted to 
the planning commission for its review and decision following a public hearing. 
2. Application: An application for submittal of a concept development plan shall include 
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the following items and information: 
a. Schematic drawings, at a scale of not smaller than fifty feet to the inch (50' = 1 ") , of the 
proposed development concept, showing buildings located within eighty five feet (85') 
(exclusive of intervening streets and alleys) of the site; the general location of vehicular 
and pedestrian circulation and parking; public and private open space; and residential, 
commercia l, industrial and other land uses, as applicable, and a tabulation of the 
following information: 
i. Total number of dwelling units and rooming units proposed, by type of structure and 
number of bedrooms if the planned development includes residential land uses; 
ii. Total square feet of building floor area proposed for commercial uses, recreation and 
accessory uses and industrial uses, by general type of use; 
iii. Proposed number of off street parking and loading spaces for each proposed type 
of land use; and 
iv. Total land area, expressed in square feet and as a percent of the total development 
area, proposed to be devoted to residential uses, by type of structure; commercial 
uses; industrial uses; other land uses; public and private open space; streets and 
sidewalks; and off street parking and loading area; 
v. Total project density or intensity of use. 
b. Proposed elevations. 
c. When the planned development is to be constructed in phases, a schedule for the 
development of such phases shall be submitted stating the approximate beginning and 
completion time for each phase. When a development provides for common open space, 
the total area of common open space provided at any stage of development shall , at a 
minimum, bear the same relationship to the total open space to be provided in the entire 
development as the phases completed or under development bear to the entire 
development. 
3. Review By Development Review Team (DRT): Upon receipt of a complete concept 
development plan application, the zoning administrator shall forward the application to the 
DRT for its review. The DRT shall prepare a memorandum with its general evaluation and 
recommendations regarding any revisions that must be incorporated in any subsequent 
application for preliminary development plan approval in order to assure compliance with 
the requirements of this title. A copy of this memorandum shall be sent to the applicant. 
4. Planning Commission Review Of The Concept Plan: Upon receipt of the DRT 
memorandum pursuant to subsection H3 of this Section, the applicant may request in 
writing within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date of receipt thereof that the Planning 
Director forward the concept development plan application to the Planning Commission for 
its review and decision. The Zoning Administrator shall forward the concept development 
plan application accompanied by the DRT memorandum to the Planning Division for 
Planning Commission consideration at a public hearing. In the event that the applicant does 
not request Planning Commission review of the concept development plan within the 
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fourteen (14) day time frame provided, no further action shall be taken on the proposed 
planned development until the applicant submits an application for preliminary plan 
development approval. 
5. Public Hearing: If an applicant requests Planning Commission review of the concept 
development plan pursuant to subsection H4 of this Section a public hearing shall be 
scheduled and conducted by the Planning Commission in accordance with the standards 
and procedures set forth in Part II, Chapter 21A.1 0 of this Title. 
6. Planning Commission Action: Following the conclusion of the public hearing, the 
Planning Commission shall either approve the concept development plan, approve the 
concept development plan subject to modifications or conditions, or disapprove the concept 
development plan. 
7. Procedure Upon Denial Of Concept Development Plan: If the Planning Commission 
denies the application for approval of the concept development plan, it shall require the 
applicant to resolve specific issues before approval may be granted, if resubmitted , for the 
preliminary development plan. 
8. Approval Of Concept Development Plan: If the Planning Commission approves the 
concept development plan, with or without modifications or conditions, it shall adopt a 
motion establishing the land uses and density for the proposed planned development and 
authorizing the proposed applicant to submit an application for a preliminary development 
plan consistent with the approved concept development plan. Every such motion shall be 
expressly conditioned upon approval of the preliminary development plan in accordance 
with subsection I of this Section. 
9. Time Limitation On Concept Development Plan Approval: Subject to an extension of 
time granted by the Planning Director, unless a preliminary development plan covering the 
area designated in the concept development plan has been filed within one year from the 
date the Planning Commission grants concept development plan approval, the Planning 
Commission's approval of the concept development plan shall automatically expire and be 
rendered void. 
I. Preliminary Development Plan: Whether or not an applicant for a planned development 
elects first to submit a concept development plan, the applicant must file an application for 
preliminary development plan approval with the Zoning Administrator. 
1. Application Requirements: The preliminary development plan application shall be 
submitted on a form provided by the Zoning Administrator accompanied by such number of 
copies of documents as the Zoning Administrator may require for processing of the 
application , and shall include at least the following information set forth below: 
a. General Information: 
i. The applicant's name, address, telephone number and interest in the property; 
ii . The owner's name, address and telephone number, if different than th e applicant, 
and the owner's signed consent to the filing of the application; 
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iii. The street address and legal description of the subject property; 
iv. The zoning classification, zoning district boundaries and present use of the subject 
property; 
v. A vicinity map with north, arrow scale and date, indicating the zoning classifications 
and current uses of properties within eighty five feet (85') (exclusive of intervening 
streets and alleys) of the subject property; and 
vi. The proposed title of the project and the names, addresses and telephone numbers 
of the architect, landscape architect, planner or engineer on the project. 
b. Preliminary Development Plan: A preliminary development plan at a scale of twenty 
feet to the inch (20' = 1") or larger, unless otherwise approved by the Zoning 
Administrator, setting forth at least the following , unless waived by the Zoning 
Administrator: 
i. The location, dimensions and total area of the site; 
ii . The location, dimensions, floor area, type of construction and use of each proposed 
building or structure; 
iii. The number, the size and type of dwelling units in each building, and the overall 
dwelling unit density; 
iv. The proposed treatment of open spaces and the exterior surfaces of all structures, 
with sketches of proposed landscaping and structures, including typical elevations; 
v. Architectural graphics, if requested by the Zoning Administrator, including typical 
floor plans and elevations, profiles and cross sections; 
vi. The number, location and dimensions of parking spaces and loading docks, with 
means of ingress and egress; 
vii. The proposed traffic circulation pattern within the area of the development, 
including the location and description of public improvements to be installed, including 
any streets and access easements; 
viii. A traffic impact analysis; 
ix. The location and purpose of any existing or proposed dedication or easement; 
x. The general drainage plan for the development tract; 
xi. The location and dimensions of adjacent properties, abutting public rights of way 
and easements, and utilities serving the site; 
xi i. Significant topographical or physical features of the site, including existing trees; 
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xiii. Soils and subsurface conditions, if requested; 
xiv. The location and proposed treatment of any historical structure or other historical 
design element or feature; 
xv. One copy of the preliminary development plan colored or shaded (unmounted) for 
legibility and presentation at public meetings; and 
xvi. A reduction of the preliminary development plan to eight and one-half by eleven 
inches (8 1/2 x 11"). The reduction need not include any area outside the property lines 
of the subject site. 
c. Plat Of Survey: A plat of survey of the parcel of land, lot, lots, block, blocks, or parts 
or portions thereof, drawn to scale, showing the actual dimensions of the parcel, lot, lots, 
block, blocks, or portions thereof, according to the registered or recorded plat of such 
land. 
d. A Preliminary Subdivision Plat, If Required: A preliminary subdivision plat showing 
that the planned development consists of and is conterminous with a single lot described 
in a recorded subdivision plat, or a proposed resubdivision or consolidation to create a 
single lot or separate lots of record in suitable form ready for review. 
e. Additional Information: The application shall also contain the following information 
as well as such additional information, drawings, plans or documentation as may be 
requested by the Zoning Administrator or the Planning Commission if determined 
necessary or appropriate for a full and proper consideration and disposition of the 
application: 
i. When the proposed planned development includes provisions for common open 
space or recreational facilities, a statement describing the provision to be made for the 
care and maintenance of such open space or recreational facilities; 
ii. A written statement showing the relationship of the proposed planned development 
to any adopted General Plan of the City; 
iii. A written statement addressing each of the standards set forth in subsection H of 
this Section, and such additional standards, if any, as may be applicable under the 
specific provisions of this Title. The statement shall explain specifically how the 
proposed planned development relates to and meets each such standard. 
iv. A written statement showing why the proposed planned development is compatible 
with other property in the neighborhood. 
2. Review Procedure: Upon the review of a preliminary development plan application, by 
the development review team, the zoning administrator shall notify the applicant of any 
deficiencies and or modifications necessary to complete the application. 
a. Public Hearing: Upon receiving site plan review and recommendation from the 
development review team, and completing a staff report , the planning commission shall 
hold a public hearing to review the preliminary development plan application in 
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accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in part II, chaRter 21A.1 0 of this 
title. 
b. Planning Commission Action: Following the public hearing, the planning 
commission shall decide, on the basis of the standards contained in subsection 13 of this 
section whether to approve, approve with modifications or conditions, or deny the 
application. 
c. Planning Commission Action On Preliminary Development Plan Subject To 
Certification By Planning Director: The motion of the planning commission approving 
the preliminary development plan shall include a provision approving the final 
development plan, subject to certification by the planning director that the final 
development plan is in conformance with the preliminary development plan approved by 
the planning commission. 
d. Notification Of Decision: The planning director shall notify the applicant of the 
decision of the planning commission in writing, accompanied by one copy of the 
submitted plans marked to show such decision and a copy of the motion approving, 
approving with modifications, or denying the preliminary development plan application. 
3. Standards: A planned development, as a conditional use, shall be subject to the 
standards for approval set forth in section 21A.54.080 of this chapter. The planning 
commission shall make written findings of fact with respect to each of the standards in 
section 21 A.54,..080 of this chapter before approval. 
J. Certification Of Final Development Plan Compliance: Upon receipt of an application for 
final development plan certification, the planning director shall review the application to 
determine if it is complete, including any modifications required in conjunction with the 
approval by the planning commission. Within ten (10) working days of receipt of the 
completed application, the planning director shall either: 1) certify that the final 
development plan complies with the approved preliminary plan; or 2) refuse to certify the 
final development plan for lack of compliance with the preliminary development plan as 
finally approved by the planning commission. 
K. Effect Of Certification Of Compliance: A final development plan as approved and certified 
shall not be modified, except pursuant to subsection S of this section. 
L. Effect Of Refusal Of Certification: If the planning director refuses to certify the final 
development plan, the applicant shall be notified in writing of the items that do not comply 
with the approved preliminary development plan. The applicant shall have fourteen (14) 
days following receipt of the planning director's notice of lack of certification to correct the 
deficiencies identified. If the applicant fails to correct the deficiencies within the fourteen 
(14) day period, unless extended by the planning director, the final development plan shall 
automatica lly expire and be rendered void. 
M. Appeal Of Planning Director's Refusal To Certify Compliance: Any party aggrieved by 
the decision of the planning director not to certify a final development plan, may appeal to 
the planning commission within thirty (30) days of the date of decision. 
N. Appeal Of The Planning Commission Decision: Any party aggrieved by the decision of 
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the plann ing commission on appeal of the planning director's refusal to certify a final 
development plan , may file an appeal to the land use appeals board. 
o. Time Limit On Approved Planned Development: No planned development approval shall 
be valid for a period longer than one year unless a building permit is issued and 
construction is diligently pursued. However, upon written request of the applicant, the one 
year period may be extended by the planning commission for such time as it shall 
determine for good cause shown, without further public hearing. 
P. Additional Requirements: The decision approving a planned development shall contain a 
legal description of the property subject to the planned development. The decision shall be 
recorded by the city in the office of the county recorder before any permits may be issued. 
Q. Effect Of Approval Of Planned Development: The approval of a proposed planned 
development by the planning commission shall not authorize the establishment or 
extension of any use nor the development, construction, reconstruction, alteration or 
moving of any building or structure, but shall authorize the preparation, filing and 
processing of applications for any permits or approvals that may be required by the 
regulations of the city, including, but not limited to , a building permit, a certificate of 
occupancy and subdivision approval. 
R. Regulation During And Following Completion Of Development: Following final 
development plan approval , the final development plan, rather than any other provision of 
this title, shall constitute the use, parking, loading, sign, bulk, space and yard regulations 
applicable to the subject property, and no use or development, other than home occupation 
and temporary uses, not allowed by the final development plan shall be permitted within the 
area of the planned development. 
S. Modifications To Development Plan: 
1. New Application Required For Modifications And Amendments: No substantial 
modification or amendment shall be made in the construction, development or use without 
a new application under the provisions of this title. Minor modifications or amendments may 
be made subject to written approval of the planning director and the date for completion 
may be extended by the planning commission upon recommendation of the planning 
director. 
2. Minor Modifications: During build out of the planned development, the planning director 
may authorize minor modifications to the approved final development plan pursuant to the 
provisions for modifications to an approved site plan as set forth in chaRter 21A.58 of this 
part, when such modifications appear necessary in light of technical or engineering 
considerations. Such minor modifications shall be limited to the following elements : 
a. Adjusting the distance as shown on the approved final development plan between any 
one structure or group of structures, and any other structure or group of structures, or 
any vehicular ci rculation element or any boundary of the site; 
b. Adju sting the location of any open space; 
c. Adjusting any final grad e; 
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d. Altering the types of landscaping elements and their arrangement within the required 
landscaping buffer area; and 
e. Signs. 
Such minor modifications shall be consistent with the intent and purpose of this title and the 
final development plan as approved pursuant to this section, and shall be the minimum 
necessary to overcome the particular difficulty and shall not be approved if such 
modifications would result in a violation of any standard or requirement of this title. 
3. Major Modifications: Any modifications to the approved final development plan not 
authorized by subsection S2 of this section shall be considered to be a major modification. 
The planning commission shall give notice to all property owners whose properties are 
located within one hundred feet (100') (exclusive of intervening streets and alleys) of the 
planned development, requesting the major modification. The planning commission may 
approve an application for a major modification to the final development plan, not requiring 
a modification of written conditions of approval or recorded easements, upon finding that 
any changes in the plan as approved will be in substantial conformity with the final 
development plan. If the commission determines that a major modification is not in 
substantial conformity with the final development plan as approved, then the commission 
shall review the request in accordance with the procedures set forth in this subsection. 
4. Fees: Fees for modifications to a final development plan shall be as set forth in the fee 
schedule, chapJer 21A.64 of this title. 
T. Disclosure Of Infrastructure Costs For Planned Developments: Planned developments, 
approved under this title after January 1, 1997, shall include provisions for disclosure of 
future private infrastructure maintenance and replacement costs to unit owners. 
1. Infrastructure Maintenance Estimates: Using generally accepted accounting 
principles, the developer of any planned development shall calculate an initial estimate of 
the costs for maintenance and capital improvements of all infrastructure for the planned 
development including roads, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, water and sewer pipes and related 
facilities, drainage systems, landscaped or paved common areas and other similar facilities 
("infrastructure"), for a period of sixty (60) years following the recording of the subdivision 
plat for the estimated date of first unit occupancy of the planned development, whichever is 
later. 
2. Initial Estimate Disclosure: The following measures shall be incorporated in planned 
developments to assure that owners and future owners have received adequate disclosure 
of potential infrastructure maintenance and replacement costs: 
a. The cost estimate shall be recorded with and referenced on the recorded plat for any 
planned development. The initial disclosure estimate shall cover all private infrastructure 
items and shall be prepared for six (6) increments of ten (10) years each. 
b. The recorded plat shall also contain a statement entitled "Notice To Purchasers" 
disclosing that the infrastructure is privately owned and that the maintenance, repair, 
replacement and operation of the infrastructure is the responsibility of the property 
owners and wi ll not be assumed by the city. 
http: //66. 113.195.234/UT/Salt%20Lake%20CityI1 80280000000 J6000.htm 8/29/2007 
21 A.S4.ISO PlaJU1ed Developments: Page 13 of IJ 
c. The cost estimate shall be specifically and separately disclosed to the purchaser of 
any property in the planned development, upon initial purchase and also upon all future 
purchases for the duration of the sixty (60) year period. 
3. Yearly Maintenance Statements: The entity responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure shall, at least once each calendar year, notify all property 
owners in the planned development of the estimated yearly expenditures for maintenance, 
repair, operation or replacement of infrastructure, and at least once each calendar year 
shall notify all property owners of the actual expenditures incurred, and shall specify the 
reason(s) for any variance between the estimated expenditures and the actual 
expenditures. 
4. Maintenance Responsibilities: The property owners in a planned development shall be 
collectively and individually responsible, on a pro rata basis, for operating, maintaining, 
repairing and replacing infrastructure to the extent necessary to ensure that access to the 
planned development is available to the city for emergency and other services and to 
ensure that the cond ition of the private infrastructure allows for the city's continued and 
uninterrupted operation of public facilities to which the private infrastructure may be 
connected or to which it may be adjacent. (Ord. 76-05 §§ 4, 5 (Exh. A), 2005: Ord. 12-05 § 
1, 2005: Ord . 3-05 §§ 9 (Exh. A), 10,2005: Ord. 71-04 § 27 (Exh. G), 2004: Ord. 13-04 §§ 
36,37 (Exh. K), 2004: Ord. 77-03 § 8, 2003: Ord. 73-02 § 19 (Exh. G), 2002: Ord. 70-02 § 
4,2002: Ord. 14-00 § 15,2000: Ord. 35-99 §§ 96-99,1999: Ord. 17-99 § 1, 1999: Ord . 52-
97 § 1, 1997: Ord. 88-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord. 26-95 § 2(27-15),1995) 
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21A.54.155 Administrative Consideration Of Conditional Uses: 
The purpose of this section is to establish an administrative hearing process for certain 
categories of low impact conditional uses as authorized by subsection 21A.54.030C of this 
chapter. Applications for administrative conditional use approval shall be reviewed as follows: 
A. Preapplication And Application Requirements: 
1. Preapplication Conference: The applicant shall first meet with a member of the Salt 
Lake City planning division to discuss the application and alternatives. 
2. Community Council Review: The applicant shall meet with the respective community 
council(s) pursuant to subsection 21A.1 0.01 08 of this title. 
3. Application: The applicant shall file an application and associated application fees with 
the planning office on a form prescribed by the city and consistent with this chapter. After 
considering information received, the planning director or designee may choose to 
schedule an administrative hearing or to forward the application to the planning 
commission . 
B. Administrative Hearing: 
1. Noticing And Posting Requirements: Notice of the proposed conditional use shall be 
mailed to all applicable property owners and the property shall be posted pursuant to 
subsection 21A.1 0.0208 of this title. 
2. Administrative Hearing: After consideration of the information received from the 
applicant and concerned residents, the planning director or designee may approve, 
approve with conditions, or deny the conditional use request. 
At the admin istrative hearing , the planning director or designee may decline to hear or 
decide the request and forward the application for planning commission consideration, if it 
is determined that there is neighborhood opposition, if the applicant has failed to 
adequately address the conditional use standards, or for any other reason at the discretion 
of the planning director or designee. 
The planning director may grant the conditional use request on ly if the proposed 
development is consistent with the standards for conditional uses listed in section 
21A.54.080 of this chapter and any specific standards listed in this title that regu late the 
particular use. 
C. Appeals: 
1. Objection To Administrative Consideration: The petitioner or any person who objects 
to the planning director or designee administratively considering the conditional use request 
may request a hearing before the planning commission by fil ing a written notice at any time 
prior to the planning director's scheduled administrative hearing on the conditional use 
request. If no such objections are received by the city prior to the planning director's 
administrative hearing, any objections to such administrative cons ideration wi ll be deemed 
waived. The notice shall specify all reasons for the objection to the administrative hearing. 
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Upon receipt of such an objection, the matter will be forwarded to the Salt Lake City 
planning commission for consideration and decision. 
2. Appeal Of Administrative Consideration: Any person aggrieved by the decision made 
by the planning director or designee at an administrative hearing may appeal that decision 
to the Salt Lake City planning commission by filing notice of an appeal within fourteen (14) 
days after the planning director's administrative hearing. The notice of appeal shall specify, 
in detail, the reason(s) for the appeal. Reasons for the appeal shall be based upon 
procedural error or compliance with the standards for conditional uses listed in section 
21 A.54.080 of this chapter or any specific standards listed in this title that regulate the 
particular use. (Ord. 69-06 § 7, 2006: Ord. 81-01 § 3, 2001) 
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21A.54.160 Appeal Of Planning Commission Decision: 
Any party aggrieved by a decision of the planning commission on an appl ication for a 
conditional use, including a planned development, may file an appeal to the land use appeals 
board within thirty (30) days of the date of the decision. The filing of the appeal shall not stay 
the decision of the planning commission pending the outcome of the appeal, unless the 
planning commission takes specific action to stay a decision. (Ord. 77-03 § 9, 2003: Ord. 83-
96 § 6,1996: Ord. 26·95 § 2(27-16),1995) 
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21A.S4.170 Appeal Of Land Use Appeals Board Decision: 
Any party adversely affected by the decision of the land use appeals board on appeal from a 
decision of the planning commission may appeal to the district court within thirty (30) days of 
the date of the land use appeals board decision. (Ord . 83-96 § 7.1996) 
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21A.62.040 Definitions: 
For the purposes of this title, the following terms shall have the following meanings: 
"Abutting" means adjacent or contiguous including property separated by an alley, a private 
right of way or a utility strip. 
"Access taper" means the transitional portion of a drive access that connects a driveway to 
a parking pad located with in a side yard. 
"Accessory building or structure" means a subordinate building or structure, located on the 
same lot with the main building, occupied by or devoted to an accessory use. When an 
accessory building or structure is attached to the main building in a substantial manner, as 
by a wall or roof, such accessory building shall be considered part of the main bui lding. 
"Accessory guest and servants' quarters" means accessory living quarters with or without 
kitchen facilities located on the same lot as the principal use and meeting all yard and bulk 
requirements of the applicable district. 
"Accessory lot" means a lot adjoining a principal lot under a sing le ownership. 
Accessory Structure: See definition of Accessory Building Or Structure. 
"Accessory use" means a use that: 
A. Is subordinate in area, extent and purpose to, and serves a principal use; 
B. Is customari ly found as an incident to such principal use; 
C. Contributes to the comfort, convenience or necessity of those occupying , working at or 
being serviced by such principal use; 
D. Is, except as otherwise expressly authorized by the provisions of this title, located on 
the same zoning lot as such principal use; and 
E. Is under the same ownership or control as the principal use. 
"Administrative decision" means any order, requirement, decision, determination or 
interpretation made by the zoning administrator in the administration or the enforcement of 
this title . 
"Agricultural use" means the use of a tract of land for growing crops in the open , dairying, 
pasturage, horticulture, floriculture, general farming uses and necessary accessory uses, 
including the structures necessary for carrying out farming operations; provided, however, 
such agricultural use shall not include the following uses: 
A. Commercial operations or accessory uses which involve retail sales to the general 
public unless the use is specifica lly permitted by this title; and 
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B. The feeding of garbage to animals, the raising of poultry or furbearing animals as a 
principal use, or the operation or maintenance of commercial stockyards, or feed yards, 
slaughterhouses or rendering facilities. 
"Alley" means a public or private right of way that affords a service access to abutting 
property. 
"Alteration", as applied to a building or structure, means a change or rearrangement in the 
structural parts or in the exit facilities, or an enlargement, whether by extending on a side, 
by increasing in height, or the moving from one location or position to another. 
"Alternative parking property" means the property for which an alternative parking 
requirement pursuant to section 21A.44.030 of this title is proposed. 
"Amusement park" means a commercial facility or operation that primarily offers 
entertainment in the form of rides and games. 
"Ancillary mechanical equipment" means supplemental equipment, attached or detached, 
including, but not limited to, equipment for the provision of services for heat, ventilation, air 
conditioning, electricity, plumbing, telephone and television. 
"Animal pound" means a public or licensed private facility to temporarily detain and/or 
dispose of stray dogs, cats and other animals. 
"Antenna" means any system of wires, poles, rods, reflecting discs, or similar devices used 
for the transmission or reception of electromagnetic waves external to or attached to the 
exterior of any building. 
Antenna, Low Power Radio Service: "Low power radio service antenna" means a 
transmitting or receiving device used in telecommunications that radiates or captures radio 
signals. 
Antenna, Low Power Radio Service Monopole With Antennas And Antenna Support 
Structures Greater Than Two Feet In Width: "Low power radio service antennamonopole 
with antennas and antenna support structures greater than two feet in width" means a self-
supporting monopole tower on which antennas and antenna support structures exceeding 
two feet (2') in width are placed. The antenna and antenna support structures may not 
exceed thirteen feet (13') in width or eight feet (8') in height. 
Antenna, Low Power Radio ServiceMonopole With Antennas And Antenna Support 
Structures Less Than Two Feet In Width: "Low power radio service antennamonopole with 
antennas and antenna support structures less than two feet in width" means a monopole 
with antennas and antenna support structures not exceeding two feet (2') in width. 
Antenn as and antenna support structures may not exceed ten feet (10') in height. 
Antenna , Roof Mounted: "Roof mounted antenna" means an antenna or series of individual 
antennas mounted on a flat roof, mechanical room or penthouse of a building. 
Antenna , Satellite Dish : "Satellite dish antenna" means a type of antenna capable of 
receiving, among other signals , television transmission signals , and which has a disk 
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shaped receiving device, excluding wall mountable antennas with a surface size less than 
four hundred (400) square inches, projecting no more than two feet (2'). 
Antenna, TV: "TV antenna" means a type of antenna used to receive television 
transmission signals, but which is not a satellite dish antenna. 
Antenna , Wall Mounted: "Wall mounted antenna" means an antenna or series of individual 
antennas mounted against the vertical wall of a building. 
Antenna, Whip: "Whip antenna" means an antenna that is cylindrical in shape. Whip 
antennas can be directional or omnidirectional and vary in size depending upon the 
frequency and gain for which they are designed. 
Apartment: See definition of Dwelling, Multi-Family. 
"Arcade" means range of arches supporting a roofed area along with a column structure, 
plain or decorated over a walkway adjacent to or abutting a row of retail stores on one side 
or both. 
"Architecturally incompatible" means buildings or structures which are incongruous with 
adjacent and nearby development due to dissimilarities in style, materials, proportions, 
size, shape and/or other architectural or site design features. 
"Art gallery" means an establishment engaged in the sale, loan or display of paintings, 
sculpture or other works of art. The term "art gallery" does not include libraries or 
museums. 
"Art studio" means a building or portion of a building where an artist or photographer 
creates works of art. 
"Assisted living facility (large)" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah that provides a 
combination of housing and personalized healthcare designed to respond to the individual 
needs of more than six (6) individuals who require help with the activities of daily living, 
such as meal preparation, personal grooming, housekeeping, medication , etc. Care is 
provided in a professionally managed group living environment in a way that promotes 
maximum independence and dignity for each resident. 
"Assisted living facility (small)" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah that provides a 
combination of housing and personalized healthcare designed to respond to th e individual 
needs of up to six (6) individuals who require help with the activities of daily living, such as 
meal preparation, personal grooming, housekeeping, medication , etc. Care is provided in a 
professionally managed group living environment in a way that promotes maximum 
independence and dignity for each resident. 
"Auditorium" means a multipurpose assembly facility that is designed to accommodate 
conventions, live performances, trade shows, sports events and other such events . 
"Automatic amusement device" means any machine, apparatus or device which, upon the 
insertion of a coin, token or simi lar object, operates or may be operated as a game or 
contest of skill or amusement and for the play of which a fee is charged, or a device simila r 
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to any such machine, apparatus or device which has been manufactured, altered or 
modified so that operation is controlled without the insertion of a coin, token or similar 
object. The term does not include coin operated televisions, ride machines designed 
primarily for the amusement of children, or vending machines not incorporating features of 
gambling or ski ll. 
"Automobile" means any vehicle propelled by its own motor and operating on ordinary 
roads. As used herein, the term includes passenger cars, light trucks (1 ton or less), 
motorcycles, recreation vehicles and the like. 
Automobile Repair, Major: "Major automobile repair" means any use principally engaged in 
repairing of automobiles, including any activities excluded in the definition of Automobile 
Repair, Minor. 
Automobile Repair, Minor: "Minor automobile repair" means a use engaged in the repair of 
automobiles involving the use of three (3) or fewer mechanics' service bays, where all 
repairs are performed within an enclosed building, and where not more than ten (10) 
automobiles, plus one automobile per employee, are parked on site at anyone time 
including, but not limited to, those permitted as gas stations. Auto body repairs and drive 
train repair are excluded from this definition. 
"Automobile salvage and recycling" means the dismantling of automobiles, including the 
collection and storage of parts for resale, and/or the storage of inoperative automobiles for 
future salvage or sale. Such activities may be conducted outdoors or within fully enclosed 
buildings. 
Bakery, Commercial: "Commercial bakery" means a use involving the baking of food 
products for sale principally to the wholesale trade, not directly to the consumer. 
"Base zoning district" means a zoning district that reflects the four (4) basic geographically 
based land use categories in the cityresidential areas, commercial areas, manufacturing 
areas and the downtownwith appropriate regulations and development standards to govern 
the uses in these districts. 
"Basement" means a story wherein each exterior wall is fifty percent (50%) or more below 
grade. For purposes of establishing building height, a basement shall not count toward the 
maximum number of stories allowed. The exposed portion of the basement wall shall not 
exceed five feet (5'). 
"Bed and breakfast" means a building constructed originally as a single-family dwelling that 
is occupied by the property owner who offers lodging in up to seven (7) rooms on a nightly 
or weekly basis to paying guests. A bed and breakfast may provide breakfast to overnight 
guests only and shall not provide other meals. 
"Bed and breakfast inn" means a building that is designed to accommodate up to eighteen 
(18) rooms for lodging on a nightly or weekly basis to paying guests. A bed and breakfast 
inn may provide breakfast from internal kitchen facilities to overnight guests and their 
guests only other than meals that are occasionally catered from off site establishments . 
The owner of the bed and breakfast inn may prepare meals on site or receive catered 
meals for private use. 
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"Bed and breakfast manor" means a building designed to accommodate up to thirty (30) 
rooms for lodging on a nightly or weekly basis to paying guests. A bed and breakfast manor 
may provide breakfast from internal kitchen facilities to overnight guests and their guests 
only other than meals that are occasionally catered from off site establishments. The owner 
of the bed and breakfast manor may prepare meals on site or receive catered meals for 
private use. Restaurants operating in conjunction with a bed and breakfast manor must be 
approved under a separate restaurant license. 
"Block corner" means the ninety degree (90°) intersection of private property adjacent to 
the intersection of two (2) public street rights of way both of which are at least one hundred 
thirty two feet (132') wide. When applied to corner buildings, the provisions of this definition 
shall extend to one hundred sixty five feet (165') from the block corner on the street face 
and one hundred sixty five feet (165') in depth. 
"Block face" means all of the lots facing one side of a street between two (2) intersecting 
streets. Corner properties shall be considered part of two (2) block faces, one for each of 
the two (2) intersecting streets. In no case shall a block face exceed one thousand feet 
(1,000'). 
"Board of adjustment" means the board of adjustment of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"Boarding house" means a building other than a hotel or motel, with three (3) or more 
bedrooms where direct or indirect compensation for lodging and/or kitchen facilities, not 
occupied in guest-rooms, or meals are provided for boarders and/or roomers not related to 
the head of the household by marriage, adoption, or blood. Rentals must be on at least a 
monthly basis. 
"Brewpub" means a restaurant type establishment that also has a beer brewery, producing 
beer in batch sizes not less than seven (7) U.S. barrels (31 gallons), on the same property 
which produces, except as provided in subsection 6.08.081 B2 of this code, only enough 
beer for sale and consumption on site or for retail carryout sale in containers holding less 
than two liters (2 I) or for wholesale as outlined in subsections 0 and E of this definition. 
Automated bottle or canning production is prohibited. At least fifty percent (50%) of the beer 
sold shall be brewed on the premises. Revenue from food sales shall constitute at least fifty 
percent (50%) of the total business revenues, excluding retail carryout sales of beer and 
the sales allowed pursuant to subsection 6.08.081 B2 of this code. Brewpubs are limited to 
a total brewing capacity of two thousand five hundred (2,500) barrels per year or one 
hundred twenty (120) barrels of fermentation at anyone time, whichever is less. Brewpubs 
may sell beer in keg (larger than 2 liters) containers for the following purposes and in the 
following amounts: 
A. An unlimited number of kegs (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity) for "brew fests" 
which, for the purpose of this definition, means events, the primary purpose of which is 
the exposition of beers brewed by brewpubs and micro breweries, which include the 
participation of at least three (3) such brewers; 
B. No more than one hundred (100) kegs per year (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity) 
to events sponsored by charitable organizations exempt from federal income tax 
pursuant to 26 USC, section 501 (c)(3) or its successor; and 
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C. No more than one hundred (100) kegs per year (not to exceed 2,500 barrel capacity) 
to events operating under a single event license from the state and the city where the 
purpose of the event is not for commercial profit and where the beer is not wholesaled to 
the event sponsor but is, instead, dispensed by employees of the brewpub; 
D. Unlimited distribution to other restaurants of same ownership or control (not to exceed 
2,500 barrel capacity). "Ownership or control" means more than fifty percent (50%) 
ownership in the actual business or controlling interest in any management partnership; 
and 
E. No more than five hundred (500) barrels for wholesale distribution (not to exceed 
2,500 barrel capacity). 
Buffer Yard: See definition of Landscape buffer. 
"Buildable area" means the portion of the lot remaining after required yards have been 
provided and after the limitations of any pertinent environmental regulations have been 
applied. Buildings may be placed in any part of the buildable area, but ifthere are 
limitations on percent of the lot which may be covered by buildings, some open space may 
be required within the buildable area. 
"Building" means a structure with a roof, intended for shelter or enclosure. 
Building, Accessory: See definition of Accessory Building Or Structure. 
"Building connection" means two (2) or more buildings which are connected in a substantial 
manner or by common interior space including internal pedestrian circulation. Where two 
(2) buildings are attached in this manner, they shall be considered a single building and 
shall be subject to all yard requirements of a single building. Determination of building 
connection shall be through the site plan review process. 
"Building coverage" means that percentage of the lot covered by principal or accessory 
buildings. 
Building, Front Line Of: "Front line of building" means the line of that face of the building 
nearest the front or corner side lot line of the lot. This face includes sun parlors, bay 
windows, and covered and/or uncovered porches, whether enclosed or unenclosed, but 
does not include uncovered steps less than four feet (4') above grade. 
"Building heightin the FR-1, FR-2, FR-3, FP, R-1 /5,OOO, R-1 /7,OOO, R-1 /12,OOO, R-2, SR-1 
and SR-3 districts" shall be the vertical distance between the top of the roof and the grade 
of the site, as described in subsection 21A.24.01001a of this title, measured at any given 
point of building coverage. (See illustration in section 21A.62.050 of this chapter.) 
"Building heightoutside FR, FP, R-1, R-2 and SR districts" means the vertical distance, 
measured from the average elevation of the finished lot grade at each face of the building , 
to the highest point of the coping of a flat roof or to the deck line of a mansard roof or to the 
average height of the highest gable of a pitch or hip roof. (See illustration in section 
21A.62.050 of th is chapter.) 
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"Building line" means a line dividing a required yard from other portions of a lot. 
"Building material distributor" means a type of wholesale distributor supplying the building 
materials industry, but excluding retail outlets conducted in a warehouse format. 
"Building official" means the building official of the department of community development. 
Building, Principal: "Principal building" means a building that is used primarily for the 
conduct of the principal use. 
Building, Public: "Public building" means a building owned and operated, or owned and 
intended to be operated by a public agency of the United States of America or the state of 
Utah, or any of its subdivisions. 
"Bulk" means the size and setbacks of the buildings or structures and the location of same 
with respect to one another, and including: a) height and area of buildings; b) location of 
exterior walls in relation to lot lines, streets or other buildings; c) gross floor area of 
buildings in relation to lot areas (floor area ratio); d) all open spaces allocated to buildings ; 
e) amount of lot area required for each dwelling unit; and f) lot coverage. 
"Business" means any occupation, employment or enterprise which occupies time, 
attention, labor and/or materials for compensation whether or not merchandise is exhibited 
or sold, or services are offered. 
Business, Mobile: "Mobile business" means a business that conducts all or part of its 
operations on premises other than its own. The term "mobile business" shall not include 
any business involved in construction, home or building improvement, landscape 
construction, surveying or medical related activities, including veterinary services. The 
simple delivery of goods shall not constitute a mobile business. 
"Business park" means a business district planned and developed as an optimal 
environment for business occupants while maintaining compatibility with the surrounding 
community. 
"Carpool" means a mode of transportation where two (2) or more persons share a car ride 
to or from work. 
"Carport" means a garage not completely enclosed by walls or doors. For the purpose of 
this title, a carport shall be subject to all of the regulations prescribed for a garage. 
"Cemetery" means land used or intended to be used for the burial of the dead and 
dedicated for cemetery purposes, including columbariums, crematories, mausoleums, and 
mortuaries when operated in conjunction with and within the boundaries of such cemetery. 
"Certificate of appropriateness" means a certification by the historic landmark commission 
stating that proposed work on historic property is compatible with the historic character of 
the property and of the historic preservation overlay district in which it is located. 
"Certificate of occupancy" means an official authorization to occupy a structure as issued 
by the building official. 
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Certificate, Zoning: "Zoning certificate" means a written certification that a structure, use or 
parcel of land is, or will be , in compliance with the requirements of this title. 
"Change of use" means the replacement of an existing use by a new use, or a change in 
the nature of an existing use which does not increase the size, occupancy, or site 
requirements. A change of ownership, tenancy, name or management, or a change in 
product or service within the same use classification where the previous nature of the use, 
line of business, or other function is substantially unchanged is not a change of use. (See 
also definition of Land Use Type (Similar Land Use Type).) 
"Charity dining hall" means a sit down dining facility operated by a nonprofit organization to 
feed, without charge, the needy and the homeless. 
"Chemical manufacturing" means a use engaged in making chemical products from raw or 
partially finished materials, but excluding chemical wholesale distributors. 
"City council" means the city council of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"College or university" means an institution accredited by the state providing full time or 
part time education beyond the high school level for aBA, BS or associate degree, 
including any lodging rooms or housing for students or faculty. (See also definition of 
Schools.) 
"Commercial districts" means those districts listed in subsection 21A.22.01 OB of this title. 
"Commercial indoor recreation" means public or private recreation facilities, tennis or other 
racquet courts, swimming pools, bowling alleys, skating rinks, or similar uses which are 
enclosed in buildings and are operated on a commercial or membership basis primarily for 
the use of persons who do not reside on the same lot as that on which the recreational use 
is located. The term "commercial indoor recreation" shall include any accessory uses, such 
as snack bars, pro shops, and locker rooms, which are designed and intended primarily for 
the use of patrons of the principal recreational use. The term "commercial indoor 
recreation" shall not include theaters, cultural facilities, commercial recreation centers, 
massage parlors, or any use which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted 
and conditional uses found at the end of each chapter in part III of this title for each 
category of zoning district or districts. 
"Commercial laundry" means an establishment primarily engaged in the provision of 
laundering, dry cleaning, or dyeing services other than retail services establishments. 
Typical uses include bulk laundry and cleaning plants, diaper services, and linen supply 
services . 
"Commercial outdoor recreation" means public or private golf courses, golf driving ranges, 
swimming pools, tennis courts, ball fields , ball courts, fishing piers, skateboarding courses, 
water slides, mechanical rides, go-cart or motorcycle courses, raceways, drag strips, 
stad iums, marinas, overnight camping, or gun firing ranges, which are not enclosed in 
buildings and are operated on a commercial or membership basis primarily for the use of 
persons who do not reside on the same lot as that on which the recreational use is located. 
The term "commercia l outdoor recreation" shall include any accessory uses, such as snack 
bars, pro shops, and clubhouses which are designed and intended primaril y for the use of 
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patrons of the principal recreational use. 
"Commercial service establishment" means a building, property, or activity, of which the 
principal use or purpose is the provis ion of services for the installation and repair, on or off 
site, of equipment and facilities that support principal and accessory uses to commercia l 
and consumer users. Commercial services establishment shall not include any use or other 
type of establishment which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted and 
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of 
zoning district or districts. 
"Commercial vehicle" means a vehicle which exceeds one ton capacity and taxis . This shall 
include, but not be limited to, the following: buses, dump trucks , limousines, roll back tow 
trucks, stake body trucks, step vans, taxis, tow trucks and tractor trai lers. 
"Commercial video arcade" means a principal use that contains ten (10) or more automatic 
amusement devices. 
"Common areas, space and facilities" means the property and improvements of the 
condominium project, or portions thereof, conforming to the definition set forth in section 
57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V, chapter 
21 A.56 of this title .) 
"Communication tower" means a tower structure used for transmitting a broadcast signal or 
for receivi ng a broadcast signal (or other signal) for retransmission . A communication tower 
does not include "ham" radio transmission antenna. 
"Community garden" means the exclusive use of a vacant lot for the growing of garden 
produce by a nonprofit organization in wh ich food produced is consumed by local needy 
individuals and families. 
"Community recreation center" means a place, structure , area, or other facility used for and 
providing social or recreational programs generally open to the public and designed to 
accommodate and serve segments of the community. 
"Composting" means a method of solid waste management whereby the organic 
component of the waste stream is biologically decomposed under controlled conditions to a 
state in which the end product or compost can be safely handled, stored or applied to the 
land without adversely affecting human health or the environment. 
"Concept development plan" means a conceptual plan submitted for review and comment 
in order to obtain guidance from the city regarding how city requirements would apply to a 
proposed planned development. 
"Concrete manufacturing" means a use engaged in making and delivering "ready mix" type 
concrete from batch plant operations. This use excludes cement manufacturing, such as 
Portland cement, wh ich is an ingredient in concrete manufactu ring. 
"Condominiumcondominium project and condominium un it" means property or portions 
thereof conforming to the definitions set forth in section 57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended , or its successor. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this titl e.) 
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"Condominium ownership act of 1975 or act" means the provisions of chapter 8 of title 57 of 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1975. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.) 
Condominium Unit: See definition of CondominiumCondominium Project And Condominium 
Unit. 
"Construction period" means the time period between when the building permit is obtained 
and the certificate of occupancy is issued. 
"Contractor's yard/office" means a use that provides construction businesses with a base of 
operations that can include office space and indoor/ outdoor storage of construction 
equipment or materials used by the construction business. This use excludes salvage or 
recycling operations. 
"Conversion" means a proposed change in the type of ownership of a parcel or parcels of 
land, together with the existing attached structures, from single ownership of said parcel, 
such as an apartment house or multi-family dwelling, into that defined as a condominium 
project or other ownership arrangement involving separate ownersh ip of individual units 
combined with joint collective ownership of common areas, facilities or elements. (See part 
V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.) 
"Corner building" means a building, the structure of which rises above the ground within 
one hundred feet (100') of a block comer on the street face and one hundred feet (100') in 
depth. 
Corner Lot: See definition of Lot, Corner. 
Corner Side Yard: See definition of Yard, Corner Side. 
"Dance studio" means a use engaged in the instruction of dance. 
Daycare: Persons, associations, corporations, institutions or agencies providing on a 
regular basis care and supervision (regardless of educational emphasis) to children under 
fourteen (14) years of age, in lieu of care and supervision ordinarily provided by parents in 
their own homes, with or without charge, are engaged in providing chi ld "daycare" for 
purposes of this title. Such providers and their facilities shall be classified as defined herein 
and shall be subject to the applicable provisions of title 5, chapters 9.08 through 9.20, 9.28 
through 9.40, and 14.36 of this code, this title, and applicable state law. 
Daycare Center, Adult: "Adult daycare center" means a nonmedical facility for the daytime 
care of adults who, due to advanced age, handicap or impairment, require assistance 
and/or supervision during the day by staff. 
Daycare Center, Child : "Child daycare center" means an establishment providing care and 
maintenance to seven (7) or more chi ld ren at anyone time of any age separated from th eir 
parents or guardians. 
Daycare, Nonregistered Home: "Nonregistered home daycare" means a person who uses 
his/her principal place of residence to provide daycare for no more than two (2) children. 
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Daycare, Registered Home Daycare Or Preschool: "Registered home daycare or preschool 
daycare" means the use of a principal place of residence to provide educational or daycare 
opportunities for children under age seven (7) in small groups. The group size at any given 
time shall not exceed eight (8), including the provider's own children under age seven (7). 
"Decibel" means a logarithmic and dimensionless unit of measure of ten (10) used to 
describe the amplitude of sound. Decibel is denoted as "dB". 
"Development" means the carrying out of any building activity, the making of any material 
change in the use or appearance of any structure or land, or the dividing of land into 
parcels by any person. The following activities or uses shall be taken for the purposes of 
these regulations to involve "development": 
A. The construction of any principal building or structure; 
B. Increase in the intensity of use of land, such as an increase in the number of dwelling 
units or an increase in nonresidential use intensity that requires additional parking; 
C. Alteration of a shore or bank of a pond, river, stream, lake or other waterway; 
D. Commencement of drilling (except to obtain soil samples), the driving of piles, or 
excavation on a parcel of land; 
E. Demolition of a structure; 
F. Clearing of land as an adjunct of construction, including clearing or removal of 
vegetation and including any significant disturbance of vegetation or soil manipulation; 
and 
G. Deposit of refuse, solid or liquid waste, or fill on a parcel of land. 
The following operations or uses shall not be taken for the purpose of these regulations 
to involve "development": 
A. Work by a highway or road agency or railroad company for the maintenance of a road 
or railroad track, if the work is carried out on land within the boundaries of the right of 
way; 
B. Utility installations as stated in SUbsection 21A.02.050B of this title; 
C. Landscaping for residential uses; and 
D. Work involving the maintenance of existing landscaped areas and existing rights of 
way such as setbacks and other planting areas. 
"Development pattern" : The development pattern standard applies to principal building 
height and wall height, attached garage placement and width, detached garage placement, 
height, wall height, and footprint size, A development pattern shall be established when 
three (3) or more existing structures are identified to establish the pattern, or in the case 
that three (3) structures constitutes more than fifty percent (50%) of the structures on the 
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block face fifty percent (50%) of the structures shall establish a pattern. 
Disabled: See definition of Persons with disabilities. 
"Drive-through window" means a facility which accommodates patrons' automobiles and 
from which the occupants of the automobiles may make purchases or transact business. 
"Dwelling" means a building or portion thereof, which is designated for residential purposes 
of a family for occupancy on a monthly basis and which is a self-contained unit with kitchen 
and bathroom facilities. The term "dwelling" excludes living space within hotels, bed and 
breakfast establishments, apartment hotels, boarding houses and lodging houses. 
Dwelling, Manufactured Home: "Manufactured home dwelling" means a dwelling 
transportable in one or more sections, which is built on a permanent chassis and is 
designed for use with or without a permanent foundation. A manufactured home dwelling 
shall be connected to all utilities required for permanent dwellings and shall be certified 
under the national manufactured housing construction and safety standards act of 1974. A 
manufactured home dwelling is a type of manufactured home that is considered a single-
family dwelling for the purposes of this title. (See definition of Mobile Home.) A modular 
home is a type of manufactured home that is a dwelling transported in one or more sections 
that is fixed to a permanent site built foundation and connected to all utilities required for a 
permanent dwelling. The dwelling shall have a minimum roof pitch of three to twelve (3: 12) 
and the nongable roof ends shall have a minimum overhang of twelve inches (12"). The 
dwelling shall also meet all uniform building code regulations and have a minimum width of 
twenty feet (20'). A "modular home dwelling" is a type of manufactured home that is 
considered a single-family dwelling for the purposes of this title. 
Dwelling, Modular Home: See definition of Dwelling, Manufactured Home. 
Dwelling, Multi-Family: "Multi-family dwelling" means a building containing three (3) or more 
dwellings on a single lot. For purposes of determining whether a lot is in multiple-family 
dwelling use, the following considerations shall apply: 
A. Multiple-family dwelling uses may involve dwelling units intended to be rented and 
maintained under central ownership or management, or cooperative apartments, 
condominiums and the like. 
B. Any multiple-family dwelling in which dwelling units are available for rental or lease for 
periods of less than one month shall be considered a hotel! motel. 
Dwelling, Single-Family: "Single-family dwelling" means a detached building containing only . 
one dwelling unit surrounded by yards that is built on site or is a modular home dwelling 
that resembles site built dwellings. Mobile homes, travel trailers, housing mounted on self-
propelled or drawn vehicles, tents, or other forms of temporary housing or portable housing 
are not included in this definition. All living areas of a single-family dwelling shall be 
accessible and occupied by the entire family. 
Dwelling, Single-Family Attached: "Single-family attached dwelling" means a dwelling unit 
that is attached via a common party side wall to at least one other such dwelling and where 
at least three (3) such dwellings are connected together. 
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Dwelling, Single-Room Occupancy: "Single-room occupancy dwelling" means a residential 
dwelling facility containing individual , self-contained, dwelling units none of which may 
exceed five hundred (500) square feet in size. 
Dwelling , Twin Home: "Twin home dwelling" means a building containing one dwelling 
separated from one other dwelling by a vertical party wall. Such a dwelling shall be located 
on its own individual lot. 
Dwelling , Two-Family. "Two-family dwelling" means a detached building containing two (2) 
dwelling units on a single lot. 
Dwelling Unit: See definition of Dwelling. 
Electric Generation Facility, Public/Private: "Public/private electric generation facility" 
means an electric generating facility that uses natural gas, coal, solar energy, steam, wind 
or other means to produce electricity for exclusive delivery to the local or regional high 
voltage electric transmission grid. 
"Electronic repair shop" means a use engaged in the consumer repair services of 
household electronic items and appliances. 
"Elevation area" means the area or portion thereof (in square feet) of an architectural 
elevation of one side of a building. 
Elevation Area, First Floor: "First floor elevation area" means the elevation area or portion 
thereof (in square feet) of the first or ground floor (story) of one side of a building. 
"Emergency medical service facility" means a facility or licensed healthcare provider 
providing emergency medical or dental or similar examination , diagnosis, treatment and 
care on an outpatient basis only. An emergency medical service facility shall not provide 
twenty four (24) hour service unless it meets all zoning requirements applicable to 
hospitals. 
"Equipment rental" means a type of use involv ing the rental of equipment, excluding heavy 
construction vehicles and equipment, in which all operations are contained within fully 
enclosed buildings. 
Equipment Rental, Heavy: "Heavy equ ipment rental" means a type of use involving the 
rental of equipment, including heavy construction vehicles and equipment, in which all 
operations are not contained within fully enclosed buildings. 
"Evergreen" means a plant having foliage that remains on the plant throughout the year. 
"Excess dwelling units" means a number of residential dwelling units in a structure in 
excess of the number of dwelling units that have been approved either under applicable 
zoning codes or issued bu ilding permits. 
"Existing/established subdivision" means any subdivision for which a plat has been 
approved by the city and recorded prior to the effective date hereof. 
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"Explosive manufacturing" means a use engaged in making explosive devices, but 
excluding explosive material s wholesale distributors. 
"Extractive industry" means an establishment engaged in the on site extraction of surface 
or sub-surface mineral products or natural resources. Typical extractive industries are 
quarries, barrow pits, sand and gravel operations, oil and gas extraction , and mining 
operations. 
"Family" means: 
A. One or more persons related by blood, marriage, adoption , or legal guardianship, 
including foster ch ildren, living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit; 
or 
B. A group of not more than three (3) persons not related by blood, marriage, adoption , 
or legal guardianship livi ng together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit; or 
C. Two (2) unrelated persons and their children living together as a single housekeeping 
unit in a dwelling unit. 
The term "family" shall not be construed to mean a club, group home, transitional victim 
home, substance abuse home, transitional home, a lodge or a fraternity/sorority house. 
"Farmers' market" means an establishment for the sale of fresh produce and related food 
items, which may have outdoor storage and sales . A farmers' market may provide space for 
one or more vendors. 
"Fee schedule" means a schedule of fees in connection with applications for a zoning 
amendment, a special exception, a conditional use, a zoning certificate, a certificate of 
occupancy, sign certificate , or any other type of approval required by the provisions of this 
title which is established by the city council and revised from time to time upon 
recommendation by the zoning administrator. The fee schedule is available from the zoning 
administrator. 
"Fence" means a structure erected to provide privacy or security which defines a private 
space and may enhance the design of individual sites . A wall or similar barrier shall be 
deemed a fence. 
"Fence, opaque or solid" means an artificially constructed sol id or opaque barrier that 
blocks the transmission of at least ninety five percent (95%) of light and vis ibility through 
the fence, and is erected to screen areas from public streets and abutting properties . 
"Fence, open" means an artificially constru cted barrier that blocks the transmission of a 
maximum of fifty percent (50%) of light and visibility through the fence, and is erected to 
separate private property from public rights of way and abutting properties . 
"Financial institution" means a building, property or activity, the principal use or purpose of 
which is the provision of financial services, including, but not limited to, banks, facilities fo r 
automated teller machines (ATMs), credit unions, savings and loan institutions, stock 
brokerages and mortgage companies. "Financial institution" shall not include any use or 
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other type of institution which is otherwise listed in the table of permitted and conditional 
uses for each category of zoning district or districts under this title. 
"Fixed dimensional standards" means numerical maximum or minimum conditions which 
govern the development on a site. 
"Flag lot" means a lot of irregular configuration in which an access strip (a strip of land of a 
width less than the required lot width) connects the main body of the lot to the street 
frontage. (See illustration in section 21A.62.050 of this chapter.) 
"Flammable liquids or gases, heating fuel distribution" means a type of wholesale 
distributor engaged in supplying fl ammable liquids, gases and/or heating fuel. This use 
does not include the accessory storage of such substances on site. 
Flea Market (Indoor): "Indoor flea market" means a building devoted to the indoor sales of 
new and used merchandise by independent vendors with individual stalls, tables, or other 
spaces. 
Flea Market (Outdoor): "Outdoor flea market" means an outdoor area devoted to the 
periodic outdoor sales of new and used merchandise by independent vendors with 
individual stalls, tables, or other spaces. 
Floor: See definition of Story (floor). 
Floor Area, Gross: "Gross floor area" (for determining floor area ratio and size of 
establishment) means the sum of the gross horizontal area of all floors of the building 
measured from the exterior face of the exterior walls or from the centerline of walls 
separating two (2) buildings. The floor area of a building shall include basement floor area, 
penthouses, attic space having headroom of seven feet (7') or more, interior balconies and 
mezzanines, enclosed porches, and floor area devoted to accessory uses. The floor area of 
covered accessory buildings, including parking structures, shall be included in the 
calculation of floor area ratio. Space devoted to open air off street parking or load ing shall 
not be included in fl oor area. 
The floor area of structures devoted to bulk storage of materials including, but not limited 
to, grain elevators and petroleu m storage tanks, shall be determined on the basis of height 
in feet (i.e., 10 feet in height shall equal one fl oor) . 
"Floor area ratio" means the number obtained by dividing the gross floor area of a building 
or other structure by the area of the lot on which the building or structure is located. When 
more than one building or structure is located on a lot, the floor area ratio is determined by 
dividing the total floor area of all the buildings or structu res by the area of the site. 
Floor Area, Usable: "Usable floor area" (for determining off street parking and load ing 
requirements) means the sum of the gross horizontal areas of all floors of the building, as 
measured from the outside of the exterior walls, devoted to the principal use, including 
accessory storage areas located within sell ing or working space such as counters, racks, or 
closets, and any floor area devoted to reta iling activities, to the production or processing of 
goods or to business or professional offices. 
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Floor area for the purposes of measurement for off street parking spaces shall not include: 
A. Floor area devoted primarily to mechanical equipment or unfinished storage areas; 
B. Floor area devoted to off street parking or loading facilities, including aisles, ramps , 
and maneuvering space. 
"Fraternity/sorority house" means a building which is occupied only by a group of university 
or college students who are associated together in a fraternity/sorority that is officia lly 
recognized by the university or college and who receive from the fraternity/sorority lodging 
and/or meals on the premises for compensation. 
Front Yard : See definition of Yard, Front. 
"Funeral home" means an establishment where the dead are prepared for burial or 
cremation and where wakes and funerals may be held. 
"Garage" means a building, or portion thereof, used to store or keep a motor vehicle. 
Garage, Attached: "Attached garage" means an accessory building which has a roof or wall 
of wh ich fifty percent (50%) or more is attached and in common with a dwelling. Where the 
accessory building is attached to a dwelling in this manner, it shall be considered part of the 
dwelling and shall be subject to all yard requirements of the main bui ld ing. 
"Gas station" means a building and premises where gasoline must be sold, and where oil, 
grease, batteries, tires and automobile accessories may be suppl ied and dispensed at 
retail, and where , in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales made: 
A. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributors and distributor parts; 
B. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving; 
c. Replacement or adjustment of mufflers and tailpipes , water hose, fan belts, brake 
fluid, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, 
grease retainers, wheel bearings, mirrors, and the like; 
D. Rad iator cleaning and flu shing; provision of water, antifreeze and the like; 
E. Greasing and lubrication; 
F. Providing and repairing fuel pumps, oil pumps and lines; 
G. Servicing and repair of carburetors; 
H. Electrical repa irs; 
I. Adjusting and repairing brakes; 
J. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase; and 
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K. Sale of beverages, packaged foods, tobacco, and similar convenience goods. 
Uses permissible at a gas station do not include major mechanical and body work, 
straightening of frames or body parts, steam cleaning, painting, welding, storage of 
automobiles not in operating condition, or any activity involving noise, glare, fumes, 
smoke or other characteristics to an extent greater than normally found in gas stations. 
"General plan" means the comprehensive plan for Salt Lake City adopted by the city 
council. 
"Government uses" means state or federal government operations providing services from 
specialized facilities, such as the highway department maintenance/construction, state 
police and federal bureau of investigation, etc. State or federal operations providing 
services from nonspecialized facilities shall be considered office uses. 
Grade, Established: "Established grade" means the natural topographic grade of 
undisturbed areas on a site or the grade that exists after approved subdivision site 
development activity has been completed prior to approval for building permit construction 
activity. 
Grade, Finished: "Finished grade" means the finished grade of a site after reconfiguring 
grades according to an approved regrading plan related to the initial building permit activity 
on a site. 
Gross Floor Area: See definition of Floor Area, Gross. 
"Groundcover" means any perennial evergreen plant material species that generally does 
not exceed twelve inches (12") in height and covers one hundred percent (100%) of the 
ground all year. 
Group Home, Large: "Large group home" means a residential facility set up as a single 
housekeeping unit and shared by seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, 
who require assistance and supervision. A large group home is licensed by the state of 
Utah and provides counseling, therapy and specialized treatment, along with habilitation or 
rehabilitation services for physically or mentally disabled persons. A large group home shall 
not include persons who are diagnosed with a substance abuse problem or who are staying 
in the home as a result of criminal offenses. 
Group Home, Small: "Small group home" means a residential facility set up as a single 
housekeeping unit and shared by up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, who 
require assistance and supervision . A small group home is licensed by the state of Utah 
and provides counseli ng, therapy and specialized treatment, along with habilitation or 
rehabilitation services for physically or mentally disabled persons. A small group home shall 
not include persons who are diagnosed with a substance abuse problem or who are staying 
in the home as a result of criminal offenses. 
"Guest" means any person hiring or occupying a room for living or sleeping purposes. 
"Halfway home" means a facility, licensed or contracted by the state of Utah to provide for 
the supervision, counseling, training or treatment of residents to facilitate their transition 
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from a correctional institutional environment to independent living. 
"Hard surfaced" means a concrete, asphalt surface, brick, stone or turf block. 
"Health and fitness facility" means a business or membership organization providing 
exercise facilities and/or nonmedical personal services to patrons, including, but not limited 
to, gymnasiums (except facil ities owned by a governmental entity), private clubs (athletic, 
health, or recreational) , reducing salons, tanning salons, and weight control establishments. 
"Health hazard" means a classification of a chemical for which there is statistically 
significant evidence based on a generally accepted study conducted in accordance with 
established scientific principles that acute or chronic health effects may occur in exposed 
persons. The term "health hazard" includes chemicals which are carcinogens, toxic or 
highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers, hepatotoxins, 
nephrotoxins, neurotoxi ns, agents which act on the hematopoietic system, and agents 
which damage the lungs, skin, eyes or mucous membranes. 
"Heliport" means a facility or structure that is intended or used for the landing and takeoff of 
rotary-wing aircraft, but not including the regular repair or maintenance of such aircraft or 
the sale of goods or materials to users of such aircraft. 
"Historic buildings or sites" means those buildings or sites listed on the national register of 
historic places. 
"Historic Landmark Commission" means the historic landmark commission of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (See section 21A.06.050 of this title.) 
Historic Site: See definition of Landmark site. 
"Home occupation" means a business, profession, occupation, or trade conducted for gain 
or support and located and conducted within a dwelling unit, which use is accessory, 
incidental and secondary to the use of the building for dwelling purposes and does not 
change the essential resid ential character of appearance of such building and subject to 
the regulations set forth in section 21A.36.030 of this title. 
"Homeless shelter" means a building or portion thereof in which sleeping accommodations 
are provided on an emergency basis for the temporarily homeless. 
"Hospital" means an institution licensed by the state of Utah specializing in giving clinical, 
temporary, or emergency services of a medical or surgical nature to human patients. 
"Hotel/motel room" means a room or combination of rooms (suite) offered as a single unit 
for lodging on a daily or weekly basis. 
"House museum" means a dwelling unit which is converted from its original principal use as 
a dwelling unit to a staffed institution dedicated to educational, aesthetic or historic 
purposes. Such museum shou ld include a staff who commands an appropriate body of 
special knowledge necessary to convey the historical , aesthetic or architectural attributes of 
the building and its collections to the general public. Such staff should also have the ability 
to reach museological decisions consonant with the experience of his or her peers and 
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have access to and acquaintance with the literature of the field. Such museum should 
maintain either regular hours or be avai lable for appointed visits such that access is 
reasonably convenient to the public. 
"Impact statement" means a statement containing an analysis of a project's potential impact 
on the environment, traffic, aesthetics, schools, and/or municipal costs and revenues, as 
well as comments on how the development fits into the general plan of Salt Lake City. 
Incinerator, Medical Waste/Hazardous Waste: "Med ical waste/hazardous waste incinerator" 
means a device using heat, for the reduction of medical/ hazardous waste materials, as 
defined by the state of Utah division of solid and hazardous waste . 
"Industrial assembly use" means an industrial use engaged in the fabrication of finished or 
partially fin ished products from component parts produced off-site. Assembly use shall not 
entail metal stamping, food processing, chemical processing or painting other than painting 
that is accessory to the assembly use. 
"Infill" means new development that occurs with in an already developed area where 
bui lding patterns and lot platting are already established . 
"Institution" means an organization or establishment providing religious, educational, 
charitable, medical, cu ltural or governmental services. 
Interior Side Yard: See definition of Yard, Interior Side. 
"Intermodal transit passenger hub" means a publicly owned and operated central transit 
passenger transfer facility servicing rail, bus, shuttle, limousine, taxis, bicyclists and 
pedestrians and may include, but is not limited to, the following complementary land uses 
such as offices, restaurants, reta il sales and services, bus line terminals, bus line yards and 
repair faci lities, limousine service and taxicab facilities. 
"Interpretation" means an administrative decision regard ing the general provisions of this 
title to specific cases. Interpretations shall not include administrative decisions that will 
effect a permitted use, conditional use or nonconforming use. 
Interpretation, Use: "Use interpretation" means an administrative decision of this title 
related to specific cases which affect permitted use or conditional use provisions within a 
specific district and affect nonconforming uses. 
"Jail" means a place for lawful confinement of persons. For the purpose of this title, a jail 
shall not include halfway homes and mental hospitals. 
"Jewelry fabrication" means the production of jewelry from component materials, diamond 
cutting and related activities. 
"Kennel, public or private" means the keeping of more than two (2) dogs and/or two (2) cats 
that are more than six (6) months old. A third dog or cat may be allowed if a pet rescue 
permit has been approved under section 8.04 .1 30 of this code. 
Laboratory, Medical, Dental, Optical: "Medica l, dental and optical laboratory" means a 
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laboratory processing on- or off-site orders limited to med ical testing and precision 
fabrication of dental/optical articles worn by patients. 
"Land use" means the conduct of an activity, or the performance of a function or operation , 
on a site or in a building or facility for the purpose for which the land or building is occupied, 
or maintained, arranged, designed or intended. 
Land Use Type (S imilar Land Use Type): "Land use types" shall be considered to be similar 
land use types if both uses are allowed in the same zoning district or in the same or more 
restrictive zoning district within the commercia l zoning category or in the same or more 
restrictive district within the manufacturing zoning category and the change from one land 
use type to another similar land use type does not increase the parking requirement. If the 
proposed land use type is a conditional use it wi ll be subject to the conditional use process. 
"Landfill" means a municipal , commercia l or construction debris disposal facil ity where solid 
waste is placed in or on the land and which is not a land treatment facility. The term 
"landfill" does not include facilities where solid waste is applied onto or incorporated into the 
soi l surface for the purpose of biodegradation. 
Landfill, Commercial: "Commercial landfill" means a commercial landfill which receives any 
nonhazardous solid waste for disposal. A commercial landfill does not include a landfill that 
is solely under contract with a local government within the state to dispose of 
nonhazardous solid waste generated within the boundaries of the local government. 
Landfill , Construction Debris: "Construction debris landfill" means a landfill that is to receive 
only construction/demolition waste, yard waste, inert waste or dead animals, but excluding 
inert demolition waste used as fill material. 
Landfill, End Use Plan: "End use plan landfill" means a plan showing how the site will be 
reused/ reclaimed upon completion of landfill activities to allow for the productive and 
compatible reuse of the site. 
Landfill, Municipal: "Municipal landfill" means a municipal landfill or a commercial landfill 
solely under contract with a local government taking municipal waste generated within the 
boundaries of the local government. 
"Landmark site" means a building or site of historic importance designated by the city 
counci l. 
"Landscape area" means that portion of a lot devoted exclusively to landscaping, except 
that streets, drives and sidewalks may be located within such area to provide reasonable 
access. 
"Landscape buffer" means an area of natural or planted vegetation adjoining or surrounding 
a land use and unoccupied in its entirety by any bui lding, structu re, paving or portion of 
such land use, for the purposes of screening and softening the effects of the land use. 
"Landscape plan" means the plan for landscaping required pursuant to part IV, chapter 
2 1A.48 of th is ti tle. 
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"Landscape yard" means that portion of a lot required to be maintained in landscape area. 
"Landscaping" means the improvement of a lot, parcel or tract of land with grass, shrubs 
and trees. Landscaping may include pedestrian walks, flower beds, ornamental objects 
such as fountains, statuary, and other similar natural and artificial objects designed and 
arranged to produce an aesthetically pleasing effect. 
"Lattice tower" means a self-supporting multiple sided, open steel frame structure used to 
support telecommunications equipment. 
"Legal conforming" means a status conferred by a provision of this title which shall be 
limited to the regulation(s) contained within that provision. Legal conforming status allows 
the reconstruction of a destroyed use/structure to its level of use intensity and building bulk 
before destruction. 
"Limousine service" means a use that provides personal vehicular transportation for a fee , 
and operating by appointment only. 
"Lodging house" means a residential structure that provides lodging with or without meals, 
is available for monthly occupancy only, and which makes no provision for cooking in any 
of the rooms occupied by paying guests. 
"Lot" means a piece of land identified on a plat of record or in a deed of record of Salt Lake 
County and of sufficient area and dimensions to meet district requirements for width, area, 
use and coverage, and to provide such yards and open space as are required and has 
been approved as a lot through the subdivision process. A lot may consist of combinations 
of adjacent individual lots and/or portions of lots so recorded; except that no division or 
combination of any residual lot, portion of lot, or parcel shall be created which does not 
meet the requirements of this title and the subdivision regulations of the city. 
"Lot area" means the total area within the property lines of the lot plus one-half (1/2) the 
right of way area of an adjacent public alley. 
Lot Area, Net: "Net lot area" means the area within the property lines of a lot, excluding any 
right of way area of an adjacent public alley. 
"Lot assemblage" means acquisition of two (2) or more contiguous lots by the same owner 
(s) that mayor may not be consolidated into a single parcel. 
Lot, Corner: "Corner lot" means a lot wh ich has two (2) adjacent sides abutting on public 
streets, serving more than two (2) lots, provided the interior angle at the intersection of 
such two (2) sides is less than one hundred thirty five degrees (1350). 
"Lot depth" means the mean horizontal distance between the front lot line and the rear lot 
line of a lot, measured within the lot boundaries. 
Lot, Flag: See definition of Flag Lot. 
Lot, Interior: "Interior lot" means a lot other than a corner lot. 
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Lot Line, Corner Side: "Corner side lot line" means any lot line between the front and rear 
lot lines which abuts a public street. 
Lot Line, Front: "Front lot line" means that boundary of a lot which is along an existing or 
dedicated public street, or where no public street exists, is along a public way. On corner 
lots , the property owner shall declare the front lot line and corner side yard line on a 
building permit application. In the case of landlocked land, the front lot line shall be the lot 
line that faces the access to the lot. 
Lot Line, Interior Side: "Interior side lot line" means any lot line between the front and rear 
lot lines which does not abut a public street. 
Lot Line , Rear: "Rear lot line" means that boundary of a lot which is most distant from , and 
is, or is most nearly, parallel to, the front lot line. 
Lot, Nonconforming: "Nonconforming lot" means a lot which lawfully existed prior to the 
effective date hereof, or any amendment thereto, but which fails to conform to the lot 
regulations of the zoning district in which it is located. 
"Lot width" means the horizontal distance between the side lot lines measured at the 
required front yard setback. 
"Lower power radio services facility or wireless telecommunications facility" means an 
unmanned structure which consists of equipment used primarily for the transmission , 
reception or transfer of voice or data through radio wave or (wireless) transmissions. Such 
sites typically require the construction of transmission support structures to which antenna 
equipment is attached. Low power radio services facilities include "cellular" or 
"pes" (personal communications system) communications and paging systems. 
"Major streets" means those streets identified as major streets on city map 19372. 
Manufactured Home: See definition of Dwelling , Manufactured Home. 
Manufacturing, Heavy: "Heavy manufacturing" means the assembly, fabrication, or 
processing of goods and materials using processes that ordinarily have greater than 
average impacts on the environment, or that ordinarily have significant impacts on the use 
and enjoyment of adjacent property in terms of noise, smoke, fumes, odors, glare, or health 
and safety hazards, or that otherwise do not constitute "light manufacturing". Heavy 
manufacturing generally includes processing and fabrication of large or bulky products, 
products made from extracted or raw materials, or products involving flammable or 
explosive materials and processes which require extensive floor areas or land areas for the 
fabrication and/or incidental storage of the products. The term "heavy manufacturing" shall 
include uses such as refineries and chemical manufacturing. The term "heavy 
manufacturing" shall not include any use which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of 
permitted and conditional uses for the category of zon ing district or districts under this title. 
Manufacturing, Light: "Light manufacturing" means the assembly, fabrication or processing 
of goods and materials using processes that ordinarily do not create noise, smoke, fumes, 
odors , glare, or health or safety hazards outside of the building or lot where such assembly, 
fabrication or processing takes place or where such processes are housed entirely within a 
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building. Light manufacturing generally includes processing and fabrication of finished 
products, predominantly from previously prepared materials, and includes processes which 
do not require extensive floor areas or land areas. The term "light manufacturing" shall 
include uses such as electronic equipment production and printing plants. The term "light 
manufacturing" shall not include any use which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of 
permitted and conditional uses for the category of zoning district or districts under this title. 
"Master plan" means a portion of the long range general plan for Salt Lake City as adopted 
by the city council. 
"Medical/dental office or clinic" means a facility dedicated exclusively to providing medical , 
dental or similar examination, diagnosis, treatment, care and related healthcare services by 
licensed healthcare providers and other healthcare professionals practicing medicine as a 
group on persons on an outpatient basis. No portion of the facility may be used to provide 
on site inpatient care, overnight care, or twenty four (24) hour operations, unless it is in 
compliance with all ordinances applicable to hospitals. Laboratory facilities shall be 
accessory only and shall be utilized for on site care. 
"Medical nursing school" means a professional school with facilities for teaching and 
training individuals for the nursing profession and that awards a degree for individuals who 
complete the nursing curriculum. 
"Microbrewery" means a brewpub which , in addition to retail sale and consumption on site, 
markets beer wholesale in an amount not to exceed sixty thousand (60,000) barrels (31 
gallons) per year. Revenue from food sales must constitute at least fifty percent (50%) of 
the total business revenues, excluding wholesale and retail carryout sales of beer. (See 
sections 6.08.081 through 6.08.089 of this code.) 
"Mid block area" means an area of development not deemed to be a block corner. 
"Miniwarehouse" means a retail service establishment providing off site storage space to 
residents and businesses, offering convenience storage and limited warehousing services 
primarily for personal effects and household goods within enclosed structures having 
individual access, but exclud ing use as workshops, hobby shops, manufacturing or 
commercial activity. 
"Mobile home" means a transportable, factory built home, designed as a year round 
residential dwelling and built prior to June 15, 1976, the effective date of the national 
manufactured housing construction and safety standards act of 1974. The following are not 
included in the mobile home definition: 
A. Travel trail ers, motor homes, camping trailers, or other recreational vehicles. 
B. Manufactured and modular housing designed to be set on a permanent foundation. 
"Motel /hotel" means a building or buildings in which lodging units are offered for persons, 
for compensation by the day or the week. 
"Municipal servi ces" means city or county government operations and governmental 
authorities providing services from specialized facilities, such as police service, 
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street/highway department maintenance/construction, fire protection, sewer and water 
services, etc. City or county operations and governmental authorities providing services 
from nonspecialized facilities shall be considered office uses. 
"Museum" means an institution for the acquisition, preservation, study and exhibition of 
works of artistic, historical or scientific value and for which any sales relating to such 
exhibits are incidental and accessory to the exhibits presented. 
"New construction" means on site erection, fabrication or installation of any building, 
structure, facility or addition thereto. 
"Noncomplying structure" means buildings and structures that serve complying land uses 
which were legally established on the effective date of any amendment to this title that 
makes the structure not comply with the applicable yard area, height and/or bulk 
regulations of this title. 
"Nonconforming lot" means a parcel of land which was legally established on the effective 
date of any amendment to this title that made the lot noncomplying that has less lot area, 
frontage or dimensions than required in the district in which it is located. 
"Nonconforming use" means any building or land legally occupied by a use at the time of 
passage of the ordinance codified in this title or amendment thereto which does not 
conform after passage of said ordinance or amendment thereto with the use regulations of 
the district in which located. 
"Nonconformity" means the presence of any nonconforming use or noncomplying structure. 
"Nursing care facility" means a healthcare facility , other than a hospital , constructed, 
licensed and operated to provide patient living accommodations, twenty four (24) hour staff 
availability, and at least two (2) of the following patient services: a) a selection of patient 
care services, under the direction and supervision of a registered nurse, ranging from 
continuous medical, skilled nursing, psychological or other professional therapies to 
intermittent health related or paraprofessional personal care services; b) a structured, 
supportive social living environment based on a professionally designed and supervised 
treatment plan, oriented to the individual's habilitation or rehabilitation needs; or c) a 
supervised living environment that provides support, training or assistance with individual 
activities of daily living. 
"Obstruction" means a structure or appurtenance to a building that is located or projects 
into a required yard. Allowed obstructions are listed in section 21A.36.020 of this title. 
"Off site" means a lot that is separate from the principal use. 
"Off street parking" means parking provided on private or public property, excluding public 
rights of way. 
"Office use" means a type of business use, which mayor may not offer services to the 
public, that is engaged in the processing, manipulation or application of business 
information or professional expertise. An office use is not materially involved in fabricating, 
assembling or warehousing of physical products for the retail or wholesale market, nor is an 
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office engaged in the repair of products or retail services. Examples of professional offices 
include accounting, investment services, architecture, engineering, legal services and real 
estate services. Unless otherwise specified, office use shall include doctors' and dentists' 
offices. Office use shall not include any use or other type of establishment which is 
otherwise specifically listed in the table of permitted and conditional uses for the applicable 
zoning districts. 
"Open space" means any area of a lot which is completely free and unobstructed from any 
structure or parking areas. Landscaping, walkways, uncovered patio areas, light poles and 
other ornamental features shall not be considered as obstructions for purposes of this 
definition. Driveways that provide access to parking lots shall not be considered as an 
obstruction subject to the driveways not exceeding twenty percent (20%) of any required 
yard area that they provide access through . 
"Outdoor sales and display" means the use of open areas of the lot for sales or display of 
finished products for sale to the consuming public. Outdoor sales and display shall include 
accessory sales/ display areas, such as auto accessory items at a gas station, as well as 
principal sales/display areas, such as the sales yard of garden center. Outdoor sales and 
display shall not include items sold in bulk quantities (e.g., sand, gravel, lumber), 
merchandise inventory not intended for immediate sale, or items not typically sold to the 
consuming public (e.g., pallets, construction equipment and supplies, industrial products). 
"Outdoor storage" means the use of open areas of the lot for the storage of items used for 
nonretail or industrial trade , the storage of merchandise inventory, and the storage of bulk 
materials such as sand, gravel, and other building materials. Outdoor storage shall also 
include contractors' yards and salvage or recycling areas. 
"Outdoor storage, public" means the use of open areas of the lot for the storage of private 
personal property including recreational vehicles, automobiles and other personal 
equipment. This use category does not include or allow the storage of junk as defined in 
section 21AAO.140 of this title. 
"Outdoor television monitor" means an outdoor large screen television monitor that displays 
material generated and/or produced by an on site television station. The material displayed 
shall be the television station's primary broadcast feed or rebroadcast news, sports and/or 
public affairs broadcasts, and shall not be in conflict with the federal communication 
commission's (FCC) community standards that apply to broadcasts from the television 
station between the hours of six o'clock (6:00) A.M. and twelve o'clock (12:00) midnight 
(regardless of the time of day that such material is displayed on the outdoor television 
monitor). The material displayed must be the television station's primary broadcast feed or 
rebroadcast news, sports and/or public affairs broadcasts to the general public (except 
between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 A.M. where daytime programming, 
consistent with community standards , may be substituted). Outdoor television monitors 
may not be illuminated to a brightness that causes undue glare or interference with 
adjacent properties. Sound emanating from the outdoor television monitor may not exceed 
Salt Lake City or County health standards. 
"Overlay district" means a zoning district pertaining to particular geographic features or land 
uses imposing supplemental requirements and standards in addition to those provided in 
the base or underlying zoning district. Boundaries of overlay districts are shown on the 
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zoning map or on special maps referenced in the text. 
"Parcel" means a continuous area of real property, or lot, which is legally described and 
accurately drawn on the plat of such property and recorded with Salt Lake County. See 
definition of Lot. 
"Park and ride lot" means the use of a lot for parking as an adjunct to mass transit. 
Park, Public: "Public park" means a park, playground, swimming pool, golf course or 
athletic field within the city which is under operation or management of the city's park 
department. 
"Park strip" means the landscape area within a public way located between the back of 
street curb and the sidewalk, or in the absence of a sidewalk, the right of way line. 
"Park strip landscaping" means the improvement of property within the street right of way 
situated between the back of curb and the sidewalk or, if there is no sidewalk, the back of 
curb and the right of way line, through the addition of plants and other organic and 
inorganic materials harmoniously combined to produce an effect appropriate for adjacent 
uses and compatible with the neighborhood. Park strip landscaping includes trees and may 
also include a combination of lawn, other perennial groundcover, flowering annuals and 
perennials, specimen shrubs, and inorganic material. 
Parking Facility, Shared: "Shared parking facility" means a parking lot or garage used for 
shared parking by two (2) or more businesses or uses. 
Parking Garage, Commercial: "Commercial parking garage" means a structure used for 
parking or storage of automobiles, generally available to the public, and involving payment 
of a charge for such parking or storage. A garage used solely in conjunction with multiple-
family housing or a hotel shall not be construed to be a commercial garage, but rather a 
permitted accessory structure and use, even though not on the same premises as the 
multiple-family housing or motel/hotel . 
Parking, Intensified Reuse: "Intensified reuse parking" means the change of the use of a 
building or structure, the past or present use of which mayor may not be legally 
nonconforming as to parking , to a use which would require a greater number of parking 
stalls available on site which would otherwise be required pursuant to table 21 A.44.060F of 
this title. Intensified parking reuse shall not include residential uses in residential zoning 
districts other than single room occupancy residential uses and unique residential 
populations. 
Parking , LeasedAlternative Parking: "Leased parkingalternative parking" means the lease, 
for a period of not less than five (5) years, of parking spaces not required for any other use 
and located within five hundred feet (500') measured between a public entrance to the 
alternative parking property place of pedestrian egress from the leased parking along the 
shortest public pedestrian or vehicle way, except that in the downtown 0-1 district the 
distance to the leased parking may be up to one thousand two hundred feet (1 ,200') 
measured between a public entrance to the alternative parking property and a place of 
pedestrian egress from the leased parking along the shortest public pedestrian or vehicle 
way. 
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"Parking lot" means a paved, open area on a lot used for the parking of more than four (4) 
automobiles whether free, for compensation, or as an accommodation for clients and 
customers. 
Parking, Off Site: "Off site parking" means the use of a lot for required parking that is 
separate from the lot of the principal use. 
Parking, Off SiteAlternative Parking: "Off site parkingalternative parking" means parking 
under the same ownership as the alternative parking property located within five hundred 
feet (500') of the alternative parking property, or within the one thousand two hundred feet 
(1,200') in a downtown 0-1 district, measured between a public entrance to the alternative 
parking property and a place of pedestrian egress from the off site parking along the 
shortest public pedestrian or vehicle way, and which parking is not required or dedicated for 
another use. 
Parking, Shared: "Shared parking" means off street parking facilities on one lot shared by 
multiple uses because the total demand for parking spaces is reduced due to the 
differences in parking demand for each use during specific periods of the day. 
"Parking space" means space within a parking area of certain dimensions as defined in part 
IV, chapter 21A.44 of this title, exclusive of access drives, aisles, ramps, columns, for the 
storage of one passenger automobile or commercial vehicle under two (2) ton capacity. 
Parking StudyAlternative Parking: "Parking studyalternative parking" means a study 
prepared by a licensed professional traffic engineer specifically addressing the parking 
demand generated by a use for which an alternative parking requirement is sought and 
which provides the city information necessary to determine whether the requested 
alternative parking requirement will have a material negative impact to adjacent or 
neighboring properties and be in the best interests of the city. 
"Patio" means a paved surface on an earthen/ stone base that is not more than two feet (2') 
above established grade, designed for pedestrian use. 
"Pawnshop" means a commercial establishment which lends money at interest in exchange 
for valuable personal property left with it as security. 
"Pedestrian connection" means a right of way intended for pedestrian movement/activity, 
including, but not limited to, sidewalks, internal walkways, external and internal arcades, 
and plazas. 
"Perennial" means a plant having a life span more than two (2) years. 
"Performance standards" means standards which establish certain criteria which must be 
met on a site, but allow flexibility as to how those criteria can be met. 
"Performing arts production facility" means a mixed use facility housing the elements 
needed to support a performing arts organization. Such facility should include space for the 
design and construction of stage components; costume and prop design and construct ion, 
administrative support, rehearsal space, storage space, and other functions associated 
either with an on site or off site live performance theater. 
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"Person" means a firm , association, authority, organization, partnership, company or 
corporation as well as an individual. 
"Persons with disabilities" means the city adopts the definition of "disabled" from the 
Americans with disabilities act, the rehabilitation act, title 8 of the civil rights act and all 
other applicable federa l and state laws. 
"Pet cemetery" means a place designated for the burial of a dead animal where burial 
rights are sold. 
"Philanthropic use" means an office or meeting hall used exclusively by a nonprofit public 
service organization. 
"Place of worship" means a church, synagogue, temple, mosque or other place of religious 
worship, including any accessory use or structure used for religious worship. 
"Planned development" means a lot or contiguous lots of a size sufficient to create its own 
character where there are multiple principal buildings on a single lot, where not otherwise 
authorized by this title, or where not all of the principal buildings have frontage on a public 
street. A planned development is controlled by a single landowner or by a group of 
landowners in common agreement as to control, to be developed as a single entity, the 
character of which is compatible with adjacent parcels and the intent of the zoning district 
or districts in which it is located . 
"Planning commission" means the planning commission of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
"Planning official" means the director of the planning division of the department of 
community development, or his/her designee. 
"Planting season" means that period during which a particular species of vegetation may be 
planted for maximum survivability and healthy growth. 
"Plaza" means an open area which is available to the public for walking, seating and eating. 
"Precision instrument repair shop" means a shop that provides repair services for industrial , 
commercial, research, and similar establishments. Precision instrument repai r does not 
include consumer repair services for individuals and households for items such as watches 
or jewelry, household appliances, musical instruments, cameras, and household electronic 
equipment. 
Prepared Food, Take Out: "Take out prepared food" means a retail sales establishment 
which prepares food for consumption off site only. 
"Printing plant" means a commercial establishment which contracts with persons for the 
printing and binding of written works. The term "printing plant" shall not include a publishing 
company or a retai l copy or reproduction shop. 
"Private recreational facility" means a golf cou rse, swimming pool, tennis club or other 
recreational facility under private control, operation or management which functions as the 
principal use of the property. 
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"Public/private utility buildings and structures" means buildings or structures used in 
conjunction with the provision of public or private utilities. 
Public Transportation, Employer Sponsored: "Employer sponsored public transportation" 
means a program offering free or substantially discounted passes on the Utah transit 
authority to employees. 
"Publishing company" means a company whose business is the editing and publishing of 
works of authors. The term "publishing company" shall not include a printing plant, unless it 
is only accessory to the publishing business. 
"Railroad freight terminal facility" means a major railroad track yard area for primary use by 
railroad employees for regional scale interstate mainline oriented intermodal freight 
transfers of: a) multimodal (sea, rail , truck transport) self-contained cargo containers from 
train to train, train to semitruck trailer, and semitruck trailer to train loading; and b) for new 
motor vehicle train transports to semitruck trailer transports for regional distribution 
purposes. No breakdown of self-contained cargo containers occurs at intermodal railroad 
freight terminal facilities. 
Rear Yard: See definition of Yard, Rear. 
"Reception center" means a facility which leases the premises for hosting weddings and 
other private events. The term "reception center" shall not include uses whose primary 
function is a restaurant or banquet hall. 
"Record of survey map" means the map as defined in section 57-8-3(18), Utah Code 
Annotated , 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V, chapter 21A.56 of this title.) 
"Recreation vehicle park" means a business that provides space for livi ng in a recreational 
vehicle, (camper, travel trailer or motor home), on a daily or weekly basis. A recreational 
vehicle park may include accessory uses such as a convenience store, gasoline pumps 
and recreation amenities, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, etc., for the convenience 
of persons living in the park. 
"Recycling collection station" means a use, often accessory in nature, providing designated 
containers for the collection, sorting and temporary storage of recoverable resources (such 
as paper, glass, metal and plastic products) until they are transported to separate 
processing facilities. 
"Recycling container" means an enclosed or semien closed container used for the 
temporary storage of recyclable materials until such materials can be efficiently collected 
and processed. 
"Recycling processing center" means a facility to temporarily store, sort, recycle, process, 
compost or treat materials (such as paper, glass, metal and plastic products) to return them 
to a condition in which they can be reused for production or transported to another 
approved site for permanent storage, landfilling or further processing. Recycling processing 
center does not include automobile salvage and recycling. 
"Relocatable office building" means a portable structure built temporarily on a chassis or 
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skids, and designed to be used with or without a permanent foundation for use or 
occupancy for any commercial or industrial purpose when connected to water, power or 
utility hookups. (See subsection 21AA2.0701 of this title.) 
"Resident healthcare facility" means a facility licensed by the state of Utah which provides 
protected living arrangements for two (2) or more persons who because of minor disabilities 
cannot, or choose not to , remain alone in their own home. The faci lity may serve the 
elderly, persons with minor mental or physical disabilities, or any other persons who are 
ambulatory or mobile and do not require continuous nursing care or services provided by 
another category of licensed health facility. The resident healthcare facility shall be 
considered the resident's principal place of residence. 
"Residential districts" means those districts listed in subsection 21A.22.01 OA of this title. 
Residential Structure: The term "residential structure" for the purposes of the RB zoning 
district means a structure that has maintained the original residential exterior without 
significant structural modifications. (False facades are not considered a significant 
structural modification. ) 
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Home, Large: "Large residential substance abuse 
treatment home" means a residential facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons, 
exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state of Utah, that provides twenty four (24) hour staff 
supervision and may include a peer support structure to help applicants acquire and 
strengthen the social and behavioral skills necessary to live independently in the 
community. A large residential substance abuse treatment home provides supervision, 
counseling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provides specialized 
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with alcohol, narcotic drug or 
chemical dependencies. 
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Home, Small: "Small residential substance abuse 
treatment home" means a residential facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of 
staff, and licensed by the state of Utah , that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision 
and may include a peer support structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the 
social and behavioral skills necessary to live independently in the community. A small 
residential substance abuse treatment home provides supervision, counseling and therapy 
through a temporary living arrangement and provides specialized treatment, habilitation or 
rehabilitation services for persons with alcohol, narcotic drug or chemical dependencies. 
"Restaurant" means a building within which there is served a va riety of hot food for 
consumption on the premises and where more than sixty percent (60%) of the gross 
volume is derived from the sale of foods served for consumption on the premises. 
"Retail goods establishment" means a building , property or activity, the principal use or 
purpose of which is the sale of physical goods, products or merchandise directly to the 
consumer. Retail goods establishment shall not include any use or other type of 
establishment which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted and conditional 
uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of th is title for the category of zoning 
district or districts. 
"Retail services establishment" means a building , property or activity, the principal use or 
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purpose of which is the provision of personal services directly to the consumer. The term 
"retail services establishment" shall include, but shall not be limited to, barbershops, beauty 
parlors, laundry and dry cleaning establishments (plant off premises), tailoring shops, shoe 
repair shops and the like. Retail services establishment shall not include any use or other 
type of establishment which is otherwise listed specifically in the table of permitted and 
conditional uses found at the end of each chapter of part III of this title for each category of 
zoning district or districts. 
"Retaining wall" means a wall designed to resist the lateral displacement of soil or other 
materials. 
"Reverse vending machine" means a machine designed to pay cash to customers in 
exchange for the deposit of used beverage cans and/or bottles for recycling. 
"Rooming house" means a building or group of attached or detached buildings containing in 
combination at least three (3) lodg ing units for occupancy on at least a monthly basis , with 
or without board, as distinguished from hotels and motels in which rentals are generally for 
daily or weekly periods and occupancy is by transients. 
"Sanitarium" means a health facility or institution for the inpatient treatment and 
recuperation of persons suffering from physical or mental disorders, providing qualified 
medical, professional and nursing staff. A sanitarium shall not include facilities for the 
criminally insane. 
Schools, Professional And Vocational : "Professional and vocational school" means schools 
offering occupational and vocational training, the courses of which are not generally 
transferable toward a bachelor's degree. 
Schools, Public Or Private: "Public or private school" means an institution of learning or 
instruction primarily catering to minors, whether public or private, which is licensed at such 
facility by either the city or the state of Utah. The definition includes nursery schools, 
kindergarten, elementary schools, junior high schools, middle high schools, senior high 
schools or any special institution of learning under the jurisdiction of the state department of 
education, but not including professional and vocational schools, charm schools, dancing 
schools, music schools or similar limited schools nor public or private universities or 
coll eges. 
"Seasonal item sales" means items that are identified with individual holidays or 
celebrations re lating to the four (4) seasons: spring, summer, autumn or winter (such as a 
winter festival or harvest festiva l). Such items include, but are not limited to, Valentine's 
Day or Easter items, Halloween pumpkin, or Christmas tree sales . Independence Day and 
Pioneer Day fireworks are governed independently in this code. Prepared food is not a 
seasonal item, however fresh farm produce, sold within the intermountain region harvest 
season, is allowed. Food pertaining to farmers' markets and farm sales are regulated 
separately. 
Setback: See defi nition of Yard. 
"Sewage treatment plant" means a licensed facility that purifies san itary sewer effluent to a 
minimum level as established by state and/or federal environmental protection agencies. 
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"Sexually oriented business" means any business for which a sexually oriented business 
license is required as an adult business, nude entertainment business, or as a seminude 
dancing bar, pursuant to the sexually oriented business licensing requirements in chaRter 
5.61_of this code. (See section 21A.36.140 of this title.) 
"Shopping center" means a concentration of related commercial establishments with one or 
more major anchor tenants, shared parking, and unified architectural and site design. A 
shopping center normally has single or coordinated ownership/ operations/management 
control and may include pad site as well as architecturally connected units. 
"Shopping center pad site" means a separate parcel of land designated in the shopping 
center plan as a building site. The pad site may not be owned by the shopping center 
owner. 
Side Yard : See definition of Yard, Side. 
"Sight distance triangle" means a triangular area formed by a diagonal line connecting two 
(2) points located on intersecting right of way lines (or a right of way line and the edge of a 
driveway). For both residential driveways and nonresidential driveways, the points shall be 
determined through the site plan review process by the development review team. The 
purpose of the sight distance triangle is to define an area in which vis ion obstructions are 
prohibited. (See illustration in section 21A.62 . 0~50 of this chapter.) 
Single~Family Dwelling: See definition of Dwelling, Single-Family. 
"Site development permit" means a permit for earth work or site preparation required 
pursuant to chapter 18.28 of this code. 
"Site plan" means an accurately scaled plan that illustrates the existing cond itions on a land 
parcel and the details of a proposed development. 
"Sketch plan review" means a preliminary review process administered by the development 
review administrator or designee for the purpose of determining the required standard for 
front or corner side yard; building height and wall height, width and placement of attached 
garages; and the location, building height and footprint of accessory structures prior to the 
formal submittal of plans to obtain a building permit. 
"Sludge" means any solid , semisolid or liqu id waste, including grit and screenings 
generated from a municipal , commercial or industrial wastewater treatment plant or water 
supply treatment plant or air pollution control facility or any other such use having similar 
characteristics. 
"Snow cone and shaved ice hut" means a temporary bui lding designed to accommodate 
the sales of flavored ice only. 
"Social service mission" means an establishment that provides social services other than 
on site housing faci lities. 
"Solid waste transfer station" means a facility used to combine and compact loads of solid 
waste into larger units of waste, which are then loaded onto trucks for delivery to landfill 
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sites. 
"Special purpose districts" means zoning districts which require regulations that address 
special types of land uses, such as the airport or institutional uses. 
"Spot zoning" means the process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use 
classification materially different and inconsistent with the surrounding area and the 
adopted city master plan, for the sole benefit of the owner of that property and to the 
detriment of the rights of other property owners. 
"Stable, private" means a detached building for the keeping of horses owned by the 
occupants of the premises and not kept for remuneration, hire or sale. 
"Stable, public" means a building or land where animals are kept for remuneration, hire , 
sale, boarding, riding or show. 
"Store, conventional department" means a retail business which offers a broad range of 
merchandise lines at moderate level price points, consisting of primarily apparel and home 
goods. No merchandise line predominates and goods are displayed in a departmentalized 
format. Customer assistance is provided in each department, but checkout facilities can be 
either departmentalized or centralized. These stores are typically over one hundred 
thousand (100,000) square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to , Kohls, J.C. 
Penney and Mervyn's, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13, 2004. 
"Store, fashion oriented department" means a retail business which offers more specialized 
lines of merchandise than conventional department stores, with an emphasis on apparel 
merchandise. The merchandise is displayed in separate departments, with over forty 
percent (40%) of sales area devoted to the sale of apparel, shoes, cosmetics and 
accessories related to personal care and appearance. Fashion oriented department stores 
sell goods which are primarily nationally advertised brands, they may sell appliances which 
are usually serviced by other companies, and often offer limited lines of merchandise 
through seasonal or special catalogs. These stores provide checkout service and customer 
assistance (salespersons) within each department. These stores are typically over one 
hundred thousand (100,000) square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to, 
Meier & Frank, Bloomingdales, Macy's, Dillards, Marshall Fields, Bon Marche, Broadway, 
Broadway Southwest, Robinsons/May, as such stores are typically configured as of 
January 13, 2004. 
"Store, mass merchandising" means a retail business selling a variety of merchandise, 
including apparel and home goods, at generally lower price points. Mass merchandising 
stores have fast turnover and high volume retailing with centralized checkout stations. 
Generally, shopping carts are available to customers and there is reduced customer 
assistance within each department but customer assistance may occur in departments for 
special promotions or where appropriate for product demonstration, legal compliance or 
security purposes. These stores typically exceed eighty thousand (80,000) square feet in 
size. Examples include, but are not limited to, Wal-Mart, K-Mart, Target, Fred Meyer and 
ShopKo, as such stores are typica lly configured as of January 13, 2004. 
"Store, specialty" means a retail business specializing in a broad range of a single category 
of goods at competitive prices. The categories usually included are home improvement, 
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consumer music and electronics, office supply, auto aftermarket, computers, toys, books, 
home/bed/bath, pet supply, craft! hobby, or sporting goods. They often have departments, 
centralized and/or exit checkout stations and operate in various physical formats. These 
stores typically range from twenty thousand (20,000) to one hundred thousand (100,000) 
square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to, The Home Depot, OfficeMax, 
Toys 'R' Us, PetsMart, Michaels, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Borders Books, Barnes & Noble, 
Circuit City, Galyan's, Sports Authority, Pep Boys, and CompUSA, as such stores are 
typically configured as of January 13, 2004. 
"Store, specialty fashion department" means a retail business which specializes in high end 
merchandise in the categories of apparel, fashion accessories, jewelry, and limited items 
for the home and housewares. These stores feature exclusive offerings of merchandise, 
high levels of customer service and amenities, and higher price points. Specialty fashion 
department stores provide checkout service and customer assistance (salespersons) within 
each department and often offer specialized customer services such as valet parking, 
exclusive dressing rooms and personal shoppers. These stores typically range from eighty 
thousand (80,000) to one hundred thirty thousand (130,000) square feet in size. Examples 
include, but are not limited to, Lord & Taylor, Neiman Marcus, Nordstrom, Saks Fifth 
Avenue, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13, 2004. 
"Store, superstore and hypermarket" means a retail business primarily engaged in retailing 
a general line of groceries in combination with general lines of new merchandise, such as 
apparel, furniture, and appliances, sold at discount prices. They have centralized exit 
checkout stations, and utilize shopping carts for customers. These stores typically range 
from one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) to one hundred eighty thousand (180,000) 
square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to , Wal-Mart Supercenter, 
Meijer's, Fred Meyer (with grocery) and Super Target, as such stores are typically 
configured as of January 13, 2004. 
"Store, warehouse club" means a retail business requiring patron membership, and selling 
packaged and bulk foods and general merchandise. They are characterized by high volume 
and a restricted line of popular merchandise in a no frills environment. They have 
centralized exit checkout stations, and utilize shopping carts for customers. These stores 
typically range from one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) to one hundred fifty thousand 
(150,000) square feet in size. Examples include, but are not limited to, BJ's Wholesale 
Club, Costeo, and Sam's Club, as such stores are typically configured as of January 13, 
2004. 
"Story (floor)" means the vertical distance between the finished floor of one level and the 
finished floor of the level above or below. 
Story, Half: "Hal f story" means the portion of a building which contains habitable living 
space with in the roof structure of a shed, hip or gable roof. The portion of a building which 
contains habitable living space within the roof structure of a mansard, gambrel or fl at roof 
constitutes one full story, not one-half (1 /2) story. 
"Street" means a vehicularway which may also serve for all or part of its width as a way for 
pedestrian traffic, whether ca lled street, highway, thoroughfare , parkway, throughway, road, 
avenue, boulevard, lane, place, alley, mall or otherwise designated. 
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"Street frontage" means all of the property fronting on one side of the street between 
intersecting streets, or between a street and a waterway, a dead end street, or a political 
subdivision boundary, and having unrestricted vehicular and pedestrian access to the 
street. For the purpose of regulating signs or flags, "street frontage" means an entire lot 
fronting on a portion of the street. 
"Street trees" means trees located in the landscape area within a public way located 
between the back of the street curb and the sidewalk, or in absence of the sidewalk, the 
right of way line. 
"Structural alteration" means any change in the supporting members of a structure , such as 
foundations, bearing walls or bearing partitions, columns, beams or girder, or any 
substantial change in the roof. 
"Structure" means anything constructed or erected with a fixed location on the ground or 
inlover the water bodies in the city. Structure includes, but is not limited to, buildings, 
fences, walls, signs, and piers and docks, along with any objects permanently attached to 
the structure. 
Structure, Accessory: See definition of Accessory building or structure. 
"Subdivision" means any land that is divided, resubdivided or proposed to be divided into 
two (2) or more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of land for the purpose, 
whether immediate or future, for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment 
plan or upon any and all other plans, terms, and conditions. 
TV Antenna: See definition of Antenna, TV. 
"Tavern" means any business establishment engaged primarily in the retail sale or 
distribution of beer to public patrons for consumption on the establishment's premises, and 
that includes beer bars, parlors, lounges, cabarets and nightclubs. 
"Temporary use" means a use intended for limited duration as defined for each type of 
temporary use in part IV, chapter 21A.42 of this title. 
"Testing laboratory" means a use engaged in determining the physical qualities of 
construction, medical or manufactured materials. This use does not include research 
laboratories engaged in scientific experimentation. 
Transitional Treatment Home, Large: "Large transitional treatment home" means a 
residential facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed 
by the state of Utah, that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision and a peer 
support structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the social and behavioral skills 
necessary to live independently in the community. Such programs provide supervision, 
counseling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provide specialized 
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with emotional , psychological, 
developmental, behavioral dysfunctions or impairments. A large transitional treatment 
home shall not include any persons referred by the Utah state department of corrections. 
Transitional Treatment Home, Small: "Small transitional treatment home" means a 
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residential facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the 
state of Utah, that provides twenty four (24) hour staff supervision and a peer support 
structure to help applicants acquire and strengthen the social and behavioral skills 
necessary to live independently in the community. Such programs provide supervision, 
counseling and therapy through a temporary living arrangement and provide specialized 
treatment, habilitation or rehabilitation services for persons with emotional, psychological , 
developmental, behavioral dysfunctions or impairments. A small transitional treatment 
home shall not include any persons referred by the Utah state department of corrections. 
Transitional Victim Home, Large: "Large transitional victim home" means a residential 
facility for seven (7) or more unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state 
of Utah as a residential support facility. A large transitional victim home provides twenty 
four (24) hour care and peer support to help victims of abuse or crime. A large transitional 
victim home arranges for or provides the necessities of life and protective services to 
individuals or families who are experiencing a temporary dislocation or emergency which 
prevents them from providing these services for themselves or for their families. Treatment 
is not a necessary component of residential support services, however, care shall be made 
available on request. 
Transitional Victim Home, Small: "Small transitional victim home" means a residential 
facility for up to six (6) unrelated persons, exclusive of staff, and licensed by the state of 
Utah as a residential support facility. A small transitional victim home provides twenty four 
(24) hour care and peer support to help victims of abuse or crime. A small transitional 
victim home arranges for or provides the necessities of life and protective services to 
individuals or families who are experiencing a temporary dislocation or emergency which 
prevents them from providing these services for themselves or for their families. Treatment 
is not a necessary component of residential support services, however, care shall be made 
available on request. 
"Trellis" means a frame of latticework designed to support plants. 
Truck Repair, Large: "Large truck repair" means a use engaged in the repair of trucks that 
are in excess of one ton in size. 
Two-Family Dwelling: See definition of Dwelling , Two-Family. 
"Undevelopable area" means the portion of a lot that is unusable for or not adaptable to the 
normal uses made of the property, which may include areas covered by water, areas that 
are excessively steep, included in certain types of easements , or otherwise not suitable for 
development, including areas designated on a plat as undevelopable. 
"Unique residential population" means occupants of a residential facility who are unlikely to 
drive automobiles requiring parking spaces for reasons such as age, or physical or mental 
disabilities. 
"Unit" means the physical elements or space or time period of a condominium project which 
are to be owned or used separately, and excludes common areas and facilities as defined 
in section 57-8-3, Utah Code Annotated , 1953, as amended, or its successor. (See part V, 
chapter 21A.56 of this title.) 
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"Unit legalizationdimensional zoning violations" means the violations of the city's zoning 
code related to side yards, rear yards, front yard setbacks, lot area and width, usable open 
space, building height and other violations. 
"Unit legalization implied permit" means a permit for construction which either specifically is 
for the construction of a particular number of units in excess of what should have been 
allowed or which references that the structure has a number of units in excess of what 
should have been allowed or the city's continuous issuance of an apartment business 
revenue license for a number of units in excess of what should have been allowed. 
"Unit legalizationnondimensional zoning violations" means violations not related to 
dimensional zoning violations, including the existence of illegal signs, front and side yard 
parking, hard surface driveways, fences, accessory buildings and similar such violations. 
"Unit legalization permit" means a permit issued for construction by the city. 
"Unit legalizationsubstantial compliance with life and safety codes" means all units, and the 
building in which they are located, are constructed and maintained in such a manner that 
they are not an imminent threat to the life, safety or health of the occupants or the public. 
"Upholstery shop" means a business specializing in the upholstery of furniture for individual 
customers for residential, office or business use, but excluding upholstery for automobile 
use. 
Use, Principal: "Principal use" means the main use of land and/or buildings on a lot as 
distinguished from an accessory use. 
Use, Unique Nonresidential: "Unique nonresidential use" means the nonresidential use of a 
building resulting in a documented need for fewer parking stalls than would otherwise be 
required by chapter 21AA4 of this title, due to the building's particular design, size, use, or 
other factors and unique characteristics. 
"Used or occupied" include the words intended, designed or arranged to be used or 
occupied. 
"Vacant lot" means a lot in an established area or neighborhood which at the present time 
contains no structures or other aboveground improvements. In new residential 
subdivisions, lots which contain no structures or other aboveground improvements shall be 
considered vacant, as opposed to undeveloped land, when ninety percent (90%) or more of 
the total number of lots in the subdivis ion have been built upon and the remaining lots are 
scattered throughout the subdivision. 
"Van pool" means a mode of transportation where two (2) or more persons share a ride in a 
van to or from work. 
Vanpool, Employer Sponsored: "Employer sponsored vanpool" means a program offered 
by a business or in conjunction with the Utah transit authority to provide a multipassenger 
van for employee tran sportation. 
"Variance" means a reasonable deviation from those provis ions regulating the size or area 
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of a lot or parcel of land , or the size, area, bulk or location of a building or structure under 
this title and authorized according to the procedures set forth in part II, chapter 21 A.18 of 
this title. 
"Vegetation" means living plant material including, but not limited to, trees, shrubs, flowers, 
grasses, herbs and groundcover. 
"Vending cart" includes any non motorized mobile device or pushcart from which limited 
types of products, as listed in title 5, chapter 5.65 of this code, are sold or offered for sale 
directly to any consumer, where the point of sale is conducted at the cart, where the 
duration of the sale is longer than fourteen (14) days and where the vending cart meets the 
requirements of title 5, chapter 5.65 of this code for the conducting of business in a 
specified permit operating area approved by the city. 
"Vertical clearance" means clear space between floor grade level and ceiling height. 
Veterinary Office, Large: "Large veterinary office" means a veterinary facility that serves 
large animals, either wild or domesticated, such as sheep, goats, cows, pigs, horses, 
llamas, wildcats, bears or other similarly sized animals. 
Veterinary Office, Small: "Small veterinary office" means a veterinary facility that serves 
only small animals such as dogs, cats, birds, rabbits, reptiles, rodents and other similarly 
sized animals. 
"Warehouse" means a structure, or part thereof, or area used principally for the storage of 
goods and merchandise. 
"Waterbody/waterway" means a natural or manmade body of water such as a lake, river, 
creek, stream, canal, or other channel over which water flows at least periodically. 
"Wholesale distributors" means a business that maintains an inventory of materials, 
supplies and goods related to one or more industries and sells bulk quantities of materials, 
supplies and goods from its inventory to companies within the industry. A wholesale 
distributor is not a retail goods establishment. 
"Yard" means on the same zoning lot with a use, building or structure, an open space 
which is unoccupied and unobstructed from its ground level to the sky, except as otherwise 
permitted herein. A yard extends along a lot line, and to a depth or width specified in the 
yard requirements for the zoning district in which such zoning lot is located. 
Yard , Corner Side: "Corner side yard" means a yard on a corner lot extending between 
front yard setback line and the rear lot line and between the corner side lot line and the 
required corner side ya rd setback line. 
Yard, Front: "F ront yard" means a yard extending between side lot lines and between the 
front lot line and the required front yard setback line. 
Yard, Interior Side: "Interior side yard" means a yard extending between the front and rear 
yard setback lines and between the interior side lot line and the required interior side yard 
setback line. 
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Yard, Rear: "Rear yard" means a yard extending between the two (2) interior side lot lines 
from the rear lot line to the required rear yard setback line. In the case of corner lots, the 
rear yard shall extend from the interior side lot line to the front yard or corner side yard 
setback line. 
Yard, Side: See definition of Yard, Interior Side. 
"Zoning administrator" means the director of the division of building services and licensing 
of the department of community development or such person as the zoning administrator 
shall designate. 
"Zoning districts" means areas of the city designated in the text of this title in which 
requirements and standards for the use of land and buildings are prescribed. 
Zoning Lot: See definition of Lot. 
"Zoning map" means a map or series of maps delineating the boundaries of all zoning 
districts and overlay districts in the city. (Ord. 68-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 52-06 § 2, 2006: Ord. 
20-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 13-06 § 1,2006: Ord. 90-05 § 2 (Exh. B), 2005: Ord. 89-05 § 9, 
2005: Ord. 77-05 § 1, 2005: Ord. 76-05 § 10,2005: Ord. 15-05 §§ 3, 4, 2005: Ord. 72-04 § 
2,2004: Ord. 6-04 § 20, 2004: Ord. 4-04 §§ 6,7,2004: Ord. 62-03 § 3, 2003: Ord. 61-03 § 
3,2003: Ord. 6-03 § 4,2003: Ord. 50-02 § 2, 2002: Ord. 23-02 § 8, 2002: Ord. 5-02 § 4, 
2002: Ord. 2-02 § 2, 2002: Ord. 84-01 § 2, 2001: Ord. 64-01 § 4, 2001: Ord. 20-01 § 4, 
2001: Ord. 54-00 § 3, 2000: Ord. 20-00 §§ 4,5,2000: Ord. 14-00 §§ 16-18, 2000: Ord. 35-
99 § 102,1999: Ord. 30-98 § 7,1998: Ord. 12-98 § 8,1998: Ord. 8-97 § 3,1997: amended 
during 5/96 supplement: Ord. 88-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord. 84-95 § 1 (Exh. A), 1995: Ord. 
26-95 § 2(31-4),1995) 
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21 A.16.01 0 Authority: 
As described in section 21 A.06.040 of this part, the board of adjustment should hear and 
decide appeals alleging an error in any administrative decision made by the zoning 
administrator or the administrative hearing officer in the administration or enforcement of this 
title. (Ord. 90-05 § 2 (Exh. B), 2005: Ord. 26-95 § 2(8-1), 1995) 
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21A.16.020 Parties Entitled To Appeal: 
An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or 
interpreting this title may appeal to the board of adjustment. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-2), 1995) 
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21A.16.030 Procedure: 
Appeals of administrative decisions to the board of adjustment shall be taken in accordance 
with the following procedures: 
A. Notice Of Appeal: Notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the administrative 
decision. The appeal shall be filed with the zoning administrator and shall specify the 
decision appealed and the reasons the appellant claims the decision to be in error. 
B. Fees: Nonrefundable application and hearing fees established pursuant to the fee schedule 
shall accompany the notice of appeal. 
C. Stay Of Proceeding: 'An appeal to the board of adjustment shall stay all further 
proceedings concerning the matter about which the appealed order, requirement, decision , 
determination or interpretation was made unless the zoning administrator certifies in writing 
to the board of adjustment, after the notice of appeal has been filed, that a stay would, in 
the zoning administrator's opinion, be against the best interest of the city. 
D. Public HearingNotice: Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board of adjustment shall 
give notice and hold a public hearing in accordance with the requirements of chaQter 
21 A.1 0 of this part. 
E. Action By The Board Of Adjustment: Following the hearing, the board of adjustment shall 
render its decision on the appeal. Such decision may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or 
may modify the administrative decision. The board of adjustment may reverse or materially 
modify the zoning administrator's or the administrative hearing officer's decision only if at 
least three (3) members of the board of adjustment vote in favor of such an action. A 
decision by the board of adjustment shall become effective the date the vote is taken. 
F. Notification Of Decision: Notification of the decision of the board of adjustment shall be 
sent by mail to all parties of the proceed ing within ten (10) days of the board of 
adjustment's decision. (Ord. 90-05, 2005: Ord. 26-95 § 2(8-3), 1995) 
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21A.16.040 Appeal Of Decision: 
Any person adversely affected by any decision of the board of adjustment may. with in thirty 
(30) days after the decision is made, present to the district court a petition specifying the 
grounds on which the person was adversely affected. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-4),1995) 
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21A.16.050 Stay Of Decision: 
By a two-thirds (2/3) majority vote at the time of any decision, the board of adjustment may 
stay the issuance of any permits or approvals based on its decision for thirty (30) days or until 
the decision of the district court in any appeal of the decision. (Ord . 26-95 § 2(8-5), 1995) 
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